Neo-Ottomanism

The fez, which entered public life in the Ottoman Empire as part of Mahmud II's Westernization reforms, became a symbol of Islamist anti-Kemalism in Turkey.
The extent of the Ottoman Empire in 1683

Neo-Ottomanism (Turkish: Yeni Osmanlıcılık or neo-Osmanlıcılık) is a reactionary, revisionist, monarchist, Islamic nationalist, neo-fascist, conservative and Islamist political ideology in Turkey that discredits the Turkish secular nationalist republic and its reforms, and glorifies the Ottoman dynasty and its traditionalist establishments like the caliphate. It is also an irredentist and imperialist ideology that, in its broadest sense, advocates to honor the Ottoman past of Turkey and promotes the greater political engagement of the Republic of Turkey within regions formerly under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, the predecessor state that covered the territory of modern Turkey and the surrounding area.

Emerging in its modern form after the Cold War and acquiring greater ideological significance under the AKP, this ideology has combined appeals to Ottoman history, pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic identity, diplomatic engagement, economic investment, religious patronage, and cultural diplomacy. Since the 2010s, it has increasingly incorporated military intervention, coercive diplomacy, overseas deployments, and challenges to established regional arrangements. Those who characterize Turkey as an imperialist nation point to the international expansion of Turkish corporations, the foreign-policy interests of the Turkish ruling class, and Turkey's military expansion.

The term "neo-Ottomanism" has been associated with Turkish leader Erdoğan's irredentist, interventionist, Pan-Islamist and expansionist foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the neighboring Cyprus, Greece, Iraq, Syria, as well as in Africa, including Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the term has been rejected by members of the Erdoğan government, such as the former Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and the former Parliament Speaker Mustafa Şentop.

Use of term

One of the first uses of the term was in a Chatham House paper by David Barchard in 1985, in which Barchard suggested that a "Neo-Ottoman option" might be a possible avenue for Turkey's future development. It seems also to have been used by the Greeks sometime after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

In the 21st century, the term has come to signify a domestic trend in Turkish politics, where the revival of Ottoman traditions and culture has been accompanied by the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, abbreviated AKP founded in 2001) which came to power in 2002. The use of the ideology by Justice and Development Party has mainly supported a greater influence of Ottoman culture in domestic social policy which has caused issues with the secular and republican credentials of modern Turkey. The AKP have used slogans such as Osmanlı torunu ("descendant of the Ottomans") to refer to their supporters and also their leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (who was elected President in 2014) during their election campaigns. These domestic ideals have also seen a revival of neo-Ottomanism in the AKP's foreign policy. Besides acting as a clear distinction between them and ardent supporters of secularism, the social Ottomanism advocated by the AKP has served as a basis for their efforts to transform Turkey's existing parliamentary system into a presidential system, favouring a strong centralised leadership similar to that of the Ottoman era. Critics have thus accused Erdoğan of acting like an "Ottoman sultan".

Two doctrines espoused by Turkey have been characterized as neo-Ottoman, imperialistic or expansionist: the Blue Homeland and Ahmet Davutoğlu's "Strategic Depth" doctrine.

History

Ottoman-era Imperialism

The Ottoman Empire in 1683; core possessions in dark green; vassal or autonomous areas in light green.

The Ottoman Empire was an imperial state that lasted from 1299 to 1922. At the height of its power under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire was a powerful multinational, multilingual empire, which invaded and colonized much of Southeast Europe, the Middle East, Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. At the beginning of the 17th century the empire contained 32 provinces and numerous vassal states. Following a long period of economic decline and military setbacks against European powers, the Ottoman Empire lost control of much of its territory in Europe and Africa. Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy encourages increased engagement in these regions as part of Turkey's growing regional influence./

Turkish Neo-imperialism

There have been two waves of this ideology: the first, in the early 1990s, developed by the Turkish journalist and foreign policy advisor to President Turgut Özal, Cengiz Çandar; the second, associated with Ahmet Davutoğlu, former Prime Minister of Turkey and founder of the Future Party. Davutoğlu's foreign policy goals include establishing Turkey as an influential power within the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle East.

Neo-Ottomanism has been used to describe Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party which took power in 2002 under Erdoğan, who subsequently became Prime Minister. Neo-Ottomanism is a dramatic shift from the traditional Turkish foreign policy of the Kemalist ideology, which emphasized looking westward towards Europe. The shift away from this concept in Turkish foreign policy under Turgut Özal's government has been described as the first step towards neo-Ottomanism. Özal's neo-Ottomanism is characterized by a rediscovery of Turkey's multiple identities, in contrast to the unitary conception of the Kemalist republic, and by a tendency to prioritize economic aspects rather than politico-state and security logics.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Hossam Zaki, Senior Advisor to the Foreign Minister of Egypt, at the Munich Security Conference in 2010

Neo-Ottomanism had a basis in religious circles. Fethullah Gülen, an influential Islamic leader, looks both to personal transformation and social and political activism, and fully embraces Turkish nationalism—the defining characteristic of which is Islam, not nationality—and economic neoliberalism while stressing continuity with Turkey's Ottoman past. His emphasis on the role of the state and neoliberalism are legacies of the changing nature of the late Ottoman state from the vantage point of the east, including conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Yugoslavia and, later, the expansion of the Soviet Union and the threat it posed.

