http://en.wikipedia.org/ redirect to https, but not change other entry points. Or one might redirect to https whenever someone first enters Wikipedia with an outsider referer specified (e.g. all links from Google trigger https). Or when someone enters the http site, we might provide them with a dismissable popup box asking if they want to move to https and then remember that choice with a cookie. Lots of things are possible, some more reasonable than others. I agree with the above users that a decision like this is really more of an issue for the WMF to try and judge whether https is an appropriate option for most readers, and how to implement that if so. Dragons flight (talk) 00:30, 18 February 2015 (UTC)
- I don't think that Jimbo said it would be a bad thing if HTTP was no longer available, but I agree that we should allow choice. I also agree that the WMF should be making the final decision, but do you (the community) agree that the WMF should consider a change from the current (HTTP-default) mode? Tony Tan98 · talk 02:07, 18 February 2015 (UTC)
Oppose Initial access should be the widest and most available protocol. That's http. I'd rather have a user start with http and debug https rather than having trying to figure out why their http request failed during a redirect to https. We have no way of knowing what access is available from an ISP or a particular platform. If a government decided to shutdown https traffic to Wikipedia, I don't think it's WP's place to lock that country out or make them debug why it doesn't work. Keep it simple and http the default. --DHeyward (talk) 02:38, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
- While that used to be the case in China, the situation has changed there. There is currently no evidence of any government in the world blocking HTTPS access to Wikipedia while allowing HTTP access, but there is evidence that some governments are filtering keywords in HTTP requests. Thanks, Tony Tan98 · talk 03:15, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
- They don't have to if they control DNS, firewalls and certificates. https and http are the same in that case. --DHeyward (talk) 04:33, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
- They are not the same. Please see my reply in our other conversation closer to the top in this section. Thanks. Tony Tan98 · talk 04:52, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
Oppose Misconfigured or old proxies tend to interfere with HTTP websocket traffic they don’t understand, but those same proxies will just forward on the encrypted HTTPS traffic. And, what about all the extra load on the servers? The CPU load has been known to increase when we switch to SSL and now only a few people use SSL, imagine if everyone was to use it all of a sudden. --QEDK ♠ T ♥ C 08:26, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
- HTTPS used to cause a lot of extra load on the server many years ago, but now technology (both software and hardware) has improved and the difference is negligible. According to Adam Langley, a Google Security Engineer, "SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10KB of memory per connection and less than 2% of network overhead" when Gmail switched to HTTPS default. This website offers more information about TLS performance. If properly implemented with SPDY and HTTP/2, it may even be faster than plain old HTTP. Moreover, the WMF would be the final judge on whether something can be implemented anyways, right? Tony Tan98 · talk 14:11, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
- Yes, you're right, thanks for pointing it out. Most CPUs now can handle 1500 handshakes/second/core or more. But, then, as it happened with StackExchange sites, switching to active/active load balancers (costs money) because sometimes SSL fails to utilise multiple physical cores. Encryption makes caching an load balancing much harder. This might result in a huge performance penalty. But connection setup is really a show stopper for most applications. On low bandwidth, high packet loss, high latency connections (mobile device in the countryside) the additional round trips required by TLS might render something slow into something unusable. And, as recently, uncovered some computers could have been hijacked already, as the recent Superfish incident has shown. Just another generic man-in-the middle attack, where the self-signed certificate allows the software to decrypt secure requests. I'm not citing this as a reason for oppose, just noting something that happened. And also, if people want to enable https when available, they have the HTTPS Everywhere extension. But in the end, it's WMF's call. --QEDK ♠ T ♥ C 15:49, 20 February 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose this has made access for me difficult in the past in some countries and if we want to expand our users this is probably not the way to do it. --Tom (LT) (talk) 00:18, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Agree after HTTP/2 is implemented and proven stable on English Wikipedia server for users in USA. • Sbmeirow • Talk • 04:51, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Strongly Support Let me list some reasons here:
- When security is concerned, allowing both HTTP and HTTPS is not ideal. Since we use HTTP by default for anonymous visitors, if you use Google to search something, you will find that all Wikipedia links are HTTP. The problem is that even if you are a registered user, when you click a Wikipedia link on Google, your browser sends its first request in clear text, so your ISP, government, and any man-in-the-middle still know which articles you have viewed. Even worse, an active man-in-the-middle can modify the server's response so that you never receive the 301 redirect to HTTPS, and most people don't realize the difference. This is especially true for mobile browsers, some of which omit the protocol and lack a lock icon. This is why redirecting HTTP to HTTPS is not so secure. By enabling HTTPS by default for everyone ensures that search engines index HTTPS links.
