Quranism

Classification

There is no consensus on how to classify Quranism structurally. Quranist writers themselves generally reject characterisation as a sect, party, or organised denomination, describing the movement instead as an open intellectual trend rather than a bounded religious body. This self-description is consistent with the movement's lack of any central authority, unified creed, or formal membership.

Academic treatments have varied in the terminology they apply. Some scholarly and reference sources describe Quranism as an "intellectual, reformist, and theological movement" rather than a discrete sect, emphasising that the degree of Hadith rejection and doctrinal positions vary considerably between individuals. By contrast, mainstream Sunni and Shia religious authorities, along with some critics, have applied sect-adjacent or heresiological terminology to the movement, labelling it a form of innovation (Bid'ah) or comparing it to historical dissenting groups such as the Khawarij.

Unlike Sunni and Shia Islam, or organised minority traditions such as Ibadism or Ahmadiyya, Quranism has no central school of jurisprudence or clerical hierarchy, and that its proponents are mostly educated lay Muslims rather than scholars or clergy, which complicates its classification.

Early Islam

Quranists trace their position to Muhammad himself, citing reports that he prohibited the writing of Hadiths. Quranists treat such reports as historical evidence rather than as religious authority, and cite several narrations about early Islam in support of this view.

They first point to reports concerning the first caliph, Abu Bakr (r. 632–634). According to a report attributed to Aisha, Abu Bakr gathered around 500 narrations attributed to Muhammad and subsequently burned them, reportedly out of concern that some might not correspond exactly to what the Prophet had said. In the report, Abu Bakr is said to have explained his actions to his daughter, stating:

"I feared that I might die while leaving these with you, and among them would be narrations from a man whom I trusted and relied upon, but it turns out it was not as he narrated to me, so I would have [unintentionally] transmitted that incorrectly." — Abu Bakr as reported in Kanz al-Ummal, vol. 5, p. 237, no. 12727

While numerous chroniclers recorded this narrative in their historical and biographical compilations, Hadith critics generally classify the account as inauthentic due to critical gaps and unverified transmitters in its chain of narration.

Quranists also cite reports about the second caliph, ʿUmar (r. 634–644), who likewise prohibited the writing of Hadiths and destroyed existing collections during his reign. Similar reports state that when Umar appointed a governor to Kufa, a garrison city in Iraq, he told him:

"You are going to a people whose recitation of the Qur'an is like the buzzing of bees. Do not distract them with hadith and thus occupy them. Devote yourselves to the Qur'an and reduce narration from the Messenger of God." — Umar as reported in Ibn Sa'd, al-Tabaqat al-Kubra, vol. 6, p. 7

Quranists further trace this position to a report attributed to Abu Sa'id al-Khudri, in which Muhammad is said to have instructed that nothing but the Qur'an be written down from him.

• 
  Sūrah al-Baqarah, verses 282–286, from an early Quranic manuscript written on vellum (mid-late 7th century)
• 
  The Sana'a manuscript, one of the oldest surviving Quranic manuscripts, radiocarbon-dated to the 7th century CE

Kharijites and Mu'tazilites

A categorical rejection of Hadiths, as found among Quranists today, was already known in the early days of Islam among some Kharijites, early dissenters from the mainstream Muslim community. The Muʿtazilite thinker Dirār ibn ʿAmr (d. c. 815) reported that two Kharijite sects, the Azraqites and the Bazighites, held that "knowledge of religion can only be acquired from the Qur'an" and rejected consensus (ijmāʿ) and traditions. The jurist ash-Shafiʿī (d. 820) described a group of scholars who argued that the Qur'an, as a "clarification for every thing" (16:89), contained everything needed to derive legal rules, making Hadith unnecessary. Joseph Schacht thought this group were Muʿtazilites, whereas Hüseyin Hansu suspects they were Kharijites. The Muʿtazilites themselves did not reject Hadith entirely, but accepted only reports so widely transmitted that their falsehood seemed unthinkable.

Umayyad period

However, the centrality of the Qur'an in the religious life of the people of Kufa that Umar described was quickly changing. A few decades later, under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), a letter was sent to the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān (r. 685–705) regarding the people of Kufa:

"They abandoned the judgement of their Lord and took Hadiths for their religion; and they claim that they have obtained knowledge other than from the Qur'an... They believed in a book which was not from God, written by the hands of men; they then attributed it to the Messenger of God."

In the following years, the taboo against the writing and following of Hadiths had receded to such an extent that the eighth Umayyad caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (r. 717–720) is credited with ordering the first official collection of Hadith, and the scholars Abū Bakr ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī were among those who compiled Hadith at his request.

Abbasid period

Despite the trend towards Hadiths, the questioning of their authority continued during the Abbasid period (750–1258) and existed during the time of ash-Shafiʿī, when a group known as Ahl al-Kalam argued that the prophetic example of Muhammad "is found in following the Qur'an alone", rather than Hadith. The majority of Hadiths, according to them, was mere guesswork, conjecture, and bid'a (religious innovation), while the Book of God was complete and perfect, and did not require the Hadith to supplement or complement it. There were prominent scholars who rejected traditional Hadiths like Dirar ibn Amr. He wrote a book titled The Contradiction Within Hadith. However, the tide had changed from the earlier centuries to such an extent that Dirar was assaulted and had to remain in hiding until his death. Like Dirar ibn Amr, the scholar ʾAbū Bakr al-Aṣamm also had little use for Hadiths.

Under the Abbasid caliph al-Maʾmūn (r. 813–833), the adherents of Kalam (rationalist theology) were favoured and the supporters of Hadiths were persecuted. Al-Maʾmūn was inclined towards rational inquiry in religious matters and supported the proponents of Kalam. His two immediate successors, al-Muʿtaṣim (r. 833–842) and al-Wāthiq (r. 842–847), followed his policies. Unlike his three predecessors, al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861) was not inclined to rational inquiry in religious matters, and strove to bolster the Hadiths as a necessary source of the Sunnah.

After the 9th century the Muʿtazilites abandoned this strict position and accepted Hadiths transmitted by individuals as sources of certainty. The Qur'an-only position largely waned during the classical period of Islamic history, and re-emerged in the 18th and 19th centuries, when Muslim reformers again questioned the authority of the traditional sources of law.

The emergence of Quranism in modern India and Egypt

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Muslim reform thinkers began to deal again with the authority of Islamic sources of law, rejected the taqlīd and demanded a return to the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In addition, there was the confrontation with the superiority of the Western great powers. Muslim scholars now had to deal with new questions and problems that arose from the influence of Western ideas, which were spread by missionaries and Orientalists, among others. They also tried to find an explanation for what they perceived as the backwardness of Muslims compared to the progress made in Western countries. In order to provide an answer to these questions, to defend Islam against accusations, and to interpret it in such a way that it is compatible with rational and scientific ideas, some modernist scholars have sought to separate the foundations of religion from historical influences and tradition. To this end, they critically examined the four traditional sources of Islamic law (Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijmāʿ, Qiyās).

In this context, especially in British India at the time, a number of thinkers and scholars emerged who rejected Hadiths and wanted to establish the Qur'an as the main source. Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), founder of the Aligarh Movement, argued that the Qur'an is the only authoritative source of Islam. The Hadith corpus is unreliable, since in traditional Hadith criticism only the trustworthiness of the narrators was used as evidence for the authenticity of the Hadiths. However, one should also critically analyse the Hadith text (matn) and check its compatibility with the Qur'an and reason. On the basis of this foundation, some theological dogmas and legal regulations would have to be rationally justified and interpreted according to criteria of reason, independent of tradition. Syed Ahmad Khan also equated the laws of nature, the "Work of God," with revelation, the "Word of God." Among other things, this led to him being dismissed by other scholars as a "naturalist" (Naychirī) and his ideas were criticised by numerous contemporary scholars.

Chiragh Ali (d. 1895) further developed the ideas of Syed Ahmad Khan and took a stricter view of the use of Hadiths as an authoritative source. He also criticised the focus of Muslim scholars on the chains of transmission (isnād) used to authenticate Hadiths, and pointed out that Hadiths were not collected until decades after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and concluded that almost all Hadiths were inauthentic. This assumption made it possible for him to invalidate and reform all regulations and institutions based on the Hadiths. Ali's starting point, however, was not the criticism of the Hadith, but the defense of the feasibility of Islam in the modern age and the search for the "True Islam" far from the ideas of traditional Muslims and the accusations of Western Orientalists.