Turkey's new foreign policy started a debate, principally in the Western media, as to whether Turkey is undergoing an "axis shift"; in other words whether it is drifting away from the West and heading towards the Middle East and Asia. Such fears appear more frequently in Western media when Turkish tensions with Israel rise. Then-President Abdullah Gül dismissed claims that Turkey has shifted its foreign policy axis.

Focused on the rhetoric of the encounter between civilizations, Davutoğlu takes up the approach of former President Turgut Özal, who was the first Turkish president to begin discussions on Turkey's accession to the West. The latter put an end to the crisis that arose following the 1974 coup in Cyprus in order to move closer to the Western bloc, and thus to look towards Asia and extend its area of influence towards the countries of the Caucasus. Aiming at a policy of national harmony, Özal refuses any denial of specificity among Turkish citizens. He sought in particular to relaunch dialogue with the Kurds, wishing to put an end to the permanent state of war between the PKK and the Turkish state, a conflict which tarnished Turkey's image in the world.

A cult of personality was developed around Sultan Abdul Hamid II to tarnish Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's established image as the founder of modern Turkey.

Position of the Turkish government

Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign minister from 2009 to 2014 and "head architect" of the new foreign policy, has, however, rejected the term "neo-Ottomanism" to describe his country's new foreign policy. Davutoğlu described Turkey's foreign policy as "zero problems with neighbours", as opposed to Neo-Ottomanism, preferring "soft power" over overt military action. In contrast, as President, Erdoğan has overseen a revival of Ottoman tradition. While serving as the Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdoğan's AKP made references to the Ottoman era during election campaigns, such as calling their supporters 'grandchildren of Ottomans' (Osmanlı torunu). This proved controversial, since it was perceived to be an open attack against the republican nature of modern Turkey founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 2015, Erdoğan made a statement in which he endorsed the old Ottoman term külliye to refer to university campuses rather than the standard Turkish word kampüs.

On August 26, 2020, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gave a speech, stating the following:

"in our civilization, conquest is not occupation or looting. It is establishing the dominance of the justice that Allah commanded in the region. First of all, our nation removed the oppression from the areas that it conquered. It established justice. This is why our civilization is one of conquest. Turkey will take what is its right in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Aegean Sea, and in the Black Sea."

Many critics have accused Erdoğan of wanting to become an Ottoman sultan and abandon the secular and democratic credentials of the Republic. The American philosopher, Noam Chomsky, said that "Erdoğan in Turkey is basically trying to create something like the Ottoman Caliphate, with him as caliph, supreme leader, throwing his weight around all over the place, and destroying the remnants of democracy in Turkey at the same time".

When pressed on this issue in January 2015, Erdoğan rejected these claims and told TRT that he would aim to fill a role more similar to Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom, explaining, "In my opinion, even the UK is a semi-presidency. And the dominant element is the Queen".

Gestures

In July 2020, after the Council of State annulled the Cabinet's 1934 decision to establish the Hagia Sophia as museum and revoking the monument's status, Erdoğan ordered its reclassification as a mosque. The 1934 decree was ruled to be unlawful under both Ottoman and Turkish law as Hagia Sophia's waqf, endowed by Sultan Mehmed II, had designated the site a mosque; proponents of the decision argued the Hagia Sophia was the personal property of the sultan. This redesignation is controversial, invoking condemnation from the Turkish opposition, UNESCO, the World Council of Churches, the Holy See, and many other international leaders. In August 2020, he also signed the order that transferred the administration of The Chora to the Directorate of Religious Affairs to open it for worship as a mosque. Initially converted to a mosque by the Ottomans, the building had then been designated as a museum by the government since 1934.

Imperialistic characterization

Contemporary Turkish neo-Ottomanism has been interpreted by a number of scholars as a form of regional imperialism that seeks to convert the historical, cultural, and political inheritance of the Ottoman Empire into renewed Turkish influence over neighbouring societies. Its geographical scope encompasses the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and selected parts of Africa. Critics interpret these policies as efforts to reconstruct spheres of influence in which Turkey occupies a privileged position, sometimes at the expense of neighbouring states' autonomy.