- What we also should do is to enable HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). When browsers receive this header, all future requests to Wikipedia are automatically sent over HTTPS, and users cannot ignore certificate errors. Ideally, we should include Wikipedia in Chrome's HSTS preload list (which is also used by IE, Firefox, and Safari), so that the user's first time visit is secured. But note that whenever Wikipedia is preloaded on the HSTS list, there will be no options for anyone to disable HTTPS on Wikipedia.
- Google promotes HTTPS. Websites that use HTTPS get a higher ranking. (HTTPS as a ranking signal)
- After we adopt HTTP/2, using HTTPS will be faster than HTTP and this will be especially true for users with high latency. Please have a look at https://www.httpvshttps.com/. My test showed that "SPDY is 56% faster than HTTP". (HTTP/2 is based on SPDY.) Although HTTP/2 standard supports plaintext, at least Firefox will never support plaintext HTTP/2.
- China no longer blocks https://*.wikipedia.org, but does block https://*.m.wikipedia.org/ and http://zh.m.wikipedia.org/. I would really appreciate it if Wikimedia Foundation can change the DNS record of mobile-lb.eqiad.wikimedia.org to an IP address which is not blocked in China.
- Among Alexa Top 10, Google, Facebook, YouTube, Yahoo, and Twitter require HTTPS on their homepages. If they can require HTTPS, why couldn't we?
- W3C and Internet Architecture Board officially encourage websites to use HTTPS by default:
- Chmarkine (talk) 10:29, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose Make it opt-in instead, and redirect only when a cookie is found (set by clicking a banner promoting secure access). This is more conservative in my opinion. Zhaofeng Li [talk... contribs...] 11:13, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- @Zhaofeng Li: But the problem is that MITM can remove the cookie if it is not secure. This does prevent passive MITM, but it doesn't work if an active MITM is present. Chmarkine (talk) 11:32, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- If unfortunately the final consensus is to make HTTPS opt-in, I hope we implement it with HSTS (i.e. introducing Extension:HSTS, authored by User:Seb35). Chmarkine (talk) 11:42, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Browser usually provide some visual hints when the page is transmitted over a secure connection (a green padlock besides the address bar, for example), and users can easily notice if a crypto downgrade attack is being used against them. The HSTS idea looks good to me, but do note that users won't be able to turn it off easily in case they want the insecure version back. Zhaofeng Li [talk... contribs...] 11:52, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Yes. The indicator is actually obvious, but I worry many users just don't look at it. A research in 2006 concluded "participants who received no training in browser security features did not notice the extended validation indicator and did not outperform the control group." I hope users nowadays are more educated in web security, but I still believe websites should provide best security by default to most users. Chmarkine (talk) 12:11, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose Unfortunately, I'm not seeing how this proposal actually benefits Wikipedia's mission. Instead, the rational used to justify it is to get around ISPs'/countries' filters that block content they find objectionable. However, I don't believe that it is Wikipedia's place to find bypasses around these filters in the first place. —Farix (t | c) 15:12, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- That is not the only rationale of this proposal. Governments in most countries (including the USA) are now known to be monitoring internet traffic and putting them in large databases. This means that the articles that each reader reads are likely to be logged. Not only does HTTPS make large-scale snooping very difficult, it also prevents ISPs from monitoring what any given user has read or searched for on Wikipedia, protecting readers' privacy. This is one of the primary reasons that Google switched to HTTPS default for all searches. Tony Tan98 · talk 16:14, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- I don't believe switching to https will do anything to protect people from spying much less prevent them from being logged. Besides, this falls into the realm of WikiMedia Foundation's Privacy Policy and something that rest solely on the Foundation to decided. This is not something that should be up for discussion among Wikipedia editors. —Farix (t | c) 18:31, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- @TheFarix: As I stated above, the reasons for using HTTPS include: 1) preventing man-in-the-middle attacks, 2) improving performance (when HTTP/2 is used), 3) getting higher rankings on Google, 4) IAB and W3C encouraging using HTTPS. Using