At the same time as Syed Ahmad Khan, Muhammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) began to cautiously criticise Hadiths in Egypt. He considered only mutawātir Hadiths to be ultimately binding, i.e. those handed down by a large number of people. However, aḥād Hadiths, i.e. those that have been handed down by only one person, are only to be followed if they convince the reader. In doing so, he opened the door to a personal assessment of the binding nature of the Hadiths without rejecting them as a whole. His focus was on rejecting the imitation of earlier schools of law and scholars, which, in his view, had contributed greatly to the stagnation of Muslim society in his country.

In 1906, the Egyptian physician Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi (d. 1920) published an article entitled "Islam is the Qur'an Alone" (Al-Islām huwa l-Qurʾān Waḥda-hū) in Rashīd Rida's magazine Al-Manār. As the name of the article suggests, Sidqi accepted the Qur'an alone as an authoritative religious source and was convinced that it contained all the necessary information. The Sunnah of the Prophet was only a model for his contemporaries. If the Prophet had wanted Hadiths to reach future generations, he would have had them written down – just like the Qur'an. Muslims today are therefore free to decide whether or not to follow something that is narrated by the Prophet and is not contained in the Qur'an. Sidqi's article drew a long discussion and several refutations, which were published in the journal along with his response.

"What is obligatory for man does not go beyond God's Book. If anything other than the Qur'an had been necessary for religion, the Prophet would have commanded its registration in writing, and God would have guaranteed its preservation." — Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi

Quranism in early 20th-century India

At the beginning of the 20th century, Abdullah Chakralawi (d. 1916) founded the community of the Ahl aḏ-Ḏhikr wa-l-Qurʾān (Ahl al-Qurʾān for short) in Lahore. He was convinced that the Qur'an was so comprehensive that it was sufficient as a divine source for the guidance of Muslims, and therefore the rest of the written tradition, including the Hadiths and earlier Quranic commentaries, could be excluded. Thus, Chakralawi and his followers, in contrast to their predecessors, rejected the Hadiths as a whole recognising only the Qur'an as an authoritative and valid source on theological and ritual issues, and breaking away from classical exegetical methods. Between 1903 and 1932, they also published the journal Ishāʿat al-Qurʾān.

A few years after Chakralawi's death, Khwaja Ahmad ad-Din Amritsari (d. 1936) founded another Quranist movement in Amritsar, the Anjuman-i Ummat-i Muslimah, with the magazines al-Balāḡ and al-Bayān. He believed that returning to the Qur'an as the only authoritative source would cleanse Islam of both Arab-dominated thinking and previous theological conclusions and jurisprudences, thus making it a universal faith that can create harmony between the different religions.

The historian and Islamic scholar Aslam Jairajpuri (d. 1955) developed a Quranic history of the Hadith and saw the Hadiths not as a religiously binding, but very important historical source. With regard to ritual questions, he considered the actions of the Prophet (Sunnah al-Mutawātir), which had been handed down over many strands, to be trustworthy.

His student Ghulam Ahmed Perwez (d. 1985) became one of the most influential and productive personalities of the Quranist movement. In 1938, he founded the organisation Tolu-e-Islam in Delhi, which was later relocated to Lahore and published the journal Tolu-e-Islam, which had previously been edited by Syed Nazeer Niazi. Like his teacher, Perwez regarded the Hadiths as a purely historical source and attributed authority to the Prophet's interpretation mainly in his time. However, the Hadiths would have to be compared with the Qur'an, selected and thus cleansed. Similar to Amritsari, he ascribed to Islam a universal character, which could be achieved on the basis of the Qur'an. As far as the details of interpretation and implementation are concerned, these would have to be determined by a central Muslim authority – also in the form of a state – in a contemporary manner. His views on Hadiths brought him much criticism, causing 1,000 traditionalist scholars to declare him an infidel in a Takfīr-Fatwa. However, the movement he founded is still active today and has followers in Pakistan and Europe, among other places.

The Yan Tatsine movement in Nigeria

A militant extremist current with a Quran-centric orientation emerged in the 1960s with the Yan Tatsine movement in Nigeria under Mohammed Marwa, better known by his nickname Maitatsine (d. 1980), which later led to an armed uprising. Muhammad Marwa came from Maroua in northern Cameroon and arrived in Kano in 1945. In the early 1960s, he began preaching a particular form of Quranic exegesis that was radically different from the commonly used Sunni Quranic commentaries in Kano and Northeastern Nigeria. Marwa rejected all Western inventions such as wristwatches, bicycles, cars and televisions. He also rejected the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and recognised only the Qur'an as an authoritative religious source. Marwa and his followers derived their specific prohibitions directly from the Qur'an, excluding traditional literature and using the Hausa language. Those who did not obey these precepts were labelled as polytheists. In December 1980, they stormed the Friday Mosque of Kano. The uprising was crushed by the Nigerian Army. Several thousand people died in the fighting, including Marwa himself. However, the movement lived on and led to uprisings in other parts of northern Nigeria for some time.

Libya under Gaddafi

The military coup in Libya in 1969 brought Muammar Gaddafi (d. 2011) to power, who initially gave the country a pan-Arabist, socialist and later increasingly clear Islamic orientation. Gaddafi ascribed a universal claim to Islam and called for a return to the "essence of Islam" and its fundamental source, the Qur'an, which was interpreted in a progressive way. In the Declaration on the Authority of the People of 1977 the Qur'an was declared the "constitution" of the People's Republic of Libya. Gaddafi asserted the Qur'an as the sole guide to Islamic governance and the unimpeded ability of every Muslim to read and interpret it. The Islamic tradition, including the Hadiths, the schools of law and jurisprudence of earlier scholars, was rejected by Gaddafi, on the grounds that it distracted Muslims from the "primordial source of divine truth". In contrast, the religious acts of the Prophet Muhammad such as ritual prayer were recognised as Sunnah. In 1978, the year zero of the Islamic calendar was also changed from the Hijrah to the anniversary of the Prophet's death. Gaddafi was also critical of the various schools of jurisprudence, such as the Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali, charging that they are the product of a struggle for political power and unconnected with either Islam or the Qur'an.

Rashad Khalifa and the Submitters

In the United States, the Egyptian-born biochemist Rashad Khalifa (1935–1990) argued that the Qur'an alone is the source of Islamic belief and practice and that it contains a mathematical structure based on the number 19, the "Qur'an code". His rejection of Sunnah and Hadith, his exclusion of two verses (9:128–129) from the Qur'an on numerical grounds, and his declaration in 1989 that he was "God's Messenger of the Covenant" drew strong criticism from Muslims and scholars. He founded United Submitters International and was murdered in 1990 at the Tucson Mosque, where he had served as imam. Because of these doctrines, the Submitters are commonly treated in the literature as a distinct movement within Qur'an-centric Islam rather than as representative of all Quranists.

Khalifa's ideas reached Quranists elsewhere. The Egyptian scholar Ahmed Subhy Mansour, dismissed from Al-Azhar University in 1985 for his Quranist ideas and imprisoned two years later, joined Khalifa in the United States in 1988 but soon left; he was granted asylum in 2002 and founded the International Quranic Center. The Turkish activist Edip Yüksel joined the Submitters in Tucson in 1989, later left them, and co-authored Quran: A Reformist Translation (2007). In Malaysia, Kassim Ahmad (d. 2017) wrote Hadith: A Re-evaluation (1997), calling for a scientific evaluation of Hadiths and of the wider Islamic tradition. In northern Nigeria, a group calling themselves Qurʾānawa formed in Kano in the late 1990s, influenced by Ahmed Deedat's book Al-Qurʾān – The Ultimate Miracle, which drew on Khalifa's early writings.

Quranist movement in Turkey

In Turkey, Quranist ideas have been making themselves felt since the mid-1970s. One of the first and most important thinkers in this line is the Islamic theologian Hüseyin Atay. Among other things, he wrote his own translation of the Qur'an and was of the opinion that Islam at the time of the Prophet consisted only of the Qur'an and reason. It was only after the death of the Prophet that people began to refer to Hadiths, statements by companions of the Prophet and scholarly opinions, which in the long term led to alienation from the Qur'an and imitation of scholars.

