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For most of the first two decades after the Velvet Revolution, the party was politically isolated and accused of extremism, but later moved closer to the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD). After the 2012 Czech regional elections, KSČM began governing in coalition with the ČSSD in 10 regions. It has never been part of a governing coalition in the executive branch but provided parliamentary support to Andrej Babiš' Second Cabinet until April 2021. The party's youth organization was banned from 2006 to 2010, and there have been calls from other parties to outlaw the main party. Until 2013, it was the only political party in the Czech Republic printing its own newspaper, Haló noviny, since replaced by the weekly Naše pravda. The party's two cherry logo comes from the song Le Temps des cerises, a revolutionary song associated with the Paris Commune.
History
The party was formed in 1989 by a congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), which decided to create a party for the territories of Bohemia and Moravia (including Czech Silesia), the areas that were to become the Czech Republic. The new party's organization was significantly more democratic and decentralized than the previous party, and gave local district branches of the party significant autonomy.
In 1990, KSČ was reorganized as a federation of KSČM and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). Later, KSS changed its name to the Party of the Democratic Left, and the federation dissolved in 1992. During the party's first congress, held in Olomouc in October 1990, party leader Jiří Svoboda attempted to reform the party into a democratic socialist one, proposing a democratic socialist program and changing the name to the transitional Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia: Party of Democratic Socialism. Svoboda had to balance the criticisms of older, conservative communists, who made up a majority of the party's members, with the demands of an increasingly large and moderate bloc of members, led primarily by a group of young KSČM parliamentarians called the Democratic Left, who demanded the immediate social democratization of the party. Delegates approved the new program but rejected the name change.
During 1991 and 1992, factional tensions increased, with the party's conservative, anti-revisionist wing increasingly vocal in criticizing Svoboda. There was an increase in popularity of the anti-revisionist Marxist–Leninist clubs amongst rank-and-file party members. On the party's other wing, the Democratic Left became increasingly critical of the slow pace of the reforms and began demanding a referendum of members to change the name. In December 1991, the Democratic Left split off and formed the short-lived Party of Democratic Labour. The referendum on changing the name was held in 1992, with 75.94% voting not to change the name.
The party's second congress, held in Kladno in December 1992, showed the increasing popularity of the party's anti-revisionist wing. It passed resolutions reinterpreting the 1990 program as a "starting point" for KSČM, rather than a definitive statement of a post-communist program. Svoboda, who was hospitalized due to an attack by an anti-communist, could not attend the congress but was nevertheless overwhelmingly re-elected. After the party's second congress in 1992, several groups split away. A group of post-communist delegates split off and merged with the Party of Democratic Labour to form the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). Several independent left-wing members who had participated with KSČM in the 1992 electoral pact, which was called the Left Bloc, left the party to form the Left Bloc Party. Both groups eventually merged into the Party of Democratic Socialism.
In 1993, Svoboda attempted to expel the members of the "For Socialism" platform, a group in the party that wanted a restoration of the pre-1989 Communist regime; however, with only the lukewarm support of KSČM's central committee, he briefly resigned. He withdrew his resignation after the central committee agreed to move the party's next congress forward to June 1993 to resolve the issues of its name and ideology. At the 1993 congress, held in Prostějov, Svoboda's proposals were overwhelmingly rejected by two-thirds majorities. Svoboda did not seek re-election as chairman, and neocommunistMiroslav Grebeníček was elected chairman. Grebeníček and his supporters were critical of what they termed the inadequacies of the pre-1989 regime but supported the retention of the party's communist character and program. The members of the "For Socialism" platform were expelled at the congress, with the existence of platforms in the party being banned altogether, on the grounds that they gave too much influence to minority groups. Svoboda left the party.
"Conservative elements within the KSČM" were described as dominating the party's May 2004 Congress. The expelled members of "For Socialism" formed the Party of Czechoslovak Communists, later renamed the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which was led by Miroslav Štěpán. KSČM refuses to work with this group. The party was left on the sidelines for most of the first decade of the Czech Republic's existence. Václav Havel suspected KSČM was still an unreconstructed neo-Stalinist party and prevented it from having any influence during his presidency; however, the party provided the one-vote margin that elected Havel's successor Václav Klaus as president. After a long-running battle with the Ministry of the Interior, the Communist Youth Union led by Milan Krajča, was dissolved in 2006 for allegedly endorsing in its program the replacement of private with collective ownership of the means of production. The decision met with international protests.