HTTPS on Wikipedia is just like using HTTPS on online banking websites, because "it has become apparent that nearly all activity on the Web can be considered sensitive, since it now plays such a central role in everyday life" (Securing the Web). Chmarkine (talk) 18:36, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- @TheFarix: It is a well established fact that HTTPS encryption protects people from spying and traffic logging. It is not a matter of opinion or belief. When a user visits a HTTPS secured website, the ISP can only see the domain name of the server, not the actual contents that the user is sending and receiving. In the case of Wikipedia, this means that the ISP will only know that the user is using Wikipedia, but it cannot tell what articles are being read and what terms are being searched for. The protection that HTTPS offers is described in detail in the articles HTTPS and Transport Layer Security, and elsewhere on the internet as well. I also recommend that you read the earlier questions, answers, and comments in this section about HTTPS.
- I do agree that the WMF should make the final decision about whether to implement something like this. What this proposal is asking is whether the community thinks that the WMF should consider a change from the current HTTP-default mode. Thanks, Tony Tan98 · talk 19:34, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Our purpose is to grant all of humanity access to the sum of human knowledge. If people are being prevented from viewing Wikipedia because of mass surveillance and censorship (regardless of source), then we have a problem that is interfering with our purpose. I honestly do not see the point of writing Wikipedia articles if the people who need the articles' information the most are being prevented from reading them, and feel that any proposal that gives more people access to Wikipedia's content is a good proposal. Spirit of Eagle (talk) 04:07, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- I've been supporting and advocating this move far a very long time now. There's no reason why internet traffic in general should not be encrypted (welcome to 2015, performance is not an issue anymore). And readers' privacy is only one part of the reason. The other is integrity of the data (website) delivered to the client (reader). Only an encrypted connection ensures that the data is not tampered with on it's way to the reader (as, for instance, here). --bender235 (talk) 21:59, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
Oppose, I'm sorry, I thought wikipedia was for the world and not just the first world countries? not everyone has fast internet speed, we may be in 2015 but internet wise, most countries are still in the 90's ..I ONLY edited on dial-up with my previous account (and not by choice) and because then Wikimedia didn't force people onto https, i was able to edit faster, https as mentioned above is pathetic in caching information, especially scripts which will make the wiki much slower for anyone with low internet speed, I'm on HSDPA and i can barely get a speed on 20kbps on the wiki. There is an OPTION to enable https on Preferences, I urge people who want "safety" to enable that and those that care for performance over security, like me would prefer to stay on, this is an ORGANIZATION, not some underground hacking/torrenting site that needs to be secured from the governments..This is WIKIPEDIA, not WIKILEAKS...All governments spy on people, that doesn't mean we live in fear all our lives..its not like we exchange private information or illegal stuff on Wikipedia that we need to "secure" ourselves from the government.......are we?--Stemoc 23:23, 21 February 2015 (UTC)
- Browsers do cache content over HTTPS. The "2015" mention in bender235's comment was mostly referring to servers and their configurations, not the Internet connection. (You will see that if you click on his link.) Moreover, even though first-world governments are not as concerning, as you mentioned, Wikipedia is for the world, and there are governments in this world that restrict access to the web and filter content on Wikipedia. Not every government in the world is benevolent, and while it is not the primary objective, enabling HTTPS by default can certainly help protect readers and give them better access to information. Of course, like mentioned above, making it default does not mean there will be no way to opt-out. For your specific editing needs, you will still have the option of using HTTP by changing your account settings. Tony Tan98 · talk 00:05, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- @Stemoc: Totally understandable. But the good news is that only after a few months, you do not have to make the choice between security and performance. With HTTP/2 over TLS, you can enjoy both high speed and security. HTTP/2 over TLS is even faster than HTTP in most cases, in terms of load time and