All extra-Quranic sources and tradition belonged only to the realm of religious culture and should be critically examined. Similar ideas were held by his student Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (d. 2016), who also wrote his own translation of the Qur'an.

Foundational tenets

Quranism is not a single organized sect with a central hierarchy; rather, it is a scriptural methodology. Despite this lack of central authority, Quranist writers and adherents worldwide broadly converge on a set of foundational tenets:

• The Qur'an is the sole, self-sufficient source of Islamic doctrine and law, requiring no external source for divine legislation.
• Hadith literature cannot serve as a binding source of religious law or doctrine, whatever historical value it may hold.
• The Qur'an is self-explanatory and is interpreted through its own text rather than through external traditions.
• Religious authority rests with the individual believer rather than with clergy, scholarly consensus, or centralised institutions.
• Each individual bears absolute accountability before God, and outsourcing religious interpretation to a third party does not excuse error.

In practice, this self-sufficiency principle leads Quranists to interpret the Qur'an using the Qur'an itself:

[A] literal and holistic analysis of the text from a contemporary perspective and applying the exegetical principle of tafsir al-qur'an bi al-qur'an (explaining the Qur'an with the Qur'an) and the jurisprudential principle al-asl fi al-kalam al-haqiqah (the fundamental rule of speech is literalness), without refracting that Qur'anic usage through the lens of history and tradition.

This methodology differs from Tafsir bi'r-Riwāyah, which is the method of commenting on the Qur'an using traditional sources, and Tafsir al-Qur'an bi-l-Kitab, which refers to interpreting the Qur'an with/through the Bible, generally referred to in Quranic studies as the Tawrat and the ʾInjīl.

This self-referential methodology has historically led individual Quranists to reject specific doctrines they judged unsupported by the Qur'an itself. Early Qur'an-centred thinkers did not accept the doctrine of abrogation (naskh). The Kufan scholar Dirar ibn Amr's Qur'an-centred position led him to deny the Dajjal, Punishment of the Grave, and Shafa'a in the 8th century. The Egyptian scholar Mohammed Abu Zaid al-Damanhury's Quranist commentaries led him to reject the belief in the ’Isrā’ and Miʿrāj in the early 20th century. In his rationalist Qur'an commentary published in 1930, which uses the Qur'an itself to interpret the Qur'an, he claimed that verse 17:1 was an allusion to the Hijrah and not ’Isrā’ and Miʿrāj.

The extent to which Quranists reject the authority of Hadith varies, but the more established groups have thoroughly criticised the authority of Hadiths and reject it for many reasons. The most common of these is the Quranist argument that Hadith is not mentioned in the Qur'an as a source of Islamic theology and practice, was not written down until about a century after Muhammad's death, and not compiled into the canonical collections until roughly two centuries after it, and contain internal errors and contradictions, including contradictions with the Qur'an. For Sunni Muslims, the Sunnah, i.e. the way of the Prophet, is one of the two primary sources of Islamic law, and while the Qur'an has verses enjoining Muslims to obey the Messenger, Quranists note that it does not use the term sunnah for Muhammad's example. The term appears several times in the Qur'an, including in the phrase sunnah Allah (way of God), but not sunnah an-Nabi (way of the Prophet), a phrase customarily used by proponents of Hadiths.

Differences with mainstream Islam

Quranists argue that the vast majority of Hadith literature is forged and maintain that the Qur'an itself criticises such narrations in both a technical and general sense. They point to 39:23, which describes the Qur'an itself as "the best hadith"; to 4:87 and 45:6, which ask rhetorically what other "hadith" beyond God's own words could be trusted; to 77:50, which poses a similar challenge in the context of disbelief; and to 31:6, which warns against those who "buy idle hadith" to mislead others from God's way — a set of verses Quranists read collectively as the Qur'an using the word hadith to refer to itself, and warning against treating any other "hadith" as equally authoritative.

Concept of the Sunnah

In Quranist discourse and modern academic Islamic studies, a distinction is drawn between the concepts of Hadith (individual textual narrations attributed to Muhammad) and Sunnah (the established normative practice, model, or "way" of the Prophet). While classical and mainstream Sunni and Shia jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh) routinely uses the terms synonymously—positing that the Sunnah is primarily recorded within and accessed through canonical Hadith collections, Quranist writers reject the Hadith compilations as a source of law but understand the Sunnah differently: Ahmed Subhy Mansour's Ahl al-Quran regards the Qur'an itself as the true sunnah of Muhammad, while Rashad Khalifa and Kassim Ahmad hold that the details of prayer, charity, fasting and pilgrimage were inherited from Abraham and not taught by Hadith.

View of Prophethood and "Obey the Messenger"

A central difference between Quranists and mainstream Sunni and Shia thought concerns the meaning of the Quranic command to "obey Allah and obey the Messenger". Traditional scholars understand this as establishing two sources of authority: the Quran and the recorded sayings and actions of Muhammad found in the Hadith literature. Quranists reject this dual-source interpretation. Quranist writers argue that the Quran itself limits the Messenger's role to the clear delivery of the divine message. They point to several verses:

Quranists argue that, since the Messenger's sole duty is the clear delivery of the message (The Quran), obedience to the Messenger (and thus belief in the message he delivered) is equivalent to obedience to God.

One of the most discussed linguistic arguments appears in Quran 53:3–4:

The Syrian thinker Muhammad Shahrur argued that the verb yanṭiqu (from the root naṭaqa) refers specifically to the act of uttering or articulating the revealed text, not to ordinary human speech (takallama). In his reading, the verse confirms that when the Messenger recited the Quran he was not speaking from personal desire. It does not mean that every word he spoke in daily life was divine revelation. Traditional interpretation, by contrast, has often treated the verse as proof that the Prophet's speech in general was divinely guided and therefore authoritative beyond the Quran itself.

According to this view, the Messenger's religious role was to receive, deliver, and live according to the Quran. Once the revelation was complete, the binding source of guidance remained the Book itself. Later claims of religious authority based on Hadith are therefore seen as an expansion of the Messenger's role beyond what the Quran itself authorises.

This leads Quranists to reject the classical equation of the "Sunnah of the Prophet" with the content of the Hadith collections. They note that the Quran never uses the term sunnah in connection with Muhammad in the technical sense later developed by jurists, and that the only sunnah explicitly attributed in the Quran is the sunnah of Allah.

Mainstream Sunni and Shia scholars reply that the command to obey the Messenger necessarily includes his detailed teachings and practice, which were preserved through the Hadith, and that without these reports many Quranic injunctions would remain incomplete.

Muhammad the Prophet and Muhammad the Messenger

Within Quranist discourse, a distinction is frequently drawn between Muhammad's role as prophet (nabi) and his role as messenger (rasul). According to this view, the Quran uses the two titles with different emphases. The title "messenger" is understood as referring specifically to Muhammad's function of receiving and delivering the divine revelation (the Quran). Obedience to "the Messenger," as commanded in verses such as 4:80 and 5:99, is therefore interpreted as obedience to the message he was charged to deliver, rather than to his personal words, actions, or decisions outside the scope of revelation.

In contrast, references to Muhammad as "prophet" are often read as relating to his historical and personal circumstances. Quranist writers, including Muhammad Shahrur, maintain that commands and statements addressed to "the Prophet" frequently concern matters limited to his own lifetime or community and do not automatically constitute universal, timeless legislation for later generations. This distinction underpins the broader Quranist position that the binding religious authority of Muhammad is confined to the Quran he transmitted, and does not extend to extra-Quranic reports attributed to him.

Quranists and the Five Pillars of Islam

The classical Five Pillars of Islam (profession of faith, ritual prayer, Compulsory giving, fasting during Ramadan, and pilgrimage) are drawn from Hadith reports such as the Hadith of Gabriel, recorded in the collections of Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. Quranist views of this formulation differ. Most of them, in general, maintained the five practices despite rejecting Hadith, whereas the Free-Minds website rejects the "five pillars" as a "myth" and argues that God provided a system rather than a set of rituals.