Several scholars have interpreted neo-Ottomanism in relation to the development of capitalism in Turkey, the international expansion of Turkish corporations, and the foreign-policy interests of the Turkish ruling class. These interpretations emphasize economic and class relations alongside the historical, cultural, and religious dimensions of neo-Ottomanism.

Monopoly capital and financial interests

In On the Emergence of the New-Imperialist Countries (2017), Stefan Engel and his co-authors characterize Turkey as an emerging imperialist power. Their analysis traces the development of large Turkish capitalist conglomerates, including Koç Holding and OYAK, from the 1960s onward. They argue that the privatization of state-owned enterprises following the 1980 military coup promoted the merger of industrial, banking, and commercial capital, strengthening a domestic monopoly bourgeoisie. According to the authors, the subsequent development of major industrial enterprises and the expansion of Turkish monopolies beyond the domestic market provided an economic foundation for Turkey's growing regional ambitions. In 2016 ten Turkish monopolies ranked among the world’s 2,000 largest.

Özgür Öztürk accounts for Turkey's foreign policy through the international expansion of domestic finance capital: noting the integration of industrial, banking, and commercial capital within Turkey. He argues that the Turkish bourgeoisie's aspirations to establish Turkey as a regional power arose from the internationalization of these enterprises, rather than merely the geopolitical ideas of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Öztürk associates this process with neo-Ottomanism, arguing that during the AKP period, the Turkish big bourgeoisie adopted a foreign-policy orientation favouring neo-Ottomanism.

International expansion of Turkish capital

Engel and his co-authors describe the overseas expansion of Turkish corporations as a component of Turkey's emergence as a regional power. They report that Turkish outward foreign direct-investment stock increased from approximately USD$ 1.2 billion in 1990 to 44.7 billion (USD$) in 2015. They also discuss Koç Holding's overseas production facilities, its joint ventures with Ford Motor Company and Fiat, and foreign energy investments by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation.T

Transnational capitalist interests and regional hegemony

Mehmet Şenalp conceptualizes neo-Ottomanism as an attempt to establish a regional hegemonic arrangement within the broader international neoliberal capitalist system..

Toni Alaranta identifies commercial interests as a major component of Turkey's African foreign policy. He argues that export-oriented Anatolian businesses supporting the AKP have sought new overseas markets, while Turkish policymakers have invoked historical connections with the Ottoman Empire to strengthen diplomatic and economic relationships/.

Military expansion and regional influence

Engel et al. connects Turkey's growing military-industrial sector with its regional ambitions. Their analysis describes the expansion of domestic arms production and international defence-industry partnerships, including cooperation between Turkey's BMC, Germany's Rheinmetall, and Malaysia's Etika Strategi. The multi-national joint venture called "Rheinmetall BMC Defense Industries Inc. (RBSS)" offers countries around the world military technologies. As of 2015 the armed forces of Qatar hold a 49% stage in one of the subsidiaries. Engel and co-authors interpret these developments as part of Turkish imperialist expansionism. The authors further identify the expansion of Turkey's military-industrial complex , citing annual arms-production growth of 21% since 2011 and a military that is ranked as the world's tenth-largest and NATO's second-largest.

Sabri Ciftci argues that economic growth, the expansion of Turkey's defence industry, and an alliance between business interests and Islamists contributs to the government's growing military posture. Alaranta describes Turkey's growing military involvement in Africa as part of an effort to increase its geopolitical influence. His study examines Turkish military deployments and security cooperation in Libya and Somalia, alongside commercial interests, diplomatic activity, and humanitarian assistance.

According to Engel and his co-authors, Turkey's former colonial dependence has evolved into a relationship of mutual economic and political influence with the West, reflecting its emergence as a regional imperialist power. The AKP government has exploited Turkey's strategic geopolitical position and rivalries between the United States, European Union, Russia, and China to advance its expansionist ambitions. During the 2015 European refugee crisis, Turkey used the movement of millions of refugees from Iraq and Syria as leverage to pressure European governments into accommodating its foreign-policy objectives.

Territorial Expansionism

Turkey's borders according to the original National Pact (Misak-ı Millî). Some Turkish nationalists still claim these as the legitimate borders of modern-day Turkey.

Turkey has engaged or is currently engaged in territorial conflicts with its neighbours, including Greece, Syria, Iraq, and Cyprus. Turkish officials have also made irredentist statements regarding former Ottoman-controlled territories. In a 2016 speech, Turkish president Erdoğan mentioned the Georgian city Batumi in the context of Ankara's "heart and soul geography", while also asking: "Our physical boundaries are different from the boundaries of our heart...Is it possible to separate Rize from Batumi?".

Some Turkish nationalists still claim the territories specified in the National Pact during the Ottoman Parliament in 1920 and acknowledged by Mustafa Kemal later on.