bandwidth. ([5][6] [7]) Since some browsers refuse to implement plaintext HTTP/2, we have to enable TLS in order to use HTTP/2. Chmarkine (talk) 01:54, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- High speed and security? I tried https a while back, net speed rarely went past 10kbps (thats as worse as dial-up) ..i don't care for security, our government does not care what people post on wikipedia and it definitely does not cache scripts well, reloading the same scripts over and over again everytime you try to make a simple edit or refresh the page is tiring, especially if they take a while to load...btw, anyone that wants to look up information on wikipedia even on countries where its restricted will always find a way to do so (proxies etc), we do not make it hard for everyone else because just a handful are missing out and as mentioned above, I prefer an opt-in option to an opt-out one..I'm just tired of WMF making stupid decision and then enforcing them and regarding the opt-out option, thats absurd Tony, HTTPS should be an OPT-IN option, not an OPT-OUT option and definitely NOT the ONLY OPTION.--Stemoc 02:27, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- Please check out this image, you can definitely forget the idea that everybody living in some kind of "first" world area can afford Internet connections that do not suck. Just in case adding an oppose, because I forgot that near the begin of this thread. € 0,02 by Be..anyone (talk) 02:38, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- @Stemoc: I never say https is fast today. I mean https will be faster than http after we adopt http/2, which will be available later this year. I know you don't care about security, but http/2 is faster than http. Why do you still hate it? Chmarkine (talk) 03:03, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- @Stemoc: Are you able to use Google search through your slow internet connection? Tony Tan98 · talk 03:14, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- Ofcourse i can use Google search, the shitty speed is only limited to wikimedia wikis which gets even worse on https, my net is slow but bearable but then i'm on Wikimedia more than I google so i do not see the reasoning (even then it takes forever to do google "image" search)..as per Be---anyone, it seems that slow connection is a problem in first world countries too so I really don't see a reason to "force" https on everyone..I think people who are supporting this idea are definitely NOT on slow connection or else they would understand how hard it is to browse, let alone edit wikipedia--Stemoc 04:40, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- Google uses HTTPS by default. You said that you are able to use Google search (over HTTPS) normally on your slow internet connection. Thus, HTTPS is not the issue that is slowing down your access to Wikipedia. Moreover, editors with accounts will have the option to disable HTTPS if they wish to do so. Also, I spend half of my time in China, and I know what it feels like to use a slow internet connection. Tony Tan98 · talk 05:06, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- when did i say it did?, I said it makes it worse as and also i generally use Google DNS so google will run faster either i like it or not and also there is a stupid bug on wikimedia created by csteipp which no one wants to fix which automatically FORCES users into https if they edit any page by mistake on https, the only way to get out of it is to clear all your cookies from *wikimedia/*wikibooks/*wiktionary and the 4 other domains and clear all centralauth cookies and log in and they go to all wikis and try logging in... I'm a file mover on commons which means if i fix a file name, my account automatically goes to all the wikis the image is on to replace the file but if i get logged out of a wiki because of this bug, it ignore that wiki which means the file remains unchanged..first they added the "forceHTTPS" cookie without asking for user opinions and now this....I'm part of the SWMT which means on some days i edit over 20 wikis and sometimes more, this flaw is not helping...https may be ok for those who edit only ONE wiki like most of those here, but its a PITA for users like me..you can't revert vandalism on a smaller wikis if you have to wait 30-45 seconds for all the effing scripts (js/css) to load...--Stemoc 06:58, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- Support - I totally agree. In the pre Snowden era, this probably would have been opposed as unnecessary and/or burdensome, although it's now absolutely necessary (per Google, Snowden, and many others) and it's barely burdensome, if at all. Yes there is censorship. But the chilling effect of surveillance has a negative impact on our mission. There are many places in the world in which asking questions about religion, sexuality, women’s rights, abuse, among others, or editing forbidden Wiki articles, can result in actions taken against them by their families, community, employers, or the state (judicial and extra-judicial). Wikipedia is an invaluable resource for information, but not for those that are afraid to access it because big brother or others are looking over their shoulder. - Becksguy (talk) 04:01, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose for viewing, Support for logging in and editing. Restricting HTTP access to Wikipedia's public content doesn't provide any real security gain, and it makes caching harder. It's also likely to break some older devices, such as the Kindle with free Wikipedia access. However, editing actions and logging in should be secured. John Nagle (talk) 07:55, 22 February 2015 (UTC)