Quranist writers have argued that the traditional Five Pillars cannot function as the universal foundations of the religion because not all of them are obligatory for every person. In particular, they note that Zakat (Compulsory giving) is not required of those without sufficient wealth, as per Quran 2:219 and 65:7, and that Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) is obligatory only for those who are physically and financially able to perform it, as per Quran 3:97. From this perspective, a foundational requirement of a religion described in the Quran as universal should be capable of being fulfilled by any human being, regardless of economic or physical circumstances.

In place of the five-pillar formulation, Quranists commonly emphasize a set of principles that the Quran presents as applicable to all people. These include:

• Belief in the one God
• Belief in His messengers
• The performance of righteous deeds.

They point to verses such as 2:177, 2:285, 4:136, and 5:69, which describe righteousness and true religion in terms of faith in God, the Last Day, the angels, the scriptures, the prophets, and ethical conduct. Quranist authors maintain that the Quran presents Islam as a universal religion of submission to God rather than as a set of practices limited to a particular cultural or historical context. They argue that defining the religion primarily through five specific ritual obligations derived from later Hadith literature risks reducing a broader Quranic message to a narrower set of practices that not all people can perform.

Most Quranists continue to observe forms of prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage. However, they generally derive the details of these practices from the Quranic text itself or from continuous communal practice, rather than from the specific Hadith that enumerates the Five Pillars. They regard the traditional five-pillar list as a later systematization that, while historically influential within Sunni and Shia tradition, does not exhaust the definition of Islam as presented in the Quran.

Predestination and free will

Some Quranist writers reject the classical doctrine of qadar (divine predestination), stressing human free will and moral responsibility. Edip Yüksel argues that qadar in the Qur'an means "measure" or "proportion" rather than a predetermined fate. They maintain that doctrines of pre-recorded fate entered Islamic theology through Hadith collections and contradict the Qur'anic principle of divine justice. Rashad Khalifa, founder of the Submitters, expressed a similar view.

Application of the Quran in changing times

Quranists regard the Quran as complete, self-sufficient, and valid for all times (6:38, 16:89, 6:114). Because they reject both the Hadith and classical tools of jurisprudence such as Qiyas, the question arises of how a text revealed in the seventh century can respond to new circumstances that appear in later periods and in the modern world.

Views on human origins and biological evolution

Individual Quranist writers have addressed the relationship between the Qur'an and evolutionary biology. Edip Yüksel has argued for theistic evolution over creationism, citing 29:20 — which instructs believers to "travel through the land and observe how He originated creation" — as scriptural grounds for treating the empirical study of biological origins as consistent with, rather than opposed to, Quranic teaching. He has also been critical of creationist positions within other Islamic movements, including that of the Turkish creationist Adnan Oktar, authoring a Turkish-language book criticising him.

Shahada (creed)

Most Qur'an-alone groups have in general maintained the Shahada among the Five Pillars, but that writers on the Free-Minds website argue that the traditional Muslim shahada is a "blasphemous hypocrisy". Some Quranists use a shortened form, lā ʾilāha ʾillā llāh ("There is no deity except God"), omitting the second clause ("Muhammad is the messenger of God"), on the ground that the Quran does not prescribe the longer formula and that adding a prophet's name risks associating him with God's oneness. This position is not uniform across all Quranist groups. Some accept the traditional two-part Shahada while still rejecting the authority of Hadith, while others insist strictly on the monotheistic formula alone.

Ṣalāh (prayer)

The practice of prayer (ṣalāh) among Quranists varies based on hermeneutical approaches to the Quranic text and the degree of acceptance of inherited mass practical tradition (tawātur ʿamalī). Quranists observe five daily prayers (Fajr, Dhuhr, ʿAṣr, Maghrib, and ʿIshāʾ), maintaining the total count of five prescribed prayers as an inherited practical tradition rather than a Hadith-derived mandate. However, while the majority perform these five prayers across five distinct times throughout the day, a minority stream within Quranism interprets specific Quranic passages addressing prayer times (such as Surah 17:78 and Surah 11:114) as specifying three distinct prayer periods (Dawn, Sunset, and Night). Consequently, this minority group combines the five prayers into three daily time windows rather than performing them at five separate times.

Ritual and Legal Differences

While traditional Sunni and Shia jurisprudence incorporates greetings and supplications upon Prophet Muhammad and Prophet Abraham during the sitting posture (Tashahhud), some Quranists omit these extra-Quranic phrases during the call to prayer (Adhan) and the prayer itself. Quranist theologians base this exclusion on Quranic verses instructing that places of worship and remembrance belong strictly to God alone (e.g., Surah 72:18 and Surah 20:14) and that believers must not make religious distinctions among God's messengers (Surah 2:285).

Additional divergent positions documented among Quranist legal theorists include:

• Menstruation and Devotion: Some Quranist writers, such as Kerem Adıgüzel, maintain that menstruation does not disqualify women from performing ṣalāh or fasting, asserting that the Quranic description of menstruation as a physical discomfort (aḏan) in Surah 2:222 pertains solely to sexual intercourse and physical hygiene, rather than ritual impurity that halts worship.

• Missed Prayers: The mainstream Sunni and Shia concept of making up missed prayers (qaḍāʾ) is generally rejected by Quranist jurists, who view prayer as a time-bound obligation (Surah 4:103) that cannot be retroactively accumulated or transferred once its ordained period has elapsed.
• Congregational Worship: Because the Quran does not explicitly mandate spatial segregation or physical barriers between male and female worshippers, proponents of Quranism generally reject traditional jurisprudence enforcing separate facilities or partitions. In practice, due to the movement's decentralised structure and sparse physical institutions, mixed-gender worship largely occurs within private study circles or progressive reformist congregations, ranging from shared-room arrangements with separated rows to side-by-side prayer.

Wuḍūʼ (ablution)

Quranist ablution (wuḍūʾ) before prayer is generally limited to the four actions explicitly mentioned in the Quran (5:6): washing the face, washing the hands up to the elbows, wiping the head, and wiping (or washing) the feet up to the ankles. Quranists typically reject additional steps found in traditional Sunni and Shia practice (such as rinsing the mouth and nose, washing each limb three times, or wiping the ears), regarding these as later elaborations derived from the Hadith rather than from the Quranic text itself.

Zakāh (Compulsory giving)

In mainstream Islam, giving Zakāh is a religious duty and amounts to 2.5 percent of annual wealth above a minimum threshold (Nisab), calculated once a year. Quranists derive their practice of Zakāh exclusively from the Quran. The Quran repeatedly commands the payment of Zakāh (for example in 2:43, 2:110, 22:41, and 24:56), yet it never states a fixed percentage such as 2.5 percent.

Because no rate appears in the text, Quranist views on the amount diverge. Some accept the traditional 2.5 percent as a reasonable or historically continuous figure, even while rejecting the Hadith literature that formally established it. Others reject any fixed percentage not found in the Quran and instead point to verses such as 2:219:

They therefore leave the exact amount to individual judgment according to means and circumstances. On the question of timing, many Quranists differ from the mainstream practice of calculating Zakāh once a year on accumulated wealth. They rely particularly on 6:141, which states:

Quranist writers interpret the phrase "the day of its harvest" as referring to the moment when income or produce is received. In the case of agricultural produce, this is understood literally as the day the harvest is gathered. For other forms of income, such as salaries or business earnings, the same principle is often extended by analogy, so that Zakāh is paid whenever income is obtained rather than once annually.

Nasī' and the lunar calendar

Quranist and reform-minded writers have also revisited the Qur'anic condemnation of nasī' ("postponement"), the pre-Islamic practice tied to the origins of the purely lunar Hijri calendar. The Qur'an states:

Traditional scholarship reads this verse, together with 9:36 on the twelve months and four sacred months, as a general ban on nasī'. On this view, nasī' meant periodically inserting an extra month into the lunar calendar to keep it aligned with the solar seasons.

This reading is usually linked to two events. First, the Prophet declared during the Farewell Pilgrimage of 10 AH that the calendar had returned to its "natural order." Second, caliph Umar formally adopted, in 17 AH, a purely lunar, non-intercalated calendar dated from the Hijrah. Under the conventional account, this closed off any future insertion of a leap month.

