Religious Sectarianism in the Middle East
Religious sectarianism in the Middle East is very old, some would argue that it started with the split between the Sunni and Shi'a, however the modern understanding of religious sectarianism started with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This event made religion more important in politics and caused more fights between the Sunni and Shi'a groups. Sunni and Shi'a are the two main sects in Islam, that have different beliefs about who should have led after the Prophet Muhammad. Later events like the 2003 invasion of Iraq made the problems between the two groups worse.
Turkey
In 1511, there was a pro-Shi'a revolt, known as Şahkulu Rebellion, which brutally suppressed by the Ottomans. Modern-day Turkey is mostly Sunni Muslim, but it also has Alevis. Alevis are a group within Shi'a Islam with their own beliefs and traditions. They are about 10% to 40% of the total population, or around 20 to 25 million. Alevis were targeted in several like the 1978 Maraş massacre, 1980 Çorum massacre and 1993 Sivas massacre.
The current government supports Sunni Islam more, which sometimes causes problems with Alevis. For example, even though the Alevis are officially seen as Muslims in Turkey, their special places of worship, called cemevis, are not legally recognized like mosques are. This means they don’t get the same government support or benefits that the Sunni or Shi'a do.
Iran
Sectarianism in Iran has existed for a very long time. During the Safavid dynasty, Shi'ism became the official government religion, this meant that the clergies were able to benefit from more rights that they could not before. This also meant that they were able to have political influence while also being socially and economically independent. During this time, the ruler changed often, which meant that the rights and power of the clergy also changed. This led to the 1906 constitutional revolution, which limited the power of the ruler and increased the power of the religious leaders. The religious leaders kept getting more powerful throughout the years, which led to changes in the Iranian society. This led to Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran forming in 1979.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s government became led by Shi'a religious leaders who have strong political power. This created a sectarian system where Shi'a Islam is favored, and religious minorities like Sunnis and Baha’is often face discrimination. Modern-day Iran is mostly Shi'a Muslim, and Shi'a Islam is the state religion. The government promotes Shi'a ideas inside Iran and supports Shi'a groups like Hezbollah in other countries, which adds to regional tensions. The leadership uses religion to unify Shia people but also to oppose groups they see as threats, increasing sectarian divisions in Iran.
Iraq
After Saddam Hussein was overthrown in 2003, sectarian conflict in Iraq got worse. Sunni terrorist groups began attacking Shi'a people. In 2006, the Iraqi Civil War started; it was between different sectarian Shi'a and Sunni groups. Many Sunnis said they were being treated unfairly. In 2005, news came out that Sunni prisoners were being tortured by the government. This violence and fear led Iraqis to flee or move to safer areas. These problems continued a long history of sectarian power struggles.
Syria
Sectarianism in Syria was not always violent. There were already tensions before the attacks in Aleppo and Damascus in 1850 and 1860. Some scholars say that these attacks were because of the modernizing reforms, the Tanzimat, within the Ottoman Empire. Another reason for the tensions could have been the European powers passing through the Silk Road. They created friendships with local sects, but only with the sects that were familiar to them, this caused new social classes to emerge, mainly Christians, Druzes and Jews. These new social classes stripped the Muslim classes of their privileges. Another influence on the communal relations in Syria was Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt. He ruled the country between 1831 and 1840. He caused even more tension between the Druze and the Maronite Christians by giving the Christians guns.
Because of all of the outside influence, the Syrians had witnessed a lot of massacres on the different religions, this made the different sects distrustful of one another. To protect the minority sects, Henri Gouraud from France created five different states for these five different sects: Armenians, Alawites, Druzes, Maronite Christians, and Sunni Muslims. Because of this, the Alawites were able to gain power and eventually grant some very high positions to their community. In 1961 to 1980, they were not the only community holding power but due to propaganda pushed by the Ba'ath regime in Syria, it was perceived this way. Because of this, the regime was considered to be sectarian, which caused the Alawite community to group together, since they were scared that they would lose their power.
Before the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, people had mixed identities and didn’t always think in sectarian terms. However, when protests began, the regime used fear and rumours to make people afraid of each other and see the protests as dangerous and sectarian. Rumours of attacks on churches or Muslim violence were spread in minority areas to make them scared for their safety. These tactics created panic and suspicion; they turned peaceful protests into a violent sectarian civil war.
Yemen
In Yemen, the main two groups that are fighting are the Salafis and Shi'a Houthis. In the past, divisions in Yemen between sects, used to be less intense than those in Pakistan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Recently, the situation has changed after the Houthi takeover in 2014. Most political forces in Yemen are characterized by regional interests instead of regional sectarianism. Examples of regional interests include how close the Northern part of the country is to Hejaz (this is where the Zaydis live), how close the Southern coast is to the Indian Ocean trade route (this is where the Shafi'is live), and the oil and gas fields in the Southeast of the country (this is where the Sufi Ba'Alawi live).