- Comment Shall we move the discussion to meta, since this is a Wikimedia-wide issue affecting all communities? Zhaofeng Li [talk... contribs...] 01:11, 24 February 2015 (UTC)
- Doesn't really matter as one of the devs mentioned on IRC a few days ago that we will be moving to https (either we like it or not) ..--Stemoc 01:26, 24 February 2015 (UTC)
- Support Everyone should be able to read Wikipedia articles without having to fear government surveillance or censorship. If people who need Wikipedia's information are prevented from getting it because of mass surveillance or censorship, then our purpose of granting people access to the sum of human knowledge is under attack and needs to be protected. Even if this RFC does not pass, I think that we should do a better job of informing readers about HTTPS, and make it easier to switch in. Spirit of Eagle (talk) 01:44, 24 February 2015 (UTC)
- Strongly support per Becksguy, at all times. In addition, with attacks that rely on starting with an unencrypted channel, there's more and more reason to start off encrypted to begin with. I question concerns of users who are talking about bandwidth use, as well; I'd like to see some actual numbers showing TLS overhead versus average article sizes before I'd give those comments any credence. // coldacid (talk|contrib) 03:35, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- Chmarkine explains it even better, above. Even HSTS can be defeated by a man in the middle if you start with unencrypted communication. Default to HTTPS, the sooner the better. // coldacid (talk|contrib) 03:39, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- Perspective Please don't pretend this is for site security. If we cared about site security, we'd have a password policy. I'm also kind of baffled by this hypothetical use case of someone who has to fear people eavesdropping their Wikipedia reading habits, but is ignorant of the use of HTTPS. Where does this end? Remove public editing histories? A one-way hash for editor names? The whole concept of a Wiki is open and public. Not secure and secret. Gigs (talk) 16:57, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- No straw men please - you know very well that those things aren't going to happen. For one thing it would violate the license terms, and editors can be pseudonymous anyway if they choose. You're right that this wiki is public, but that only covers overt participation, not reading, where people would have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
- Also, I don't think (generally) people are saying this move is for site security, it's for the readers' security. BethNaught (talk) 17:07, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- Please actually read the above proposal, Gigs. It is (mainly) not intended for site security, but for the security & privacy of readers. No one is proposing to make this wiki secretive; it is and always will be open and public. I genuinely hope that you were actually confused and not trying to make a straw man argument. Tony Tan98 · talk 17:45, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- This is also another reason to either block editing via Tor or at least include a big "you are not as anonymous as you think" message on the edit pages served to Tor exits: an attacker able to observe your network traffic can trivially correlate bursts of activity with Wikipedia's public edit histories. Edits look different from reading: reading a page is a large response to a small request, while editing is a large response to a large request. If we really want to take the paranoid approach, we should modify the software to include random bits of other articles (as comments) in every page sent over HTTPS. Currently, an attacker might be able to guess what articles are being read by looking at the sizes of the responses from the servers. Pathore (talk) 22:45, 25 February 2015 (UTC)
- @Pathore: While what you are saying (traffic analysis) is certainly theoretically possible, it is currently not an easy task for even a government to use for mass snooping. It is not "trivial." Moreover, Wikipedia does not allow edits from Tor unless the user logs in and has IP block exemption.
