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After his promotion to lieutenant in 1905, Nagano served on the battleship Shikishima. From 1905 to 1906, he studied naval artillery and navigation. From 1906 to 1908, he was chief gunnery officer on the cruiser Itsukushima. In 1909, he graduated from the Japanese Naval War College.
In 1910, Nagano was promoted to lieutenant commander and assigned as chief gunnery officer on the battleship Katori. From January 1913 to April 1915, he was a language officer in the United States, during which time he studied at Harvard Law School.
During World War I, Nagano was executive officer on the cruisers Nisshin and cruiser Iwate. In 1918, he was promoted to captain. In 1919, he received his first (and only) ship command, the cruiser Hirado.
From December 1920, Nagano was a military attaché to the United States. In this capacity, he attended the Washington Naval Conference. In November 1923, he returned home, although he returned to the United States on official visits in 1927 and 1933. In December 1923, he was promoted to rear admiral.
In 1936, Nagano was appointed Navy Minister under Prime MinisterKōki Hirota. Later in 1937, he became commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet. By April 1941, he had risen to the very top of the Japanese Navy leadership to become chief of the Imperial Japanese Naval General Staff.
A staunch believer in Nanshin-ron, Admiral Nagano played a central role in Japan's decision to go to war with the United States and its allies. On 24 June 1941, the army and navy high commands jointly agreed to push for the occupation of southern Indochina. When Japanese forces occupied southern Indochina on 24 July 1941, the U.S. froze Japanese assets within their borders, thereby resulting in a halt on all oil shipments to Japan. At the end of the month, Nagano informed Emperor Hirohito that the nation's oil supply would run out in two years if the embargo was not lifted. Consequently, he advised that Japan should be ready for war within that timeframe if attempts at diplomacy failed.
At a liaison conference held on 3 September 1941, both Nagano and the Army's Chief of Staff, General Hajime Sugiyama, called for Japan to be committed to war if negotiations with the U.S. had not been successfully concluded within the first 10 days of October. After being endorsed by those present, the aforementioned proposal (formalized in a document entitled Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies) was presented to the Emperor for his approval.
On 5 September 1941, Admiral Nagano and General Sugiyama were called before Emperor Hirohito to brief him on the proposed movement toward war set forth within the Essentials. When Hirohito admonished the service chiefs for adopting such bellicose positions despite having no guarantee of victory, Nagano made the following argument:
"If we were to compare today's U.S.-Japanese relations to a sick patient, the patient is in dire need of an operation. If we don't operate, and instead leave him be, the patient will gradually be[come] weaker and weaker. Not that there isn't any hope of recovery. But we must decide while there still is a chance [for the success of the operation]. The high command desires diplomatic negotiations to reach a successful conclusion. But in case of its failure, I am afraid that we must pluck up enough courage and operate."
Despite expressing concern over the Essentials' prioritization of war over diplomacy, Emperor Hirohito refrained from overruling its recommendations, which were adopted as national policy at the ensuing Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941. However, on October 17, Hirohito effectively overturned the results of the Imperial Conference by naming General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister and charging him with "mak[ing] an exhaustive study" of alternatives to conflict with the Western Allies. By October 19, Nagano had authorized Japan's Combined Fleet to proceed with its plans to attack Pearl Harbor once the decision for war had been finalized.
On November 1 1941, members of the Japanese high command and the nation's government met to deliberate whether to (1) avoid war even at the cost of the status quo, (2) immediately commit Japan to conflict with the United States and its allies, or (3) prepare for hostilities while simultaneously continuing negotiations with Washington. Despite conceding there was no guarantee of victory, Nagano argued at the meeting that Japan must nonetheless be prepared to go to war immediately, given that a favorable military outcome would be all but impossible within 3 years if not sooner. On November 2, all those in attendance reached a consensus to commit the country to war if a diplomatic solution had not been reached by midnight on November 30. By 1 December 1941, the Emperor ultimately gave his imperial sanction for the onset of hostilities.
On 7 December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a massive surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, thereby signaling the spread of World War II to the Asia-Pacific theater. As Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Nagano was responsible for overseeing all Japanese naval operations and their participating units. Within months of the Asia-Pacific conflict's outbreak, the Empire of Japan conquered a broad swathe of territory in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific including Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, and the Philippines in a matter of months. However, the tide of the conflict decisively turned against the Japanese after their military was defeated at the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal.
In 1943, Nagano was promoted to marshal admiral. After losing the Emperor's confidence by 1944 , Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō removed Nagano from his post and replaced him with Navy MinisterShigetarō Shimada. Nagano spent the remainder of the war as an advisor to the government.
Remark
According to the opinion of the Japanese government, if Japan accepts the demand of the United States, Japan will perish. However, even if Japan fights against the United States, Japan may perish. That is, accepting the request of the United States will destroy Japan without fighting the United States. Even if we fight against the United States, if Japan can not avoid the danger of extinction, if Japan defeats without fighting with the United States, the Japanese people will truly disappear from the earth. However, if Japanese people can fight and show the spirit of defending Japan, even if Japan fights against America, our descendants will always rebuild Japan. We hope to solve problems in diplomatic negotiations. But unfortunately we will be fighting if we are to be commanded to wage war. (September 6, 1941, Osami Nagano)[titlemissing]
Bradley, F.J. (2014). He Gave the Order: The Life and Times of Admiral Osami Nagano. Bennington, VT: Merriam Press. ISBN9781576383711.
Evans, David (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN0-87021-192-7.
Fuller, Richard (1992). Shōkan: Hirohito's Samurai. Arms and Armour Press. ISBN1-85409-151-4.
Hotta, Eri (2013). Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy. New York City, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN978-0-307-59401-3.
Iriye, Akira, ed. (1999). Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History With Documents and Essays. Bedford/St. Martin's. ISBN0-312-14788-0.
Kershaw, Ian (2008). Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941. Penguin Books. ISBN978-0-14-311372-0.
Miranda, Joseph (2017). "Grand Strategy in the Pacific: Coral Sea and Midway 1941". World At War: The Strategy & Tactics of World War II. Strategy & Tactics Press. pp.6–23.
Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001) [1948]. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume 3: The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931–April 1942. Castle Books. ISBN0-7858-1304-7.
Prange, Gordon W. (1991). At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. Penguin Group. ISBN978-0-14-015734-5.
Toland, John (2003) [1970]. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. The Modern Library. ISBN0-8129-6858-1.
Wright, Michael (Ed.) (1989). The World At Arms: The Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II. London, UK: The Reader's Digest Association Limited. ISBN0-89577-333-3.
Further reading
Asada, Sadao (2006). From Mahan to Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN978-1-55750-042-7.
D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN0-8159-5302-X.
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