Some recent scholarship proposes a narrower reading of 9:37: Zein and El-Wakil argue that the verse condemns a specific tribal custom, not intercalation itself. In this custom, a tribe would declare a normally sacred, fight-free month ordinary for that year, and declare an ordinary month sacred in its place. This kept the total count of prohibited months at four while letting the tribe fight whenever it wished.

Ṣawm (fasting)

Quranists observe the fast of Ramadan in accordance with the Quranic command in 2:183–2:185. They generally do not regard the last day of Ramadan or Eid al-Fitr as a specially mandated holy day, since neither is named or prescribed as such in the Quran.

Although many Quranists reject the traditional purely lunar Islamic calendar and argue that the Qur'an does not prohibit calendar intercalation (Nasi'), the majority continue to observe Ramadan according to the same calendar used by mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims.

A minority of Quranists, however, go further by insisting that Ramadan should be determined according to a lunisolar calendar rather than the current purely lunar system. They argue that Ramadan was originally tied to a specific solar season, pointing to the historical meaning of the word "Ramadan" as "scorching heat." According to this view, Ramadan begins with the sighting of the new moon in September and remains around September–October, which they consider to be the correct Qur'anic method of determining the month.

Ḥajj (pilgrimage)

Extra-Quranic rituals associated with the Hajj, such as kissing or touching the Black Stone and the symbolic Stoning of the Devil (ramy al-jamarāt), are rejected by many Quranists. They regard these practices as lacking any basis in the Quran and view them as forms of shirk (associating partners with God) or as innovations derived solely from the Hadith literature.

Quranists generally affirm the obligation of the pilgrimage itself when mentioned in the Quran (for example 3:97 and 22:27–22:29), but limit the required rites to those explicitly described in the text, such as circumambulation of the Kaaba (ṭawāf) and the overall pilgrimage to the Sacred House.

Quranist writers further argue that the Quran defines Hajj as occurring across a span of months rather than a fixed narrow window, citing 2:197, which states that "Hajj is [during] well-known months." They note that mainstream practice has restricted the main rites of the pilgrimage to a fixed five-day period (the 8th–13th of Dhu al-Hijjah), whereas the Quran describes the period in the plural as "well-known months." They further point to the wording of 2:197:

as indicating that the believer personally chooses when, within these months, to undertake the pilgrimage, rather than being bound to dates fixed by external authority.

Quranist writers identify the "well-known months" of 2:197 with the four sacred months named in 9:36, but they disagree about which four months these are:

Some Quranist writers distinguish between Hajj and the Greater Hajj, holding that Hajj (the pilgrimage) may be performed at any time during the four sacred months. By contrast, the "day of the greater pilgrimage" mentioned in the Quran is understood as a single specific day:

Mainstream Sunni and Shia scholarship identifies that day with the Day of Sacrifice (10 Dhu al-Hijjah), citing a Hadith in which Muhammad is reported to have named it as such.

Ridda (apostasy)

Quranists generally reject the classical death penalty for apostasy (ridda), arguing that it has no basis in the Quran. Verses on freedom of belief include 2:256:

Other passages that speak of freedom of belief include 10:99, 18:29 and 109:6. In their view, the traditional ruling that an apostate must be executed derives exclusively from the Hadith literature and later juristic consensus, both of which they regard as non-binding. Quranist writers maintain that the Quran consistently treats matters of faith as a personal responsibility between the individual and God, with accountability deferred to the afterlife rather than enforced by human authorities in this world.

Riba (usury) and banking

While mainstream Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) relies on Hadith literature to define Riba as any form of predetermined interest—forming the basis of modern Islamic banking—Quranist scholars restrict the definition of Riba strictly to what is delineated in the text of the Quran. Drawing upon Surah (3:130), which forbids consuming Riba "doubled and multiplied," many Quranist and reformist scholars contend that the Quranic prohibition applies specifically to predatory, exorbitant, or compounding usury, and that a modest interest rate charged by modern banks can function as compensation for currency depreciation and administrative cost rather than the exploitative increase the Quran condemns.

Other scholars, including within Islamic finance more broadly, dispute this reasoning on several grounds. They argue that the Quranic condemnation of Riba is not limited to the "doubled and multiplied" case named in 3:130, since other verses (2:275–2:279) prohibit Riba in general terms without a compounding qualifier, and that classical jurists reached the broader definition through exactly the kind of cross-referencing and legal reasoning that Quranists apply elsewhere. Critics of the inflation-compensation argument also note that it is an economic justification rather than a textual one, and that the Quran does not itself distinguish fixed bank interest from other forms of predetermined return.

Polygamy

Views on polygyny among Quranists diverge significantly from classical Sunni and Shia jurisprudence. Traditional legal schools interpret Surah 4:3 as a general permission for a man to marry up to four wives, provided he treats them equally. In contrast, Quranist scholars argue that the text establishes strict, non-negotiable prerequisites tied exclusively to the care of orphans.

Central to the Quranist argument is a linguistic analysis of the word used in Surah 4:3, yatāma (يَتَامَى, the plural of yatīm, يَتِيم). In classical Arabic lexicography, such as Ibn Manzur's Lisan al-Arab and Edward William Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, a child is defined as a yatīm specifically upon the death of their father (a fatherless child). Classical Arabic distinguishes this from a child who has lost both parents, designated by the term latīm (لَطِيم, a double-parent orphan), or a child who has lost only their mother, called an ʿajiyy (عَجِيّ, a motherless child).

Because the Qur'an deliberately employs yatāma (fatherless children) rather than latīm (double-parent orphans), Quranist scholars argue that the verse specifically addresses widowed mothers left with fatherless children after events of mass casualty, such as the Battle of Uhud. Under this interpretation, polygyny is not a general sexual or marital privilege, but a socio-economic relief mechanism limited to marrying the widowed mothers of fatherless children to integrate them into established households and protect their inheritance.

Furthermore, Quranists synthesize Surah 4:3—which mandates marrying only one wife if a man fears he cannot treat them with justice—with Surah 4:129, which explicitly states, "You will never be able to be equal between wives, even if you should strive [to do so]." Based on this cross-textual link, reformist theologians such as Edip Yüksel argue that the Qur'an establishes a self-limiting rule that effectively restricts systemic polygyny, establishing monogamy as the sole achievable moral baseline under modern conditions.

Military jihad

In Quranist theology and jurisprudence, a distinction is drawn between the general concept of jihād (literally "striving" or "exerting effort", which Quranists primarily interpret as intellectual and moral striving using the Qur'an) and Qital (armed warfare). Rejecting the classical legal doctrine of offensive expansionist warfare (jihād al-ṭalab) developed during early medieval empires, Quranists maintain that armed combat is strictly restricted to defensive, reactive, and anti-oppressive operations.

Rejection of abrogation (naskh)

A core point of departure between classical jurisprudence and Quranism concerns the hermeneutical doctrine of abrogation (naskh). Classical Sunni jurists historically relied on naskh to argue that the "Sword Verse" (Surah 9:5) abrogated over one hundred earlier peaceful and defensive Quranic verses, thereby legally justifying imperial conquest.

Conversely, Quranist theologians reject the doctrine of textual abrogation entirely, maintaining that the Qur'an is an internally consistent, self-contained text (citing Surah 15:9 and Surah 4:82). Quranists argue that Surah 9:5 was a specific historical ordinance directed exclusively against pagan tribes who had repeatedly breached peace treaties during the Tabuk campaign, rather than an open-ended command against non-Muslims. Consequently, Quranist thinkers contend that utilizing extra-Quranic traditions to justify offensive aggression violates the foundational Quranic principles of bodily sovereignty and freedom of conscience, codified in Surah 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion").

Food and dietary laws

Dietary jurisprudence among Quranists is derived exclusively from the explicit text of the Qur'an. Edip Yüksel and his co-authors hold that the Qur'an prohibits only four categories of food, as set out in Surah 2:173, Surah 5:3, Surah 6:145, and Surah 16:115, and they reject additional prohibitions derived from Hadith:

1. Carrion: Animals that die of natural causes, illness, injury, or strangulation before being properly slaughtered (maytah).
2. Running blood: Flowing or poured-forth blood (damm masfūḥ).
3. Swine: The flesh of swine or pork products (laḥm khinzīr).
4. Sacrifices to idols: Food or animals dedicated, sacrificed, or slaughtered in the name of any entity other than God (uhilla li-ghayr Allāh).