- The main purpose of this proposal is to prevent mass snooping (and censorship) of readers by upgrading to the HTTPS protocol by default, which is what many other websites such as Google have started to do years ago. As a side benefit, HTTPS also ensures the integrity of data being transferred, so that a user can be certain that the page from Wikipedia has not been tampered with (censored or inserted with ads) while in transit.
- We are not trying to take the "paranoid approach" and there is currently no need to "include random bits of other articles." Given the sheer number of articles we have and the current state of technology, it should be very difficult (currently) for someone to use traffic analysis to correlate encrypted traffic to specific articles that are being read. However, because it is trivially easy to sniff unencrypted traffic using tools such as Wireshark, I strong believe that we should enable HTTPS encryption by default for all readers. Since you have not yet stated it, may I ask for your opinion on this proposal? Tony Tan98 · talk 01:49, 26 February 2015 (UTC)
- Correlating public edit histories to network activity is trivial, especially over a longer period of time, and identifies the network location behind an account, fingering an editor.
- Identifying pages based on their size is neither trivial nor particularly accurate, but should be a concern if we are really worried about our readers' privacy, given the poor standards of "evidence" associated with mass snooping fishing expeditions. Exactly how accurate such an attack would be depends on the distribution of page sizes given links. (A snoop can guess that users tend to follow links from the page that they are reading; this means that if pages A and B are the same size, but A links to C and B links to D, which are different sizes, a snoop could guess that a user was more likely on A or B, based on a subsequent request that appears to be either C or D. This game of Guess Who? scales, although I don't know exactly how well.)
- If I understand correctly, HTTP/2 allows the server to send the client extra resources that have not (yet) been requested. We could use this to return a number of random extra articles (that the client will cache) with each request, further enhancing reader privacy. Even looking at someone's cache wouldn't tell you what articles they were reading, since the server stuffed extras in there at every opportunity. Exactly how to choose those extra items is a good question.
- I'm currently unsure of my position on this proposal. On one hand, Jimbo has promised to push Wikipedia towards HTTPS in response to privacy-violating politicians and I don't want to take whatever leverage Jimbo may have for human rights away by pushing that change regardless. On the other hand, the article you cite is from almost three years ago; perhaps the situation has changed and it is now necessary for the community to stand behind making good on its founder's promise. Has this come to pass? Do we need to stand behind Jimbo making good on his promise? Pathore (talk) 03:06, 26 February 2015 (UTC)
- Opposed It'll break links and infrastructure. It breaks caching important for overseas users and increased latency (unless WMF's planning 20+ more data centers). And unless we're padding the payload its still vulnerable to the Google Suggest side channel attack. — Dispenser 18:03, 5 March 2015 (UTC)
- 1. I don't understand what you mean by breaking links and infrastructure. Could you please explain?
- 2. Browsers do cache content over HTTPS.