Northern Syria

Several scholars and foreign-policy analysts characterize Turkey's military intervention in and occupation of Syria as examples of Turkish neo-ottoman imperialism aimed at gaining regional hegemony, suppressing autonomous local administrations and expanding Ankara's territorial influence. Beginning in 2016, Turkey pursued these objectives through successive military interventions, the occupation of northern Syrian territories, support for allied armed groups, and the establishment of Turkish-supervised administrative, economic, educational, and religious institutions. Erwin van Veen and Jan van Leeuwen argued that Turkey combined military occupation with systematic Turkification to consolidate its authority, restrict local self-government, and establish economically dependent territories under Turkish influence. Researchers have documented population displacement affecting non-Turkish minority communities, the restructuring of local governance, economic dependence on Turkey, and the extension of Turkish state institutions into Syrian territory. The overthrow of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 subsequently created new opportunities for Turkish influence over Damascus.

Aegean dispute with Greece

Turkey's policies in the Aegean dispute have been characterized by scholars and foreign-policy analysts as neo-Ottoman or imperialist. This set of conflicts has strongly affected Greek-Turkish relations since the 1970s, and has twice led to crises coming close to the outbreak of military hostilities, in 1987 and in early 1996. The issues revolve around interpretations of the Treaty of Lausanne, relating to the delimitation of territorial waters and national airspace.

Political scientist Peter Seeberg links Turkey's Blue Homeland doctrine to Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's references to the Ottoman occupation of Greece and objections to the Treaty of Lausanne. Pavel Gudev argues that neo-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism are used to justify expansive Turkish maritime claims. Mauro Bonavita describes Turkish demands concerning Aegean island sovereignty, demilitarization and disputed territorial status as accompanied by "nationalist, militarist and recently neo-Ottoman rhetoric,", arguing that Turkey has employed military pressure to obtain negotiating advantages. Omri Eilat interprets Turkish maritime policy as a longer-term effort to secure regional maritime control and prevent the application of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Dominique Marques de Souza likewise connects the Blue Homeland and neo-Ottoman doctrines to Turkish challenges to established maritime arrangements.

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Multiple sources:

References

  1. ↑ "The AKP and Turkey's Long Tradition of Islamo-Fascism". Turkey Analyst. Retrieved 11 February 2015.
  2. ↑ "Lozan Antlaşması'nın 100. Yılında Komplo Teorileri ve Gizli Maddelerin İzinde". Yalansavar (in Turkish). 25 June 2023. Archived from the original on 6 August 2023. Retrieved 18 July 2025.
  3. ↑ Türkiye'de Komplo Zihniyeti: Söylemler, Aktörler ve Eğilimler Üzerine Bir Araştırma, Nuh Akçakaya. Selçuk Üniversitesi, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Sosyoloji Bölümü
  4. ↑ Wastnidge, Edward (2 January 2019). "Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics" (PDF). Middle East Critique. 28 (1): 7–28. doi:10.1080/19436149.2018.1549232. ISSN 1943-6149. S2CID 149534930.
  5. ↑ Talmiz Ahmad (27 September 2020). "Erdogan's neo-Ottomanism a risky approach for Turkey". Arab News. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  6. ↑ Allison Meakem (25 December 2020). "Turkey's Year of Living Dangerously". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  7. ↑ Joseph Croitoru (9 May 2021). "Imperialist aspirations of Turkey - Ankara on course for expansion (Original: Imperialistische Bestrebungen der Türkei - Ankara auf Expansionskurs)". Die Tageszeitung: Taz. Die Tageszeitung (Taz). Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  8. ↑ Branislav Stanicek (September 2020). "Turkey: Remodelling the eastern Mediterranean" (PDF) (Briefing). European Parliamentary Research Service. Retrieved 18 May 2021.
  9. ↑ Raso Della Volta, Lea (2021). Les paradoxes du nationalisme turc: La construction de l'identité de 1869 au néo-ottomanisme de Recep Erdogan. L'Harmattan. p. 393. OCLC 1268921056.
  10. 1 2 3 Rašidagić, Ešref Kenan; Hesova, Zora (2020). "Development of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Western Balkans with Focus on Bosnia and Herzegovina". Croatian International Relations Review. 26 (86): 96–129. doi:10.37173/cirr.26.86.4.
  11. ↑ Öktem, Kerem (2023). "Turkey's Moment in the World: Davutoğlu and Neo-Ottomanism in Turkey's Foreign Policy". In Yenen, Alp; Zürcher, Erik-Jan (eds.). A Hundred Years of Republican Turkey: A History in a Hundred Fragments. Leiden University Press. pp. 473–476. doi:10.24415/9789400604551-089. ISBN 978-94-006-0455-1.
  12. ↑ Ataç, C. Akça (2019). "Pax Ottomanica No More! The "Peace" Discourse in Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Davutoğlu Era and the Prolonged Syrian Crisis". Digest of Middle East Studies. 28 (1): 48–69. doi:10.1111/dome.12152.
  13. 1 2 Kutlay, Mustafa; Öniş, Ziya (2021). "Turkish Foreign Policy in a Post-Western Order: Strategic Autonomy or New Forms of Dependence?". International Affairs. 97 (4): 1085–1104. doi:10.1093/ia/iiab094.
  14. ↑ Kunz Saponaro, J. Luigi M. (4 July 2025). "Neo-Ottomanism in Türkiye's Foreign Policy: Examining Turkish Influence in Syria (2016–2024)". Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (Opinion Paper 58/2025). Spanish Ministry of Defence. Retrieved 5 November 2026.
  15. ↑ Taşpınar, Ömer (1 August 2012). "Turkey's Strategic Vision and Syria". The Washington Quarterly. 35 (3): 127–140. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2012.706519. ISSN 0163-660X. S2CID 154875841.
  16. ↑ Antonopoulos, Paul (20 October 2017). "Turkey's interests in the Syrian war: from neo-Ottomanism to counterinsurgency". Global Affairs. 3 (4–5): 405–419. doi:10.1080/23340460.2018.1455061. ISSN 2334-0460. S2CID 158613563.
  17. ↑ Danforth, Nick (23 October 2016). "Turkey's New Maps Are Reclaiming the Ottoman Empire". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  18. ↑ Sahar, Sojla (2 September 2020). "Turkey's Neo-Ottomanism is knocking on the door". Modern Diplomacy. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  19. ↑ "Turkey's Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability". Middle East Institute. 21 April 2020. Retrieved 4 May 2021.
  20. ↑ Sinem Cengiz (7 May 2021). "Turkey's militarized foreign policy provokes Iraq". Arab News. Retrieved 9 May 2021.
  21. ↑ Asya Akca (8 April 2019). "Neo-Ottomanism: Turkey's foreign policy approach to Africa". Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  22. ↑ Michael Arizanti (10 October 2020). "Europe must wake up to Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambition". CAPX. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  23. ↑ Srdja Trifkovic (2011). "Turkey as a regional power: Neo-Ottomanism in action". Politea. 1 (2). ReadCube: 83–95. doi:10.5937/pol1102083t.
  24. ↑ Slaviša Milačić (23 October 2020). "The revival of neo-Ottomanism in Turkey". World Geostrategic Sights. Retrieved 13 May 2021.
  25. ↑ Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (8 November 2021). "Turkish Irredentism and the Greater Middle East". Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. Retrieved 12 November 2021.