In November 2008, the Czech Senate asked the Supreme Administrative Court to dissolve KSČM because of its political program, which the Senate argued contradicted the Constitution of the Czech Republic. 30 out of the 38 senators who were present agreed to this request, and expressed the view that the party's program did not reject violence as a means of attaining power and adopted The Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx. However, this was only a symbolic gesture, as according to the constitution only the cabinet may file a petition to the Supreme Administrative Court to dissolve a political party. For the first two decades after the end of communist rule in Czechoslovakia, the party was politically isolated. After the 2012 Czech regional elections, it started participating in coalitions with the Czech Social Democratic Party, forming part of the ruling coalition in 10 out of 13 regions. From 2018 to 2021, KSČM provided parliamentary support to Andrej Babiš' second cabinet.
After the party's poor performance in the 2021 Czech parliamentary election, in which KSČM failed to reach the 5% voting threshold and was excluded from representation in parliament for the first time in its history, Filip resigned as leader of the party. On 23 October 2021, Member of European Parliament Kateřina Konečná was elected as leader. In 2025, the Czech government passed an amendment to the national criminal code that introduces up to five years of prison for anyone who "establishes, supports or promotes Nazi, communist, or other movements which demonstrably aim to suppress human rights and freedoms or incite racial, ethnic, national, religious or class-based hatred". KSČM condemned the law, describing it as an attempt "to push KSČM outside the law and intimidate critics of the current regime". The amendment will come to force in 2026; it is not clear how the amendment will affect the party – in an interview with Novinky.cz, constitutional lawyer Jan Kysela argued that while KSČM's existence might not be in danger, the law could result in legal actions against its members.
In the 2025 Czech parliamentary election, the party's coalition Stačilo! won 4.3% of the vote, unexpectedly falling below the 5% electoral threshold necessary to win seats, despite some polls giving it over 7% days before the election. Reacting to the results, Kateřina Konečná stated that Stačilo! would continue despite the defeat, hoping that "left-wing issues will find their representation in all future elections." The party chair Daniel Sterzik declared that he would discuss his position with the party's board. The former deputy chairman of KSČM, Jiří Dolejš, attributed the party's failure to a "forced merger with SOCDEM".
In November 2025, the party appealed to the Constitutional Court to repeal the amendment to the Criminal Code, describing it an "unreasonable interference with political rights and freedoms" that "would allow for the prosecution of the propaganda of communism". However, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal in December due to "unjusticiability of the petitioner". Numerous approaches to the law were considered by KSČM, including renaming the party, dissolving it, or renaming it to Stačilo!; ultimately, the party's November congress decided to retain the party's name and re-elected Kateřina Konečná as the party's leader, despite the electoral failure in October election. At the congress, the party delegates also passed a resolution "strongly rejecting the criminalization of supporters of the communist movement enshrined in the amended Criminal Code." The amendment to the Criminal Code became effective on 1 January 2026. KSČM and Stačilo! continued to exist as political parties.
On 30 May 2026, the party's spokesperson Roman Roun was elected as leader, beating vice-chair Milan Krajča in the second round of voting. In the 2026 Czech municipal elections, the party's coalition Ostravská levice won 1.69% of the vote, and lost its representation in the Ostrava city council for the first time in 81 years. On 21 October 2026, MEP Konečná announced that she had joined the far-right Patriots for Europe political group. Konečná's decision triggered significant internal backlash within the KSČM. Krajča openly condemned the move, stating that the decision had not been discussed with the party leadership. Krajča described the alignment with a right-wing and anti-communist political group as a fundamental political mistake, pointing out the group's ideological contradictions with the KSČM's positions on international policy. The head of the Prague Regional Committee, Petra Prokšanová, stated that no communist should join a political group which supports 'the genocide of the Palestinian people or the destabilization of socialist Cuba'. KSČM leader Roman Roun convened a meeting of the party's executive committee for 27 October.
Ideology
Political alignment of Czech political parties on a two-dimensional spectrum. In the TAN/GAL (sociocultural) dimension, KSČM is shown as more TAN (socially conservative) than KDU-ČSL.