Dress code

In Quranist jurisprudence, dress codes and standards of modesty are derived strictly from the text of the Qur'an, rejecting extra-Quranic regulations codified in Hadith literature. Traditional Sunni and Shia legal requirements—such as mandatory female head-covering (hijab), face-veiling (niqab), or compulsory male facial hair (beards)—are considered by Quranist scholars to be cultural or extra-scriptural additions rather than divine mandates.

Punishment for theft

The Quranic verses concerning theft are:

Mainstream Sunni and Shia jurisprudence (fiqh) traditionally interprets the verb qaṭaʿa (to cut) in this verse as literal amputation of the hand, subject to strict conditions regarding the value of the stolen property, the manner of theft, and the absence of mitigating circumstances.

Quranist interpreters, relying solely on the Quranic text and Arabic linguistic usage, generally reject the amputation reading. They note that the root q-ṭ-ʿ frequently appears in the Quran with non-literal meanings such as "to sever ties," "to interrupt," or "to mark/cut into." They also observe that the word aydī (hands) is used metaphorically elsewhere in the Quran to mean power, means, or capability (for example 38:45 and 48:10).

Consequently, many Quranists render the verse as a command to "mark, cut, or cut off their hands/means." This is understood as restricting the thief's ability to steal again, imposing a visible mark, or applying a proportionate and reversible deterrent measure rather than permanent physical amputation. They further emphasize the immediately following verse (5:39), which stresses repentance and reform, arguing that irreversible mutilation would contradict the Quran's repeated emphasis on mercy and the possibility of rehabilitation.

This approach differs sharply from classical fiqh, which derives detailed procedural rules — such as minimum value thresholds and rules of evidence — primarily from the Hadith literature, sources that Quranists do not regard as authoritative for religious law.

Male grooming and beards

In classical Sunni and Shia jurisprudence, growing a beard and trimming the mustache are considered obligatory Sunnah based on Hadith commands (e.g., Sahih al-Bukhari). Because Quranists do not view Hadith as binding law, they maintain that facial hair is a matter of personal choice and aesthetic preference rather than a religious requirement.

Hadith

Quranists believe that Hadiths – while not being reliable sources of religion – can be used as a reference to get an idea on historical events. They argue that there is no harm in using Hadiths to get a common idea on the history as long as they are not taken as historical facts. According to them, a Hadith narration about history can be true or can be false, but a Hadith narration adding rulings to religion is always false.

This position is rooted in the view that the Quran is complete and fully detailed (6:114, 16:89), and that any additional religious legislation derived from post-Quranic narrations constitutes an unauthorised addition to divine law. Academic studies of the movement note that while Quranists vary in their degree of rejection, the majority treat the entire Hadith corpus as historically secondary and religiously non-binding.

• 
  Sahih al-Bukhari cover. Considered by Sunni Muslims to be the most authentic collection of Hadith after the Quran.
• 
  Sahih Muslim cover. Regarded by Sunni Muslims as one of the most authentic collections of Hadith, second only to Sahih al-Bukhari.
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  Collections of Hadith books (right to left): Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abi Dawud, Jami' at-Tirmidhi, Sunan an-Nasa'i, Sunan Ibn Majah, and Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal
• 
  Al-Kafi cover. Considered by Twelver Shia Muslims to be the most authentic collection of Hadith.

Wasiyyah (the will) and inheritance

Quranists distinguish between two layers of Quranic legislation on the disposal of an estate: a general command to write a personal will (waṣiyyah), and a set of fixed numerical shares for specific relatives. They read the Qur'an as giving the personal will explicit priority over the fixed shares.

Quranist writers note that the verses which set out the numerical shares for children, parents and spouses each state that these shares are calculated only after the bequest has been paid out: in Surah An-Nisa's inheritance verses (4:11–4:12), each time a share is named — for the parents, the spouse, or the siblings — the Qur'an repeats the qualifying phrase "...after any bequest which was made, or debt," making the payment of debts and the honouring of the deceased's bequest a repeated precondition rather than an afterthought.

On this basis, Quranists argue that the fixed fractions of Surah An-Nisa function as a default distribution supplied by God for cases of intestacy, rather than a mandatory formula that overrides an individual's own testamentary wishes. Under this reading, a person may lawfully leave a larger share to a family member in greater need — for example a daughter in financial difficulty; Quranists criticised Sharia court rulings that invalidated such wills in favour of the standard fractions as contrary to the Qur'an.

Classical and mainstream Sunni and Shia jurisprudence takes the opposite position. Most jurists hold that 2:180 was restricted or abrogated by the later, more detailed verses of inheritance, citing a Hadith in which Muhammad is reported to have said that "God has given everyone their due right, so there is no bequest for an heir"; on this basis a will is void if it benefits an heir who already receives a fixed Quranic share, and is capped at one-third of the estate even for non-heirs.

Tafsīr

Although some Quranist scholars have produced works of exegesis, most Quranists view formal external commentary as non-binding. Quranist hermeneutics relies primarily on intra-textual cross-referencing (analysing verses through other verses) alongside individual reason (aql).

Quranists generally reject traditional interpretive hierarchies and clergy, maintaining that any reader can engage the text directly through rational inquiry and linguistic analysis. Consequently, no exegesis—including works by prominent Quranist figures—is considered authoritative or obligatory.

Other

Beyond these core areas of law and ritual, Quranists hold a range of further positions—some rejecting practices as unsupported innovations, others affirming rulings they consider explicit in the text—that they derive independently from the Quran rather than from Hadith or later tradition.

• Circumcision is generally viewed as irrelevant or non-religious, since it is not mentioned in the Quran.
• Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha are often treated as cultural rather than religiously mandated festivals, as neither is named or prescribed as such in the Quran.
• The headscarf (hijab) is not considered obligatory for women; Quranist interpretations of Q 24:31 and 33:59 emphasize covering the chest and outer garments rather than the hair or face.
• Cremation is regarded by some Quranists as permissible because the Quran contains no prohibition against it and does not exclusively require burial.
• Stoning (rajm) for adultery or other offences is rejected on the ground that it does not appear in the Quran; the Quranic penalty for zina is flogging (Q 24:2).
• Prohibitions on music, figurative drawing, and the making of statues (including images of prophets) are rejected as extra-Quranic.
• Restrictions on men wearing gold or silk, or on shaving the beard, are rejected as lacking Quranic foundation.
• Dogs are not regarded as unclean or to be avoided; the Quran mentions dogs in neutral or positive contexts (e.g., Q 18:18) and permits their use in hunting (Q 5:4).
• Quranists generally regard homosexual acts as prohibited on the basis of the Quranic narrative of the people of Lot (Lut), in which the primary sin highlighted is men approaching men with desire instead of women (7:80–81, 26:165–166, 27:54–55, and 29:28–29).
• Quranists also consider intentional gender transition (transgenderism) to be forbidden (Sin), interpreting it as a form of "changing the creation of God," which the Quran attributes to the command of Satan in 4:119, they view this as a violation of the natural order established by God.
• Belief in the Mahdi or the Dajjal is rejected because neither figure is mentioned in the Quran; both appear only in later Hadith literature.

Individual interpretation vs. centralised authority

Because Quranism fundamentally rejects centralised religious institutions, the movement lacks a universal governing body, formal clergy, or standardised creed. Critics argue that this decentralization leads to subjective interpretation and widely differing understandings of practices such as prayer, almsgiving, and ritual purity.

Quranist thinkers generally view interpretive differences as a natural consequence of allowing individuals to engage directly with the Quran rather than treating a particular group of scholars or an established tradition as the final religious authority. From this perspective, keeping interpretation open allows the Quran to be understood and applied in different circumstances and in light of new knowledge, while avoiding the establishment of a fixed religious orthodoxy, provided that such interpretations remain grounded in the Quran itself and do not contradict its clear and foundational verses, which the Quran describes as the "Mother of the Book" in Surah 3:7. They therefore characterize this approach as preserving what they regard as the original, decentralized spirit of early Islamic thought.