  26. ↑ Raxhimi, Altin (26 April 2011). "Davutoglu: 'I'm Not a Neo-Ottoman'". Balkan Insight. Retrieved 7 January 2021.
  27. ↑ Rakipoglu, Zeynep (29 January 2021). "'Turkey determined to protect its rights': Official". www.aa.com.tr. Retrieved 21 June 2021.
  28. ↑ David Barchard (1985). Turkey and the West. Royal Institute of International Moin Ali Khan Affairs. ISBN 0710206186.
  29. ↑ Kemal H. Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays, BRILL, 2002, ISBN 978-90-04-12101-0, p. 524.
  30. ↑ "İstanbul Barosu'ndan AKP'li vekile çok sert tepki". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 16 January 2015. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  31. ↑ "AKP'li vekil: Osmanlı'nın 90 yıllık reklam arası sona erdi". www.cumhuriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 15 January 2015. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  32. ↑ "İslami Analiz". www.islamianaliz.com. Archived from the original on 28 October 2020. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  33. ↑ "AKP'nin Osmanlı sevdası ve... - Barış Yarkadaş". Archived from the original on 8 February 2015. Retrieved 8 February 2015.
  34. ↑ "Yeniden Osmanlı hayalinin peşinden koşan AKP, felaketi yakaladı!." www.sozcu.com.tr (in Turkish). 15 May 2013. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  35. ↑ "Kılıçdaroğlu: AKP çökmüş Osmanlıcılığı ambalajlıyor". T24 (in Turkish). 20 January 2015. Retrieved 8 October 2020.
  36. ↑ Adar, Sinem; Toygür, Ilke; Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (2020). "Turkey, the EU and the Eastern Mediterranean crisis". SWP Comment. doi:10.18449/2020C62.
  37. ↑ Quamar, Md. Muddassir (2024). Türkiye's Foreign Policy under the AKP: Implications and Challenges for India (PDF). New Delhi: Pentagon Press. pp. 69–70. ISBN 978-81-951894-2-7. Retrieved 22 October 2026.
  38. ↑ Taspinar, Omer (September 2008). "Turkey's Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Archived from the original on 15 September 2004. Retrieved 5 June 2010.
  39. ↑ "Neo-Ottoman minister". POLITICO. 8 July 2009. Retrieved 22 February 2023.
  40. ↑ "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy". Docslib. Retrieved 22 February 2023.
  41. ↑ Murinson, Alexander (December 2009). Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics). Routledge. p. 119. ISBN 978-0-415-77892-3.
  42. ↑ Kaya, Ugur (2017). "Frontière et territorialité dans la perception du monde selon l'État turc". Confluences Méditerranée. 101 (2): 13–25. doi:10.3917/come.101.0013. ISSN 1148-2664.
  43. 1 2 "Fethullah Gülen". rlp.hds.harvard.edu. Archived from the original on 27 March 2019.
  44. 1 2 3 4 Adem Palabıyık (29 June 2010). "Interpreting foreign policy correctly in the East-West perspective". Today's Zaman. Archived from the original on 3 July 2010. Retrieved 8 September 2010.
  45. ↑ "Claims of axis shift stem from ignorance, bad intentions, says Gül". Today's Zaman. 15 June 2010. Archived from the original on 6 October 2012. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
  46. ↑ Lea, Raso Della Volta (2021). Les paradoxes du nationalisme turc : La construction de l'identité de 1869 au néo-ottomanisme de Recep Erdogan. L'Harmattan. p. 401. OCLC 1268921056.
  47. ↑ Lea, Raso Della Volta (2021). Les paradoxes du nationalisme turc : La construction de l'identité de 1869 au néo-ottomanisme de Recep Erdogan. L'Harmattan. p. 396. OCLC 1268921056.
  48. ↑ Zürcher, Erik (1993). Turkey: A Modern History (2nd ed.). I. B. Tauris. pp. 80–81. ISBN 1-86064-222-5.
  49. ↑ İnanç, Yusuf Selmen (29 March 2024). "Abdulhamid II: An autocrat, reformer and the last stand of the Ottoman Empire". Middle East Eye.
  50. ↑ Yetkin, Murat (29 July 2020). "Abdülhamid: yazdım diye MİT sitesinden çıkarabilirler ama". Yetkin Report.
  51. ↑ Edhem Eldem. “Sultan Abdülhamid II: Founding Father of the Turkish State?” Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association, vol. 5, no. 2, 2018, pp. 25–46. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2979/jottturstuass.5.2.05. Accessed 18 July 2025.
  52. ↑ "I am not a neo-Ottoman, Davutoğlu says". Today's Zaman. Turkey. 25 November 2009. Archived from the original on 25 October 2013. Retrieved 9 January 2012.
  53. 1 2 3 Calian, Florin George (25 March 2021). "The Hagia Sophia and Turkey's Neo-Ottomanism". The Armenian Weekly. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
  54. ↑ "Europe must wake up to Erdogan's neo-Ottoman ambition". CapX. 10 October 2020. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
  55. ↑ Todorović, Miloš (2021). "TİKA's Heritage Restoration Projects: Examples of Foreign Aid or Proof of Neo-Ottomanism?". Insight Turkey. 23 (3): 141–156. doi:10.25253/99.2021233.8. S2CID 244203965. Retrieved 8 December 2022.