As a communist party and the successor of the former ruling Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, its party platform promotes anti-capitalism and socialism. Unlike other communist parties in post-communist Europe, KSČM "refused to break away with its communist past and largely preserved its Marxist agenda". The party is also described as national communist. It is classified as a radical left party. It holds Eurosceptic views in regards to the European Union, and has been described as pro-Russian, pro-Chinese, left-authoritarian in that it "combines cultural conservativism with an economic left-wing stance", nativist, and left-conservative. It is conservative on sociocultural matters. The Green European Journal described it as "culturally conservative, Islamophobic, and anti-EU, with many pro-Russian and openly far-right personalities in its ranks." Ideologically, the party is very similar to Slovak Smer and German BSW. Political scientist Luke March also compares it to the Russian KPRF:
In particular, they are relatively weakly influenced by post-68 new left ideas or Eurocommunism, and some evidence of environmentalism in KSCM and KPRF platforms notwithstanding, these two parties remain far more socially conservative, materialist, and national-chauvinist than more reformist parties such as Rifondazione and even the PCF.
The party's platform is considered to be based on key tenets of socialist ideology, as it supports the re-nationalization of the water, gas, electricity and transportation industries, the expansion of worker cooperatives, and the introduction of communally-owned firms based on the economic model of socialist Czechoslovakia. The party argues that everyone should have a guaranteed right to a job, receiving a salary that corresponds to how demanding the job is, and that the minimum wage should correspond to half the national average income. KSČM also promotes a system of non-profit hospitals and a single state-owned health insurance company. It says it would be willing to participate in non-socialist governments as long as its six demands are met: regular increases in both the minimum wage and pensions, expanding public ownership of water utilities, extraction of natural resources only by domestic companies, construction of communal housing, and abolishing patient fees in health care.
Political scientist Maria Snegovaya wrote that "over the years, KSČM adopted a platform reminiscent of those used by populist right parties in other countries: protectionist on the economic dimension, Euroskeptic and nationalist on the sociocultural dimension". It rejects European integration as "capitalist" and "neoliberal", arguing that it is destructive to the living conditions of citizens and ignores social issues. KSČM is considered to be an anti-Western party, and opposes Czech membership of NATO on nationalist grounds, calling NATO "US- and Germany-dominated" and naming it, alongside the Lisbon Treaty, as "a threat to Czech state sovereignty that led to the exploitation of Czech interests by multinational capitalist forces". Party representatives also advocate for the legitimization of the Russian policy towards Ukraine, regarding Crimea as a Russian territory and opposing EU sanctions against Russia. In 2014, KSČM leader Vojtech Filip visited Russia, and party members served as election observers in the Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic.
Regarding the Gaza War, the KSČM "strongly condemns the ongoing aggression of the State of Israel against Lebanon, which follows a year of brutal Israeli aggression in the Palestinian Gaza Strip." KSČM is considered "a staunch ally of China, both in domestic and international contexts." Since the 1990s, members of the party have been frequently visiting China on state-organized tours, and the KSČM also attended a conference on Chinese policies in Xinjiang organized by the Chinese Communist Party. The party criticizes the Czech government for its support of Taiwan and "aggressive and interventionist stance on China". It argues that the Czech Republic should instead recognize One China principle and also accuses 'US-funded NGOs' on shaping the Czech foreign policy. Along with Russia and China, KSČM also expressed support for Cuba, Venezuela, and Belarus.
The party has been described as embracing "a socially conservative and nationalist platform in the democratic era". On the GAL-TAN (green/alternative/libertarian vs. traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) dimension used to measure sociocultural values, the KSČM is "a radical left party both in terms of its general positioning and economic stances, but characterised by holding traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) views." It was described as illiberal, and its sociocultural views are considered to be as TAN as the ones of KDU-ČSL. Jan Rovny of Sciences Po commented on the party: "Its socioeconomic program may be left-wing, but it is otherwise a nationalist, anti-immigrant, very conservative party." According to historian Stanislav Holubec, the party's former newspaper Haló noviny published "nationalistic, Stalinist, authoritarian and homophobic items".