Quranists argue that the Quran itself is complete and sufficient for matters of faith, doctrine, and religious law, rendering any centralised religious authority or binding scholarly consensus (ijma) unnecessary and, in their view, unsupported by the Quran. Separately, the Qur'an praises those "whose affair is consultation among themselves" (42:38), a phrase Muhammad Asad renders as "whose rule [in all matters of common concern] is consultation among themselves".

Institutionalization and critique of clerical authority

In academic analyses of modern Islamic reform, Quranist literature is characterized by its systemic critique of traditional institutionalization and scholarly authority. Writers within the movement argue that the historical rise of formal legal schools (madhhabs) and clerical bodies (the ulama) gradually introduced systemic vulnerabilities into religious practice, citing three main concerns: that formal hierarchies position scholars as intermediaries between God and believers, making clerical positions susceptible to political patronage and personal ambition; that established institutions tend to prioritize defending consensus (ijma) over open inquiry once they hold social and political power; and that reliance on established hierarchies encourages passive compliance among lay believers rather than direct engagement with scripture.

Defenders of institutionalized religious scholarship, and critics of Quranism's anti-institutional stance, argue that formal scholarly structures serve functions that individual interpretation does not readily replace. They contend that peer review among trained scholars historically functioned as an error-correction mechanism, subjecting interpretive claims to scrutiny before they gained authority, and that this differs from Quranism's more decentralized model in which, critics argue, an individual reader's interpretation faces no equivalent structural check. Critics also point to the wide range of interpretive outcomes across the Quranist movement itself — visible, for example, in its internal disagreements over prayer times, Zakāh calculation, and the Islamic calendar — as evidence that removing institutional checks does not eliminate interpretive disagreement but instead disperses it to the individual level, with no established mechanism for resolving it.

Individual accountability

Quranist writers hold that each person is individually accountable before God, and that shifting responsibility to religious teachers, jurists or ancestors is not a valid excuse. They cite 35:18, which says that no bearer of burdens will bear the burden of another, and 33:67, in which followers on the Day of Judgment say they "obeyed our masters and our dignitaries, and they led us astray from the way".

Demographics

No comprehensive census or survey of the global Quranist population exists.

Fanack attributes the absence of reliable figures in part to concealment: in several Arab countries, most Quranists reportedly hide their beliefs for fear of harassment or prosecution. Reflecting this, both Fanack and the Minority Rights Group describe Quranists generally as "a small group" of Muslims.

No reliable country-level estimates have been published; Quranism is described as a minority current in Egypt, for example.

Rejecting the Hadith has become a growing trend in the Middle East and North Africa, such as in Egypt and Morocco.

Quranists in Egypt and elsewhere have stirred heated discussions in the Muslim world. Quranism has been criticised by Sunnis and Shias. The Sunni belief is that "...the Quran needs the Sunnah more than the Sunnah needs the Quran." Sunnis and Shias argue that Islam cannot be practised without Hadith. Sunnis have often described Quranists as Khawarij.

Egypt

In Egypt, Quranists are a religious minority. According to one Quranist leader, the contemporary Quranist current in Egypt began in 1977, when Quranists took the initiative to debunk Sahih al-Bukhari and its assumed sanctification inside Al-Azhar Mosque. Quranists who have been vocal in their criticism of Hadiths include Ahmed Subhy Mansour, Ibrahim Eissa, Islaam Behery, Khaled Muntaser, and Ahmed Abdo Maher.

India

Quranist ideas gained a following in India from the 19th century, building on reformers such as Syed Ahmad Khan and Chiragh Ali (see above). The first organised movement, the Ahl-i Quran, was founded in Lahore by Abdullah Chakralawi. The Ahl-i Quran has been described by Aziz Ahmad and Dietrich Reetz as a "fundamentalist splinter group of Ahl-i-Hadith" while Francis Robinson has described it as puritanical. Alongside his criticism of Hadiths, Chakralawi opposed Sufism and vehemently condemned the shrine-based practices and Piri-Muridi traditions of the time.

Chakralawi established a Quranist mosque with the financial assistance of his disciple Shaykh Muhammad Chittu (d. 1911) in Lahore.

Iran

Like some of their counterparts in Egypt such as Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi and Mohammed Abu Zaid al-Damanhury, some reformist scholars in Iran who adopted Quranist beliefs came from institutions of higher learning. Shaykh Hadi Najmabadi, Mirza Rida Quli Shari'at-Sanglaji, Mohammad Sadeqi Tehrani, and Sayyid Abu al-Fadl Burqaʻi were educated in traditional Shia universities in Najaf and Qom. However, they believed that some beliefs and practices that were taught in these universities, such as the veneration of Imamzadeh and a belief in Raj'a, were irrational and superstitious and had no basis in the Qur'an. And rather than interpreting the Qur'an through the lens of Hadith, they interpreted the Qur'an with the Qur'an (Tafsīr al-Qur’an bil-Qur’an). These reformist beliefs provoked criticism from traditional Shia scholars like Ayatollah Khomeini, who attempted to refute the criticisms made by Sanglaji and other reformists in his book Kashf al-Asrar. Qur'an-centered beliefs have also spread among Muslims like Ali Behzadnia, who became Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare and Acting Minister of Education shortly after the Iranian Revolution. He has criticised the government in Iran for being undemocratic and totally alien to the "Islam of the Quran".

Niger and Nigeria

Kala Kato is a Quranist movement based in Niger and northern Nigeria. Kala Kato leaders established a mosque in Kaduna. In 2009, they engaged in skirmishes with Nigerian police at Zango on the outskirts of Bauchi, resulting in the deaths of 38 people. Similar cases occurred in Maiduguri in 2004. In Niger, Sunni Imams have urged the government to suppress Kala Kato, who have been described as militant.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia's Basic Law declares "God's Book (Quran) and the Sunna of his Prophet" to be the kingdom's constitution, and in 2017 King Salman issued a royal decree creating a King Salman Complex for the Prophet's Hadith in Medina, with a council of hadith scholars appointed by royal decree. In 2017, the Saudi scholar Hassan al-Maliki was arrested, and in 2018 he was charged with offences carrying the death penalty; his ideas, which include criticism of Wahhabism, have been described by some commentators as "Quranist", "moderate" and "tolerant". Other Saudi intellectuals, like Abd al-Rahman al-Ahdal, continue to advocate for the abandonment of Hadith and a return to the Qur'an.

Syria

There is a Quranist community within Syria, who began forming in the 19th century and followed the teachings set forth by the Indian theologian Syed Ahmad Khan and then spread to Syria soon afterwards via intermediary pilgrims. However, Quranist adherents precede these 19th century developments in the form of Mu'tazilites such as Ibrāhīm an-Naẓẓām, who lived for some period in these environs. Contemporary adherents of Quranism in Syria have included Muhammad Shahrur.

Turkey

In Turkey, Quranist ideas became particularly noticeable, with portions of the youth either leaving Sunni Islam or converting to Quranism. There has been significant Quranist scholarship in Turkey, with Qur'an-centred scholars holding professorships at Turkish universities, such as Yaşar Nuri Öztürk.

Quranists have responded to the criticisms of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) with arguments and challenged them to a debate.

Tunisia

In Tunisia, Quranist ideas have been associated with the historian and Islamologist Mohamed Talbi (1921–2017). Talbi advocated reliance on the Quran as the primary source of religious guidance and was critical of traditional interpretations based on Hadith and classical jurisprudence. In 2013, he founded the International Association of Quranic Muslims.

Quranist voices in Tunisia have participated in public debates about the role of religion in society, particularly after the Tunisian revolution in 2011, though they remain a minority current.

Other places

In Morocco, rejecting the Hadith has become a growing trend. Quranists who have been vocal in their criticism of Hadiths include Ahmed Assid, Mohamed Lamsiah, and Rachid Aylal. Quranists are present in Pakistan. In 1920, the Lahore High Court gave legitimacy to the Ahl-e Quran group as a Muslim sect.

Legal status

The legal treatment of Quranists varies considerably by country, ranging from unrestricted practice to state-sanctioned harassment and criminal prosecution.