  56. ↑ Oktay Özilhan. "AKP'nin şarkısında 'Uzun adam' gitti 'Osmanlı torunu' geldi ! – Taraf Gazetesi". Taraf Gazetesi. Archived from the original on 8 February 2015.
  57. ↑ "Erdoğan: Kampus değil, külliye". ilk-kursun.com. Archived from the original on 3 June 2016. Retrieved 17 September 2021.
  58. ↑ "WATCH: Turkish conquest is spreading the justice of Allah, Erdogan says". World Israel News. 6 September 2020. Retrieved 18 November 2022.
  59. ↑ "Recep Tayyip Erdogan: The 'new sultan' now has a new palace – and it has cost Turkish taxpayers £400m". The Independent. Archived from the original on 18 June 2022.
  60. ↑ "Erdogan Is Turkey's New Sultan – WSJ". WSJ. 13 August 2014.
  61. ↑ "The next sultan?". The Economist. 16 August 2014.
  62. ↑ Akkoc, Raziye (2 February 2015). "'Turkey's president is not acting like the Queen – he is acting like a sultan'". Telegraph.co.uk.
  63. ↑ Barsamian, David (10 October 2020). "Noam Chomsky Discusses Azeri Aggression on Artsakh". Chomsky.info. Retrieved 10 January 2021. Erdogan in Turkey is basically trying to create something like the Ottoman Caliphate, with him as caliph, supreme leader, throwing his weight around all over the place, and destroying the remnants of democracy in Turkey at the same time, Chomsky said
  64. ↑ Akkoc, Raziye (30 January 2015). "Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan: I want to be like Queen of UK". Telegraph.co.uk.
  65. ↑ AFP. "Erdogan wants to be like Queen Elizabeth". The Times of Israel. ISSN 0040-7909. Retrieved 4 November 2021.
  66. ↑ Bethan McKernan (25 July 2020). "Erdoğan leads first prayers at Hagia Sophia museum reverted to mosque". The Guardian. Retrieved 2 February 2021.
  67. ↑ "Presidential Decree on the opening of Hagia Sophia to worship promulgated on the Official Gazette". Presidency of the Republic of Turkey: Directorate of Communications. 10 July 2020. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
  68. ↑ "Turkey's Erdogan says Hagia Sophia becomes mosque after court ruling". CNBC. 10 July 2020. Retrieved 24 July 2020.
  69. ↑ "Church body wants Hagia Sophia decision reversed". BBC News. 11 July 2020. Retrieved 13 July 2020.
  70. ↑ "Pope 'pained' by Hagia Sophia mosque decision". BBC News. 12 July 2020. Retrieved 13 July 2020.
  71. ↑ "World reacts to Turkey reconverting Hagia Sophia into a mosque". Al Jazeera. 10 July 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2020.
  72. ↑ "Kariye Camii ibadete açılıyor". Sözcü. 21 August 2020. Archived from the original on 21 August 2020.
  73. ↑ Yackley, Ayla (3 December 2019). "Court Ruling Converting Turkish Museum to Mosque Could Set Precedent for Hagia Sophia". The Art Newspaper. Retrieved 9 December 2019.
  74. ↑ Wastnidge, Edward (2019). "Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics". Middle East Critique. 28 (1): 7–28. doi:10.1080/19436149.2018.1549232.
  75. 1 2 3 Türkeş, Mustafa (2016). "Decomposing Neo-Ottoman Hegemony". Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. 18 (3): 191–216. doi:10.1080/19448953.2016.1176388. hdl:11511/45753.
  76. 1 2 Oğuz, Zeynep (2023). "Speculative Undergrounds: Oil's Absent Presence, Neo-imperial Nationalisms, and Earth Politics in Turkey". Cultural Anthropology. 38 (3): 411–437. doi:10.14506/ca38.3.05.
  77. ↑ Hovsepyan, Levon; Ter-Matevosyan, Vahram (21 July 2026). "Turkey's Assertive Turn in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: From Cautious Support to Strategic Engagement with Azerbaijan". Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies: 1–24. doi:10.1080/14683857.2026.2704513.
  78. ↑ Tanrıverdi Yaşar, Nebahat (2026). "A Relational Approach to Turkey's Security Engagement with African States". European Journal of International Security. 11 (1): 115–133. doi:10.1017/eis.2025.9.
  79. ↑ Cengiz, Fatih Çağatay (2020). "Authoritarian Turn, Sub-imperialist Foreign Policy, and the Failed Coup of 15 July 2016". Turkey: The Pendulum between Military Rule and Civilian Authoritarianism. Brill. pp. 177–202. doi:10.1163/9789004435568. ISBN 978-90-04-43556-8.
  80. ↑ Öztürk, Özgür (2011). "Türkiye finans kapitalinin dışa açılması" [The International Expansion of Turkish Finance Capital] (PDF). Devrimci Marksizm (in Turkish) (13–14): 106–132.
  81. 1 2 Şenalp, Mehmet Gürsan (2017). "Yeni-Osmanlıcılığın Ekonomi Politiğinin Bir Eleştirisi: Ulusötesi Bir Hegemonya Projesinin Yükseliş ve Düşüşü" [A Critique of Political Economy of Neo-Ottomanism: The Rise and Demise of a Transnational Hegemonic Project]. Praksis (in Turkish) (44–45): 937–970.
  82. ↑ Engel, Stefan; Fechtner, Gabi; Gärtner-Engel, Monika; Finkbohner, Oskar; Arnecke, Klaus (2017). "New-imperialist Turkey at the Crossroads between Europe and Asia". On the Emergence of the New-Imperialist Countries (PDF). Essen: Verlag Neuer Weg. pp. 46–51. ISBN 978-3-88021-470-5.