The party does not present an official stance on LGBT issues. In 2014, 20 MPs from ODS, VV, LIDEM, ČSSD, TOP 09 and KSČM drafted an unsuccessful amendment to allow stepchild adoption within same-sex registered partnerships. In June 2018, 46 MPs from ANO, ČSSD, the Pirate Party, STAN, TOP 09 and KSČM introduced a draft bill to abolish registered partnerships and introduce same-sex marriage. However, the majority of KSČM MPs were opposed to same-sex marriage. Political scientist Tomáš Novotný described the party's view on same-sex marriage as "rather negative", while Balkan Insight wrote that the party is in "staunch opposition" to it. KSČM does not consider gender equality to be a policy aim, and voted against the Antidiscrimination Bill. The party also argues that immigrants are taking advantage of the Czech social system, including economic immigrants. It denounced the EU migration quota system, describing the EU as a "dictatorship" and declaring that the Czechs are "not pupils of Brussels".
After the election of Konečná as the leader of the party in 2021, KSČM "reinforced its image as a Eurosceptic, populist radical-left party, while increasingly shifting towards conservative and nationalist positions, particularly in its criticism of the European Union, migration, and LGBT policies". This was coupled with reinforcing its strongly pro-Russian position and the foundation of Stačilo!, where the party formed an alliance with nationalist-conservative parties which marked "a further departure from its left-wing roots." It is argued that KSČM underwent a "transformation towards a nationalist-populist party". At the same time, while increasingly adopting traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist stances on social issues, the party preserved its economically communist character. Political scientist Michael Perottino argues that KSČM "clearly turned from red to “brown,” becoming less leftist than nationalist" and that the main traits of the party's ideology have become "sovereigntism and nationalism, pro-Russian positions at any cost, and the fight against NATO".
The voter base of KSČM is dominated by blue-collar workers and retired workers; it also preserves strong links to trade union activists, and 57% of its supporters are drawn from trade unions. About 20% of trade unions members are supporters of KSČM. The party's membership and voter structure shows a disproportional share of blue-collar workers, and working-class voters in general. The party's voter base is predominantly those who are dissatisfied with the functioning of Czech democracy, distrust public institutions, or live in areas with high levels of unemployment and crime. It is stronger among older than younger voters, with the majority of its membership over 60. The party is also stronger in small and medium-sized towns than in big cities.
12Kossack, Oliver (2023). Pariahs or Partners? Patterns of Government Formation with Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 1990–2020. Edition Politik. Vol.153. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. p.70. doi:10.14361/9783839467152. ISBN978-3-8394-6715-2. Some of them, such as the Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) or the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), undertook credible reforms and transformed into socialist or social democratic parties, whereas the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) in the Czech Republic maintained their orthodox Communist ideology after 1989.
↑Snegovaya, Maria (2018). Ex-Communist Party Choices and the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe (Doctor of Philosophy thesis). Columbia University. p.129. CORE output ID161515337. Reflecting the party's ideological rigidity, the KSČM platform consistently stressed some of the Marxist dogmas, for example, identifying capitalism as the main disease afflicting world's population and offering to combine the Marxist collectivist goals with democratic objectives.
1234Macek, Lukáš (2025). Juliet Lodge; Julie Smith; Stergios Fotopoulos (eds.). Palgrave Handbook on the 2024 European Parliament Elections. Political Science and International Studies. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. p.172. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-87397-3_12. ISBN978-3-031-87397-3. On the far-left, KSCM's Euroscepticism is mainly based on anti-capitalism, anti-German feelings, and pro-Russian attitudes.
↑Marušiak, Juraj (2021). "The Czech Republic and Slovakia. Changing Perception of the European Integration since 1989". In Ostap Kushnir; Oleksandr Pankieiev (eds.). Meandering in Transition: Thirty Years of Reforms and Identity in Post-Communist Europe. Bloomsbury USA Print. pp.115–116. doi:10.5040/9781666994421.ch-6. As one may see, the Euroskeptic and pro-sovereign moods were much stronger in the Czech society and manifested themselves not only in criticism of some aspects of the EU's functioning, but in the rejection of the very idea of membership. The latter rejection was mostly fostered by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, alongside selected representatives of ODS (e.g., party's vice-chairman Ivan Langer).
Kim, Seongcheol; Borbáth, Endre (2022). "A Typology of Postcommunist Successor Parties in Central and Eastern Europe and an Explanatory Framework for Their (Non-)Success". East Central Europe. 49 (2–3). Brill Publishers: 292. doi:10.30965/18763308-49020007. The KSČM, on the other hand, occupied a socioeconomically left-wing and socioculturally conservative position and benefited electorally from a pronounced oppositional positioning in the wake of Social Democrat-led (ČSSD) governments in particular.
