Election official

An election official, election officer, election judge, election clerk or poll worker is an official responsible for the proper and orderly voting at polling stations. Depending on the country or jurisdiction, election officials may be identified as members of a political party or non-partisan. They are generally volunteers or paid a small stipend for their work. Each polling station is staffed with multiple officials. The duties include signing in registered voters, explaining voting procedure and use of voting equipment, providing ballots, and monitoring the conduct of the election.

In US states with Election Day voter registration, they also register unregistered voters on election day. In most other countries, however, voters do not need to register, all citizens being automatically included in the lists of eligible voters. Depending on the jurisdiction, election officials are chosen by a board of elections, county official (such as the county clerk or county auditor), city or township official (such as a city clerk), the federal state, or a national committee.

In California, poll workers can be any citizen who requests the job at least two months prior to an election. Inspectors and site supervisors receive a minimum of two training classes, and clerks are required to attend a training class within two weeks of the election, with additional certification classes for any machine or technological devices to be used. These classes cover a wide range of topics, including opening and closing of the polls, which color pen to use on which paper, dealing with irate voters, and the rare times when a voter can be challenged.

In Pennsylvania three poll workers in each election division are elected by their neighbors for a four year term. These poll workers are elected in the year following the US Presidential election (e.g., 2017, 2021, etc.)

In 41 of the 50 United States, high school students can serve as student election judges. Each state has its own set of requirements for students to serve as poll workers, but generally, students must be in good academic standing at their school and meet the particular age or grade conditions.

The period during and after the 2020 United States presidential election saw an unprecedented rise in threats and harassment directed at election officials fueled by disproven claims that election officials had been complicit in a conspiracy to steal the presidential election from Donald Trump.

Prominent examples:

• Georgia election workers Ruby Freeman and her daughter Wandrea' Moss were driven from their home by death threats after being falsely accused by Trump advisor Rudy Giuliani of manipulating vote tallies. Freeman and Moss subsequently won a defamation judgment against Giuliani.
• After Trump falsely claimed that then-Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt, a Republican, "refuse[d] to look at a mountain of corruption & dishonesty" in the city, Schmidt received graphic threats against his family.
• After a standoff with Arizona Senate Republicans over the handling of post-election voting materials, Republican Maricopa County Supervisor Bill Gates and his family were subject to explicit death threats, and Gates was hospitalized for treatment of PTSD.
• Following the phone call in which President Trump pressured Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to "find 11,780 votes" and overturn the state's 2020 election results, Raffensperger and his family received death threats and "disgusting sexualized texts." The home of his daughter-in-law and two grandchildren was invaded by supporters of the president, and the home of Raffensperger's chief operating officer Gabriel Sterling was swatted.
• Threatening letters, some containing fentanyl, were mailed to elections offices in at least five states in November 2023, with some including messages such as "End elections now."

As much as two years after the 2020 election, some election officials have reported varying their routes to their homes and offices to avoid being followed, training in de-escalation techniques, and upgrading their home security systems. The profession as a whole has experienced an unparalleled exodus. A study by the Bipartisan Policy Center and UCLA found a four-year turnover rate of 39% for election officials in 2022.

In Fall 2021, Democratic election law attorney Robert Bauer (White House Counsel during the Obama Administration) and Republican election law attorney Benjamin Ginsberg (national counsel to the George W. Bush 2000 presidential campaign) launched the Election Official Legal Defense Network (EOLDN), a service connecting election administrators in need of legal advice or assistance with qualified, licensed pro bono attorneys. As of June 2024, EOLDN consisted of more than 6,000 attorneys in 47 states.

In February 2025, in response to concerns expressed by election administrators of both parties regarding an "expanded threat environment," EOLDN announced a broadening of its scope to include assisting election officials targeted by federal agencies including the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or Congress.

Election officials play a prominent role in voting security as well as cybersecurity. After the Russian government conducted foreign electoral interference in the 2016 United States elections, including both cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns, election officials worked alongside the newly created Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to assess and strengthen the security of election infrastructure. This included upgraded voting equipment, improved post-election audits, hardening of voter registration database security, and enhanced cybersecurity, all implemented by election officials.

Over the past two decades, significant changes in election laws and procedures have impacted the roles and responsibilities of election officials. These include:

• The Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act of 2022, bipartisan legislation that clarified the process of casting and counting electoral votes, aiming to prevent future disputes and ensure a more transparent electoral process.
• State-level voting law changes such as stricter voter ID requirements, limitations on mail-in voting, and reductions in early voting periods.
• Adoption and rejection of alternative voting systems like ranked-choice voting (RCV). While states like Maine and Alaska, and cities including New York, Minneapolis, Cambridge (MA), and San Francisco have implemented RCV to promote majority support and reduce negative campaigning, several states including Colorado, Oregon, Missouri, Idaho, and Nevada have voted against adopting RCV, indicating varied public opinion on altering traditional voting methods.
• Federal initiatives and executive actions: Efforts such as the For the People Act and the John Lewis Voting Rights Act aimed to expand voting access and protect voter rights but faced challenges in Congress and were not enacted into law. Executive actions, like President Trump's 2025 executive order Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections, have sought to influence election administration, reflecting ongoing debates over federal versus state control of elections.

When enacted, these reforms and initiatives often required election officials to adapt to new regulations, implement updated voting systems, and address evolving security challenges to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.

• Returning officer
• Scrutineer

• Elections Office of Minneapolis, Minnesota – Page describing the duties of an election judge