  83. ↑ Engel, Stefan (August 2017). On the Emergence of the New-Imperialist Countries (eBook). Essen, Germany: Verlag Neuer Weg. p. 49. ISBN 978-3-88021-470-5.
  84. ↑ Öztürk, Özgür (2011). "Türkiye finans kapitalinin dışa açılması" [The International Expansion of Turkish Finance Capital] (PDF). Devrimci Marksizm (in Turkish) (13–14): 106–110.
  85. ↑ Öztürk, Özgür (2011). "Türkiye finans kapitalinin dışa açılması" [The International Expansion of Turkish Finance Capital] (PDF). Devrimci Marksizm (in Turkish) (13–14): 129–131.
  86. ↑ Engel, Stefan; Fechtner, Gabi; Gärtner-Engel, Monika; Finkbohner, Oskar; Arnecke, Klaus (2017). On the Emergence of the New-Imperialist Countries (PDF). Essen: Verlag Neuer Weg. pp. 49–50. ISBN 978-3-88021-470-5.
  87. ↑ Alaranta, Toni (April 2020). Turkey in Africa: Chasing Markets and Power with a Neo-Ottoman Rhetoric (PDF) (Report). FIIA Briefing Paper. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. pp. 2–3. ISBN 978-951-769-634-0.
  88. 1 2 Engel, Stefan; Fechtner, Gabi; Gärtner-Engel, Monika; Finkbohner, Oskar; Arnecke, Klaus (2017). On the Emergence of the New-Imperialist Countries (PDF). Essen: Verlag Neuer Weg. pp. 50–53. ISBN 978-3-88021-470-5.
  89. ↑ Ciftci, Sabri (2023). "Military might: a domestic economy explanation of Turkish foreign policy". Turkish Studies. 24 (5): 764–787. doi:10.1080/14683849.2023.2196020.
  90. ↑ Alaranta, Toni (April 2020). Turkey in Africa: Chasing Markets and Power with a Neo-Ottoman Rhetoric (PDF) (Report). FIIA Briefing Paper. Finnish Institute of International Affairs. pp. 3–6. ISBN 978-951-769-634-0.
  91. 1 2 Danforth, Nick (23 October 2016). "Turkey's New Maps Are Reclaiming the Ottoman Empire". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 13 September 2021.
  92. ↑ Isachenko, Daria (2025). "The Riparian Logic of the Montreux Convention in Turkey's Black Sea Policy". Naval War College Review. 78 (1/2): 77–98. ISSN 0028-1484. JSTOR 48835535.
  93. ↑ Guthrie, Samantha (20 August 2018). "Turkish Investment in Adjara Shrinks". Georgia Today on the Web. Retrieved 29 June 2026.
  94. 1 2 Kunz Saponaro, J. Luigi M. (4 July 2025). Neo-Ottomanism in Türkiye's Foreign Policy: Examining Turkish Influence in Syria (2016–2024) (Report). Opinion Paper. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. p. 13.
  95. ↑ Kunz Saponaro, J. Luigi M. (4 July 2025). Neo-Ottomanism in Türkiye's Foreign Policy: Examining Turkish Influence in Syria (2016–2024) (Report). Opinion Paper. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. pp. 1–13.
  96. 1 2 Al-Hilu, Khayrallah (2021). The Turkish Intervention in Northern Syria: One Strategy, Discrepant Policies (Report). European University Institute. doi:10.2870/72894. ISBN 978-92-9084-982-7.
  97. 1 2 van Veen, Erwin; van Leeuwen, Jan (June 2019). Turkey in Northwestern Syria: Rebuilding Empire at the Margins (PDF) (Report). CRU Policy Brief. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. pp. 1–11.
  98. 1 2 Schmid, Dorothée (October 2020). Is Escalation Between France and Turkey in the Middle East and Beyond Inescapable? (Report). Syria Transition Challenges Project Discussion Paper. Geneva Centre for Security Policy. p. 7.
  99. ↑ Violakis, Petros (2023). "Putting the Common Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean under Scrutiny: Türkiye's Conflicting Role". Social Sciences. 12 (9): 481. doi:10.3390/socsci12090481.
  100. 1 2 Seeberg, Peter (2021). "Neo-Ottoman Expansionism beyond the Borders of Modern Turkey: Erdoğan's Foreign Policy Ambitions in Syria and the Mediterranean". De Europa. 4 (1): 107–108. doi:10.13135/2611-853X/5302.
  101. ↑ Gudev, Pavel A. (2021). "Foundations of Turkish Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean". Vestnik RUDN. International Relations. 21 (3): 472–486. doi:10.22363/2313-0660-2021-21-3-472-486.
  102. ↑ Bonavita, Mauro (16 May 2019). Contemporary Strategies and Conflicts in the Aegean Sea Region (PDF) (Report). Opinion Document. Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies. pp. 12–13.
  103. ↑ Eilat, Omri (2025). "Water Is Thicker Than Gas: Turkey, UNCLOS, and the Eastern Mediterranean in the Gas Decade, 2010–2020". The Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 16 (4): 377–400. doi:10.1080/21520844.2025.2569744.
  104. ↑ Marques de Souza, Dominique (30 June 2026). "Equity versus Legality in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Mavi Vatan Doctrine and Turkey's Objection of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)". Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval. 31 (2): 392–421. doi:10.21544/2359-3075.31225.

Further reading