Holubec, Stanislav (2021). "The party is over: the identities and biographies of Czechoslovak and East German (post) communists in the year 1990". In Joachim von Puttkamer; Włodzimierz Borodziej (eds.). From Revolution to Uncertainty: The Year 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge. p.241. ISBN978-1-351-14032-4. He served as party vice-chairman for many years and later as a member of the European Parliament; however, he remained isolated in a prevailingly nostalgic and socially conservative KSČM.
Rohac, Dalibor; Zgut, Edit; Győri, Lóránt (2017). Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair (Report). American Enterprise Institute. p.13. Czech Communists even share with the Kremlin a substantial degree of social conservatism on issues including LGBT rights, in sharp contrast to other left-wing political groups.
March, Luke[in Spanish] (2023). "The Eastern European Context". In Fabien Escalona; Daniel Keith (eds.). The Palgrave Handbook of Radical Left Parties in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. p.583. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56264-7. ISBN978-1-137-56264-7. "As previously noted, the Czech KSČM is widely considered the product of a 'bureaucratic authoritarian communist' regime. This implies that much of its relative strength is historically derived, as a product of its emergence from the powerful interwar workers' movement. Indeed, as Chapter 21 by Handl in this volume argues, the party's residual societal strength long underpinned its social conservatism, and this continued into the post-communist era when the KSČM remained a mass membership party.
Wondreys, Jakub (2020). "The "refugee crisis" and the transformation of the far right and the political mainstream: the extreme case of the Czech Republic". East European Politics. 37 (4). Taylor & Francis Group: 722–746. doi:10.1080/21599165.2020.1856088. p.11: That said, the KSČM has long combined far left socio-economic policies with quite conservative socio-cultural positions, so this is not necessarily out of line with party history.
Císař, Ondřej[in Czech] (2017). "Czech Republic: From Post-Communist Idealism to Economic Populism"(PDF). International Policy Analysis. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. p.8: The most stable among them is the direct heir to the pre-1989 ruling party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), usually classified as an example of »social populism«. The party remains nominally on the left due to its economic program, but it is clearly very authoritarian and conservative in its sociocultural orientation, mirroring the values of predominantly older generations longing for the lost times of real socialism before 1989.
12Josef Bernard; Martin Refisch; Anna Grzelak; Jerzy Banski; Larissa Deppisch; Michal Konopski; Tomáš Kostelecký; Mariusz Kowalski; Andreas Klärner (2025). "Left-behind Regions in Poland, Germany, Czechia: Classification and Electoral Implications"(PDF). Thünen Working Paper (261). KSČM – Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (Communist party of Bohemia and Moravia) is a left-wing conservative populist party, the direct successor of the Communist Party that ruled before 1989, criticizing post-1989 political development and emphasizing social security issues.
12Thomeczek, Jan Philipp (2024). "Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW): Left-Wing Authoritarian—and Populist? An Empirical Analysis". Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 65 (1). Springer: 535–552. doi:10.1007/s11615-024-00544-z. hdl:10419/315570. Her public statements and books indicate that she appeals to the "left-wing authoritarians" (Lefkofridi et al. 2014), namely voters who hold economically left positions but are culturally conservative. [...] According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2019), there are several parties with a similar left-authoritarian profile in Europe. Examples are the Social Democratic Party in Romania (PSD), the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), and far-left parties such as the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM).
12Wondreys, Jakub (2020). "The "refugee crisis" and the transformation of the far right and the political mainstream: the extreme case of the Czech Republic". East European Politics. 37 (4). Taylor & Francis Group: 722–746. doi:10.1080/21599165.2020.1856088. p.11: That said, the KSČM has long combined far left socio-economic policies with quite conservative socio-cultural positions, so this is not necessarily out of line with party history.
12Císař, Ondřej[in Czech] (2017). "Czech Republic: From Post-Communist Idealism to Economic Populism"(PDF). International Policy Analysis. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. p.8: The most stable among them is the direct heir to the pre-1989 ruling party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), usually classified as an example of »social populism«. The party remains nominally on the left due to its economic program, but it is clearly very authoritarian and conservative in its sociocultural orientation, mirroring the values of predominantly older generations longing for the lost times of real socialism before 1989.