- 3. TLS isn't slow anymore. I spend half my time in China, the other half in the U.S., and I use HTTPS; I have not experienced any noticeable latency or slowness. Tony Tan98 · talk 08:20, 10 March 2015 (UTC)
Just a quick update on where we are with this. Consistent with Jimmy's comments here, we do believe encryption should ultimately be the default for all web traffic, on our sites and elsewhere. That said, we have significant work lined up on improving the performance of Wikimedia's HTTPS infrastructure (phab:T86666, phab:T35890) which we aim to complete in coming weeks. We're also collecting global performance metrics as we tune our setup. We need to fully understand performance impact and other potentially negative consequences before any switchover to HTTPS for all traffic (or a less dramatic solution, such as pointing search engines to the HTTPS version).--Erik Moeller (WMF) (talk) 06:08, 7 March 2015 (UTC)
The web is inexorably marching toward secure encrypted traffic. See today's NY Times op-ed piece Stop Spying on Wikipedia Users, written by Jimmy Whales and Lila Tretikov, in which they discuss a lawsuit against the NSA. I think that nails it for us here. Offering Transport Layer Security (or TLS/HTTPS) for Wikimedia projects with opt-out as the default is the only way to go. Otherwise, due to human nature, too many readers/editors will not opt-in which results in those using encryption as standing out, and therefore being targeted for increased surveillance. Everyone needs to use encryption all the time and everywhere, such that it becomes the norm. - Becksguy (talk) 15:29, 10 March 2015 (UTC)
- Support. Chmarkine's and bender235's rationales above convince me. Using https will make all Wikipedia pages secure, as opposed to fast and insecure; performance isn't really an issue at this point. More and more webpages on the internet are using https. However, https should be opt-in for unregistered users. Epic Genius (talk) 01:37, 17 March 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose. Some internet browsers, particularly embedded browsers which receive few updates after their release, may have difficulties with this. I'm sorry, but I just don't see any importance in this. Exactly what on wikipedia needs to be secure? People are arguing for more privacy without considering whether there's anything worth securing. ― Padenton|✉ 01:28, 26 March 2015 (UTC)
- Who the hell is browsing Wikipedia on a phone so old that its browser doesn't support HTTPS? I highly doubt that we'll have people trying to read the site on some circa 2000 feature phone. // coldacid (talk|contrib) 02:04, 26 March 2015 (UTC)
- @Coldacid: A lot of phones don't, even more embedded browsers don't (such as those in TVs or game consoles) ― Padenton|✉ 16:02, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- Could you give a specific example? Most phones today support HTTPS. Tony Tan98 · talk 18:12, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- Pretty sure every game console of this and the last generation support HTTPS as well. Without some naming and shaming of recent devices by Padenton, I find myself unable to believe their claim. I wouldn't mind if WMF would chip in with some user-agent stats for the past year as well, so we have an idea of how (in)frequently users without HTTPS support even come to Wikipedia. // coldacid (talk|contrib) 18:38, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- This is NOT about securing Wikipedia content (which remains open and available to anyone), rather its about protecting user's privacy in accessing WP, in much the same way a battered women is given anonymity to protect her from reprisals. Something quite different and in the opposite direction from securing WP. - Becksguy (talk) 08:48, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- @Becksguy: Sorry, I didn't mean to imply anything about applying protection to wikipedia articles. This has nothing to do with battered women. So you're talking about preventing people from knowing what pages a user views? Is there any significant user survey in addition to the arguments above that users want such things? Sadly, there is a systemic bias in any Wikipedia namespace discussion towards active editors. There is already a setting to enable secure connection, and I don't see why that is not enough. ― Padenton|✉ 16:02, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- @Padenton: Internet traffic to Wikipedia has been specifically identified as one of the targets for NSA mass surveillance, and HTTPS can make monitoring by governments, ISPs, or other parties as difficult as possible. HTTPS can also prevent Wikipedia content from being selectively censored or inserted with ads by ensuring the authenticity of delivered content. While there is currently an option for users to use HTTPS, the default is HTTP (plain text), and research has shown that as many as 95% of users don't bother to change the default settings simply because they are not aware. Google, along with many other companies/organizations, has already made HTTPS the default or even the only method of accessing its websites. By making HTTPS the default method for accessing Wikipedia, we can protect those users with almost no noticeable change in experience for them. Tony Tan98 · talk 18:12, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- @Tony Tan 98: I still don't see how anyone has reason to be afraid of what their wikipedia browsing history shows, what is it you think the government will find out? Google is not Wikipedia, people don't type the same things into Google that they do into Wikipedia. People don't type in "How do I make bomb" or "where can I find child porn" into Wikipedia's search bar. Ad insertion is exclusive to a few obscure ISPs, non-intrusive, and there's a setting to make https the default method for accessing wikipedia in preferences. The 3rd link is irrelevant. People can make their own choices about their own privacy. If you want to propose a banner at the top of the page letting people know about the setting, I wouldn't oppose that. ― Padenton|✉ 18:37, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- If Wikipedia browsing history is useless, why is the NSA targeting it? Such history shows what a user has been reading and what his/her interests are. Its sensitivity can be seen in the lawsuit that the WMF filed against the NSA.