Sectarianism reached Yemen in 1911 because of the Treaty of Daan, which divided the country into an Ottoman controlled section and an Ottoman-Zaydi controlled section. Both parts had different religions, Sunni Islam in the Ottoman controlled section, and Zaydi-Shia Islam in the Ottoman-Zaydi controlled section. Yahya Muhammed Hamid ed-Din ruled over the Zaydi portion. This agreement did not affect the sectarian fights between the two groups, the fights in Yemen were mainly nonsectarian. After the Ottoman Empire collapsed the Shafi'is were forced to accept Yahya Muhammed Hamid ed-Din as their ruler.
The region was then unified for the first time in the 1990 Yemeni Unification. To help with this unification the Myth of Qahtanite was created as a nationalist narrative. Not all groups fit into this narrative, like the Al-Akhdam and the Teimanim. This caused tensions, which led the Teimanim made a Jewish state in ancient Yemen, later on this Jewish state led to the 1947 Aden riots, which led to the Teimanim leaving Yemen.
In modern-day Yemen, the rivalry between Salafists and Houthis is not the same as the Sunni and Shi'a mentioned earlier. Not all Houthis are Shi'a and not all Zaydis are Houthis, but most Houthis are from the Zaydi branch. Most Shi'a are from the Twelver branch. Houthis are often exploited for political purposes, their slogan is 'Death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews.'
Saudi Arabia
Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia can be seen through the problems with the Shi'ite population, who make up about 15% of the population in Saudi Arabia. Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia are pushed aside socially, politically, religiously, legally, and economically, whilst facing discrimination in education and work. This is because, in 1744 there was a coalition between the House of Saud and Wahhabis, who see Shi'itism as polytheism.
Lebanon
Sectarianism in Lebanon is built into the country’s laws and political system, and the country officially recognizes 18 sects. Power has always been divided by religion in Lebanon, since Ottoman rule, and later through the 1926 constitution and the 1943 National Pact. The 1990 Taif Agreement also kept this structure.
In times of crisis, like the economic problems in Lebanon today, sectarian leaders gain support by providing services and presenting themselves as protectors of their sects. Despite the 2019 protests, this sectarian system remains strong. The state is weak, and powerful sectarian groups make real change difficult.
Political parties sometimes try to exploit religious division for political gain. Some might use the process of sectarianization to ensure the survival of the regime. This is carried out by posing a certain group as a threat to the security of the country, to lessen the support for the group.
Sectarian identity often becomes a foundational element of state legitimacy or identity. An example of this is Iran’s post 2003 political restructuring and the tensions between it’s three main sects, the Sunnis, the Shi'a and the Kurds. The United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought the Shi'a majority into power, removing the Sunni ba’ath regime. Due to contrary expectations the Shi'a refused to form a strictly opposite power pole to Iran and the Sunnis were unhappy with their new role as the under-priviledged minority.
Political divisions based on sectarian identity are not just happening in Iran, they could also happen in other Middle East countries that have a large Shi'a minority or a Shi'a majority that feels oppressed.
Sectarian Identity and Power
The current sectarian situation dates back to the birth of Islam and the “major schism”. The Shi’a separated from mainstream Islam, at first for political reasons and then it became a question of faith. The divide was aggravated through centuries of warfare and fighting and the Sunni oppressing the Shi'a. This shows how sectarian identity is not entirely theological but a political identity rooted in history, marginalization, and modern power dynamics.
Power structures such as Arab nationalist regimes, like the Ba’ath party in Iraq, have reinforced exclusion of Shi'a populations, emphasizing the sectarian divides. Power exclusion keeps sectarian identity alive and politically charged. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq systematically excluded the Shi'a from meaningful participation in governance. In Saudi Arabia, the state’s support, in forms of subsidies or access to services, served to institutionally supress Shi'a influence both domestically and regionally.
Role of militia, patronage networks, sectarian clientelism
Since the state is unable to provide security and public services to marginalized and vulnerable communities, the vulnerable seek protection from private groups Iran’s support for Hezbollah shows how sectarian militias function as extensions of foreign and domestic political patronage. This provokes rival networks reinforcing sectarian identities through armed and social service provision.
Lebanon is a good example to understand why sectarianism can influence identity forming. Lebanon has multiple sects that coexist with each other, the three main ones are the Sunni Muslims, the Shi'a Muslims and the Maronite Christians. This can be seen in their education system. Religious communities can have their own school. Most Lebanese kids are enrolled in private schools that have different religious backgrounds. The government allows the schools to add religious material to their syllabus without interference from the government, but they monitor educational activities.