12Dvořáková, Petra (30 May 2024). "No Country for Progressive Women: European Elections in Czechia". Green European Journal. The coalition Stačilo! ('Enough!'), led by the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, may gain a seat or two in the European Parliament this year, but this isn't good news for progressives. The Communist Party is culturally conservative, Islamophobic, and anti-EU, with many pro-Russian and openly far-right personalities in its ranks.
↑Kaniok, Petr; Hloušek, Vít (2023). "Czech Political Parties and the War in Ukraine: Continuity of Foreign Policy Stances". East European Politics. 40 (3). Taylor & Francis: 8. doi:10.1080/21599165.2023.2295888. Prior to the elections, the opposition consisted of two newly formed coalitions – Spolu(Together), containing the three centre-right or centre-conservative parties KDU-ČSL, ODSand TOP 09, and the two-party bloc of the Pirates and Mayors and Independents (STAN) –and two established anti-system parties – the far-right SPD and far-left KSČM.
↑Haughton, Tim; Deegan-Krause, Kevin (2020). "Maps and Measures: Assessing Changes in the Composition of Central European Party Systems". The New Party Challenge Changing Cycles of Party Birth and Death in Central Europe and Beyond. Oxford University Press. p.29. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198812920.003.000 (inactive 31 December 2025). ISBN978-0-19-881292-0. Although some parties came and went, particularly in the liberal centre, the party political scene was dominated by a left–right battle between the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social Democrats (ČSSD), with the Christian People's Party (KDU-ČSL) floating between them and the hard-line Communist Party (KSČM) remaining a pariah on the far left (Figure 3.5).{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of December 2025 (link)
↑Hough, Dan; Handl, Vladimír (September 2004). "The post-communist left and the European Union: The Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) and the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 37 (3): 319–339. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2004.06.002.
↑Thompson, Wayne C. (2008). The World Today Series: Nordic, Central and Southeastern Europe 2008. Harpers Ferry, West Virginia: Stryker-Post Publications. ISBN978-1-887985-95-6.
↑Kim, Seongcheol; Borbáth, Endre (2022). "A Typology of Postcommunist Successor Parties in Central and Eastern Europe and an Explanatory Framework for Their (Non-)Success". East Central Europe. 49 (2–3). Brill Publishers: 292. doi:10.30965/18763308-49020007. The KSČM, on the other hand, occupied a socioeconomically left-wing and socioculturally conservative position and benefited electorally from a pronounced oppositional positioning in the wake of Social Democrat-led (ČSSD) governments in particular.
↑James Cronin; George Ross; James Shoch (2011). What's Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times. Durham and London: Duke University Press. p.303. ISBN978-0-8223-5079-8. In a subsequent document the KSČM publicly rejected the practices of former regimes but also put strong emphasis on its aim to create a modern socialist society, which will guarantee real and lasting freedom and equality, regardless of property and social status.
↑March, Luke[in Spanish] (2011). "The fall and (partial) rise of the Eastern European communists". Radical Left Parties in Europe. Routledge. p.78. ISBN978-0-203-15487-8. Moreover, the KSCM's documents show a commitment to a participative and pluralistic socialism.
↑Snegovaya, Maria (2024). When Left Moves Right: The Decline of the Left and the Rise of the Populist Right in Postcommunist Europe. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197699027.001.0001. ISBN978-0-19-769902-7. p.13: I define parties as the traditional left if they constituted the part of the unreformed communist party that refused to break away with its communist past and largely preserved its Marxist agenda. Among the countries studied, only one electorally successful party represents such a clear-cut case: the Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunisticka strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM), the successor to the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the Czech Republic.
↑Engler, Sarah; Pytlas, Bartek; Deegan-Krause, Kevin (2019). "Assessing the diversity of anti-establishment and populist politics in Central and Eastern Europe"(PDF). West European Politics. 42 (6). Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich: 10–11. doi:10.1080/01402382.2019.1596696. Parties with this ideological profile occupy a wide range on the unidimensional left–right spectrum in Figure 2, including the social-conservative right such as Poland's Law and Justice (PiS), the Hungarian Fidesz (Vachudova 2008; Pytlas 2015), nationalist communists (such as the Bulgarian BSP or the Czech KSČM), and even 11 mainstream left parties such as Direction (Smer) in Slovakia or Romania's Social Democratic Party (PSD) (cf. Pop-Eleches 2008; Pytlas 2013).