- What is the downside of using HTTPS? Usually things are disabled by default only when there are downsides; otherwise they are enabled by default. For example, why not remove airbags from cars and make it an option for people to install it themselves? Surely people should "make their own choices about their own" security? Because the benefits of having an airbag outweigh the virtually nonexistent downside.
- This proposal does not prevent people from explicitly opting to not use HTTPS, but simply makes it the default should the user decide to go by the default. The benefits of using HTTPS (protection of privacy, prevention of selective censorship, assurance of authenticity, etc.) outweigh the possible downsides. Tony Tan98 · talk 20:11, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose If individuals are concerned about governments, internet service providers, and hackers from snooping on their traffic, they may elect to use https as I do. Forcing it on individuals is not appropriate. I would argue that also extends to editors changing links to other sites used as references to secure connections also. Walter Görlitz (talk) 04:10, 26 March 2015 (UTC)
- This proposal does NOT force HTTPS on anyone; users are completely free to opt out at anytime. What it does change is the default to secure, rather than insecure. If someone doesn't like it, just opt-out. - Becksguy (talk) 09:00, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- Support – While some might argue that users can choose to opt in, we know that most people are unaware of the issues and will take no action even if they are told of them; defaults should be set in the general best interest for those that will leave it at the default. —Quondum 18:56, 29 March 2015 (UTC)
- It appears that one of the reasons for opposing is "I have nothing to hide", so why encrypt. To which some might reply: (1) "I have nothing to hide... from those I trust." Does anyone that hasn't been living under a rock since the Snowden revelations, seriously think in their most optimistic pipe dreams that anyone that snoops on our communications has the slightest concern for our individual best interests or rights, or that those that commit surveillance on us are our friends? With global surveillance, there is so much data gathered about us, stuff that maybe doesn't seem important at the time, that can come back and bite us in the ass. Remember Big Brother. And today this is reality, not paranoia. (2) There are places in which people have very legitimate and real fears about surveillance. Places and communities where, for example, if someone is outed by viewing the kind of information that is taboo or contraband, they can suffer punishment, beatings, imprisonment, and execution, both judicial and extrajudicial. (3) When Windows XP was released in 2001, it had a form of firewall that was off, thus disabled by default (opt-in mode), and these machines were rapidly infected with various malware (viruses, worms, etc.) that also infected other vulnerable machines. Microsoft set the firewall default to enabled (opt-out) in SP2, realizing that users and the internet needed protection. No one manned the barricades when that default was changed. (3) Our mission is to realize "...a world in which every single person on the planet is given free access to the sum of all human knowledge." We will fail if there are those that are afraid or unable to access this knowledge due to surveillance or censorship and the very real and serious consequences thereof. - Becksguy (talk) 02:51, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- Oppose - I'm puzzled by this. If you're in the telephone directory, then apart from your number any Tom, Dick or Harry can see your home address. But if the NSA accesses your IP address, so what? There's no "IP directory" which links that to your name and address. 87.81.147.76 (talk) 10:38, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- They aren't just accessing your IP address, and HTTPS wouldn't prevent them from doing so. What it does is encrypt all data between you and the server, even what pages you are looking at. Using your example, this would be like the NSA not only being able to know your address and telephone number even if you have them unlisted, they can also read all your mail and hear all your telephone calls. And there is an IP directory, the one that your ISP keeps on you. They also know, and can possibly keep and therefore track, every connection you make through them. Without HTTPS your ISP can see that you visited this page, and all the text that is on it. Jerodlycett (talk) 10:52, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
- There seems to be some synthesis going on here. If I type "google" into my browser and click on "Gmail" the url that comes up is https://www.gmail.com. So are you telling me that even with that "s" on the end the NSA can still read my email? 87.81.147.76 (talk) 11:18, 30 March 2015 (UTC)
The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.