In Egypt, adherents have periodically faced state action over their religious beliefs. In August 2020, Egyptian security forces detained Reda Abdel Rahman, a teacher and Qur'anist blogger, along with several relatives; his relatives were released after a few days, but Abdel Rahman was held incommunicado for more than forty days before being brought before state prosecutors and charged with joining a terrorist organisation and spreading false news. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) called for his release, stating that Egypt's blasphemy laws and pre-trial detention practices had been used against him because of his religious interpretation. Abdel Rahman was released in February 2022 after roughly a year and a half in pre-trial detention.

In Saudi Arabia, authorities arrested the writer Hassan al-Maliki, whose ideas some commentators describe as Quranist, in September 2017 and brought charges against him in October 2018; Human Rights Watch reported that Saudi prosecutors sought the death penalty, with two of the fourteen charges relating specifically to his questioning of the authenticity of certain Hadith and his criticism of early Islamic religious figures, alongside separate charges concerning political statements.

In Sudan, twenty-five men were charged with apostasy and threatened with the death penalty in 2015 after being accused of following Quranist teachings; they were released on bail after more than five weeks in detention.

By contrast, Quranist groups and publications operate openly and without legal restriction in some countries. In Pakistan, the Lahore High Court ruled in 1920 that a waqf (religious endowment) established in favour of the Ahl al-Quran movement was valid under Muhammadan law, effectively recognising the group's standing as a Muslim religious body. In Turkey, Qur'an-centred theologians such as Yaşar Nuri Öztürk have held academic posts at public universities.

Notable organisations

• Association Internationale des Musulmans Coraniques, Quranist organisation founded in Tunisia promoting Quranism and countering Salafism
• Izgi Amal, Kazakh Quranist organisation
• Kala Kato, mostly Nigerian Quranist movement
• Quran Sunnat Society, Indian Quranist movement, with its headquarters in Kerala
• Tolu-e-Islam (organization), non-denominational Quranist organisation founded by Ghulam Ahmed Perwez
• United Submitters International, a related Qur'an-centred movement founded by Rashad Khalifa in Tucson, Arizona

Notable individuals

Individuals with full or partial Quranistic ideas include:

• Muhammad Shahrur (1938–2019), Syrian civil engineer, philosopher and author. He developed a contemporary reading (qirāʾa muʿāṣira) of the Quran that rejected traditional medieval tafsīr and Hadith-based authority. Central to his methodology is the principle of anti-synonymy (no tarāduf): he argued that no two words in the Quran are true synonyms and that each term carries a distinct meaning. This led him to differentiate key terms such as al-Kitāb, al-Qurʾān, al-Dhikr and others that classical scholarship often treated as interchangeable. He also formulated the Theory of limits (ḥudūd Allāh), according to which the Quran sets fixed upper and lower boundaries for legislation while allowing human societies flexibility within those boundaries, and he largely rejected classical abrogation (naskh). His works, especially Al-Kitāb wa-l-Qurʾān: Qirāʾa Muʿāṣira (1990), provoked strong opposition from traditional Sunni scholars while influencing later Quran-centric and reformist thought.

• Mohammad Sadeqi Tehrani (1926–2011), Iranian Shia thinker who followed a Quranist approach in his legal ways. He studied in seminaries of Qum, Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini and Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i.

• Kassim Ahmad (1933–2017), Malaysian intellectual, writer, poet and an educator known for his rejection of the authority of Hadiths. He was the founder of the Quranic Society of Malaysia. At the time of his death, he was working on a Malay translation of the Quran.

• Muammar Gaddafi (1942–2011), Libyan revolutionary, politician and political theorist. He governed Libya as the "Brotherly Leader" of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya until 2011. He ruled according to his own Third International Theory.

• Gamal al-Banna (1920–2013), Egyptian author and trade unionist.

• Mustafa İslamoğlu (born 1960), Turkish theologian, poet and writer. He was criticised in Turkey and received threats for his ideas that promoted logic above tradition and denying the authority of Hadith, who he saw to be fabricated.

• Rashad Khalifa (1935–1990), Egyptian-American biochemist, professor, theologian, computer expert and Islamic reformer. In his book Quran, Hadith and Islam and his English translation of the Qur'an, Khalifa argued that the Qur'an alone is the sole source of Islamic belief and practice. He argued that the Qur'an contained a mathematical code based on the number 19 that proved its divine origin.

• Hassan al-Maliki (born 1970), a Saudi Arabian writer, historian and scholar.

• Ahmed Subhy Mansour (born 1949), Egyptian-American Islamic scholar.

• Chekannur Maulavi (born 1936), Islamic cleric who lived in Edappal in Malappuram district of Kerala, India. He was noted for his controversial and unconventional interpretation of Islam based on the Qur'an alone.

• Yaşar Nuri Öztürk (1951–2016), Turkish university professor of Islamic theology, lawyer, columnist and a former member of Turkish parliament. Öztürk died in 2016, due to stomach cancer.

• Muhammad Tawfiq Sidqi (1881–1920), Egyptian scholar and physician who focused on criticising Hadith as a whole from the Qur'an as well as based on Hadithic pseudo-scientific claims on medicine.

• Mohamed Talbi (1921–2017), Tunisian historian and professor. He was the founder of the Association Internationale des Musulmans Coraniques (AIMC), or International Association of Quranic Muslims.

• Caner Taslaman (born 1968), Turkish academician and writer known for his works on the Big Bang theory and the scientific structure of the Qur'an.

• Edip Yüksel (born 1957), Turkish philosopher, lawyer, Quranist advocate, author of Nineteen: God's Signature in Nature and Scripture, Manifesto for Islamic Reform and a co-author of Quran: A Reformist Translation. He taught philosophy and logic at Pima Community College and medical ethics and criminal law courses at Brown Mackie College.

• In addition to these names, Quranists assert that naturally Muhammad and his true companions were also Qur’an-centric.

Citations

Books and journals

• Ahmad, Aziz (1967). Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964. Oxford University Press.
• Birışık, Abdulhamit (2002). "Kurʾâniyyûn". Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi. 26: 428–429.
• Brown, Daniel W. (1996). Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-65394-7.
• Burton, John (1977). The Collection of the Qur'an. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-21439-1.
• Christelow, Allen; Adamu, Mahmud (2009). Mai Tatsine. Vol. III.
• Christmann, Andreas (2009). The Qurʾan, Morality and Critical Reason: The Essential Muhammad Shahrur. Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-17103-9.
• Della Vida, Giorgio Levi (1978). "Azāriḳa". Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed.).
• Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck; Smith, Jane I. (1993). Mission to America: Five Islamic Sectarian Movements in North America. University Press of Florida. ISBN 978-0-8130-1216-2.
• Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck; Smith, Jane I. (2014). Muslim Minority Groups in American Islam. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-993897-1.
• Hager (1985). Volksmacht und Islam (in German).
• Hansu, Hüseyin (2016). Debates on the Authority of Hadith in Early Islamic Intellectual History.
• Hasan, Mushirul (2006). The Aligarh Movement.
• Juynboll, G. H. A. (1969). The Authenticity of the Tradition Literature: Discussions in Modern Egypt. Brill Archive.
• Lewinstein, Keith (1991). "The Azāriqa in Islamic Heresiography". Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. 54 (2): 251–268. doi:10.1017/S0041977X00014774.
• Musa, Aisha Y. (2008). Hadith as Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic Traditions in Islam. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-60535-0.
• Musa, Aisha Y. (2010). "The Qur'anists". Religion Compass. 4 (1): 12–21. doi:10.1111/j.1749-8171.2009.00189.x.
• Nguyen (2007). United Submitters International.
• Öztürk, Mustafa (2010). "Modern Döneme Özgü Bir Kur'an Tasavvuru". Marife Dini Araştırmalar Dergisi (in Turkish). 10 (3).
• Qasmi, Ali Usman (2012). Questioning the Authority of the Past: The Ahl al-Qur'an Movements in the Punjab. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-195-47348-5.
• Rahman, Fazlur (1993). Modernist Muslim's Approach to Ḥadīth.
• Yüksel, Edip; al-Shaiban, Layth; Schulte-Nafeh, Martha (2007). Quran: A Reformist Translation. Brainbow Press. ISBN 978-0-9796715-0-0.

Internet sources

• "Quranists, Islam's Outcasts". Fanack. 30 January 2025. Retrieved 2 August 2026.
• "Quranists in Egypt". Minority Rights Group. April 2026. Retrieved 27 October 2026.