↑Guasti, Petra; Michal, Aleš (18 June 2025). "Polarization and Democracy in Central Europe". Politics and Governance. 13 9560. doi:10.17645/pag.9560. p.9: In the Czech political landscape, these parties are regarded as moderate, while SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy) is classified as radical right and KSČM (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia) as radical left.
↑Triglavcan, Patrick (2023). "The People's Republic of China: Political perceptions in Central Europe"(PDF). Geopolitics Programme. Council on Geostrategy. p.52: Members of ČSSD and ANO displayed more positive views regarding the PRC and embraced it pragmatically, while KSČM consistently projected a pro-Chinese position throughout the electoral cycles mentioned.
↑Snegovaya, Maria (2024). When Left Moves Right: The Decline of the Left and the Rise of the Populist Right in Postcommunist Europe. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197699027.001.0001. ISBN978-0-19-769902-7. p.206: Populist parties then appealed to such voters by integrating redistributive appeals with their sociocultural conservative nativist stances on the sociocultural dimension. There are different trajectories for parties to get there. While PiS and Fidesz started with cultural conservatism, only later adding redistributionist positions, the Czech KSČM was on the left economically from the start but subsequently adopted nativist positions.
↑March, Luke[in Spanish] (2011). "The fall and (partial) rise of the Eastern European communists". Radical Left Parties in Europe. Routledge. p.93. ISBN978-0-203-15487-8. Moreover, the KSCM's documents show a commitment to a participative and pluralistic socialism.
↑Cirhan, Tomáš; Collini, Mattia (2025). "The crisis of the left in the Czech Republic, a party-elite perspective (KSČM and SOCDEM)". Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review. 25 (1). Bucharest University Press: 155. doi:10.62229/sprps25-1/6. ISSN3008-6566.
↑Pogule, Sijla (2022). "ILGA-Europe: Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe 2014". Czech Republic. ILGA-Europe Annual Review 2014. Corelio Printing: 61. ISBN978-92-95066-11-3.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: periodical has ISBN (link)
↑Novotný, Tomáš (3 May 2022). Stejnopohlavní sňatky jako politické téma v českém veřejném prostoru (Politologie a veřejná politika thesis) (in Czech). Univerzita Karlova. p.15.
↑Novotný, Tomáš (3 May 2022). Stejnopohlavní sňatky jako politické téma v českém veřejném prostoru (Politologie a veřejná politika thesis) (in Czech). Univerzita Karlova. p.35.
↑Gosling, Tim (18 March 2020). "Czech Activists Bang Their Heads Against 'Rainbow Wall'". Balkan Insight. Prague: BIRN. The centrist Pirates and small centre-right Stan are the only parties to show solid support. Staunch opposition is found on the part of the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy, the Communist party and the Christian Democrat KDU-CSL.
↑Vendula, Ženatá (August 2015). Political Discourse on Immigration in the Czech Republic: A Critical Analysis(PDF) (Master in International Relations thesis). Anglo-American University. pp.154–155. This theme of immigrants' taking advantage of our social system is present in the case of KSČM and the Dawn of Direct democracy, with the difference that in the case of these parties, economic immigrants are portrayed as all draining the social system (whereas the Social Democrats point out that only those unqualified do). [...] it is evident that some parties typecast all economic migrants as a drain on our social system (above all KSČM and Úsvit).
12Cirhan, Tomáš; Collini, Mattia (2025). "The crisis of the left in the Czech Republic, a party-elite perspective (KSČM and SOCDEM)". Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review. 25 (1). Bucharest University Press: 153. doi:10.62229/sprps25-1/6. ISSN3008-6566.
↑Snegovaya, Maria (2018). Ex-Communist Party Choices and the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe (Doctor of Philosophy thesis). Columbia University. p.131. CORE output ID161515337.
Bozóki, András; Ishiyama, John (2002). The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Routledge. ISBN978-0-7656-0986-1.
Further reading
Hough, Dan; Paterson, William E.; Sloam, James, eds. (2005). Learning from the West? Policy Transfer and Programmatic Change in the Communist Successor Parties of East Central Europe. Routledge. ISBN978-0-415-37316-6.
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