Elections for the Shura Council (sometimes called the Consultative Assembly) were held in Qatar for the first time on 2 October 2021, allowing the public to vote for 30 out of the 45 seats, with the remaining 15 still appointed by the emir.
The Council has the authority to approve "general state policies and the budget", but "has no say in the setting of defence, security, economic and investment policy". The emir also maintained the final say upon any disagreement between himself and the Council.
Political parties are outlawed, and all candidates ran as independents. The election could not effect a change of government, which is appointed by the emir.
The elections, originally outlined in the 2003 constitution, had previously been scheduled for 2013, before being postponed in June of that year until at least 2016, at which point they were postponed again until at least 2019. Finally, in November 2020, EmirTamim bin Hamad Al Thani pledged to hold the election in October 2021.
In a 2024 referendum, future elections were abolished and struck from the constitution, making this the only legislative election in Qatar's history.
Background
Postponements and criticism of timing
In 2003, Qatar's new constitution first mandated that partial elections were to be held for the Shura Council, where 30 of its 45 members would be elected by the public, and 15 would remain appointed by the emir. Elections were first promised for 2005, but were delayed. In 2009, scholar Mehran Kamrava concluded that emir Hamad bin Khalifa's rhetoric on political liberalization was mostly meant to recruit support in the West, and predicted that "for the time being" chances that these elections would actually take place "seem minimal".
Elections were delayed several more times, until they were finally held in practice in 2021. Some observers, especially after the abolishment of further elections in 2024, noted that the timing of the election, after many delays, shortly before the 2022 FIFA World Cup, suggested that the election had more to do with Qatar wanting to improve its international image than with genuine political liberalization.
The authorities of the Shura Council
The Council has the authority to approve "general state policies and the budget", but "has no say in the setting of defence, security, economic and investment policy". The emir also retained veto powers over the body, and even if a two-thirds majority were to overrule said veto, the emir could "order the suspension of a given law for the period that he deems necessary to serve the higher interests of the country", giving him the final decision in any potential disagreement. The election could not effect a change of government, which is appointed by the emir.
Electoral system, eligibility and disenfranchisement
Electoral system
The vote was for 30 of the 45 seats in the Shura Council, with the remainder appointed by the Emir. The thirty members were elected from single-member constituencies by first-past-the-post voting.
Eligibility to vote and run as candidate
Voters had to be at least 18 years old, and candidates had to be at least thirty. Only citizens, who made up around 10% of Qatar's population at the time, were eligible to vote or run as candidates. However, naturalised citizens and citizens whose ancestors settled in Qatar after 1930 were barred from running or voting, unless they could prove that their grandfathers were born in the country, in which case they could vote based on "the place of residence of the tribe or family", or unless an Emiri Decree states them to have "Qatari origins".
Disenfranchisement, criticism, protest and repression
This led to criticism by international human rights organisations, who characterised it as "arbitrary voter disenfranchisement", as well as to protests led by members of one of the largest tribes in Qatar, Al Murrah, who were among those most affected by the discriminatory conditions. Several critics and protestors were detained by Qatari authorities, with Al Murrah members reporting that some were released only after "signing statements promising not to discuss their detention publicly and to remain off social media". Human rights organisations criticised this as repression of the right to free expression and freedom of assembly.
Campaign
A total of 233 candidates contested the 30 seats, with 26 women running. Political parties remained banned and all candidates ran as independents.
In 2024, general elections were formally discontinued. On 15 October Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani announced a constitutional referendum on proposals to abolish elections to the Shura Council and revert it to a fully appointed body. On 5 November the amendments were reportedly approved by 91% of voters, with a turnout of around 84%. As a result, the 2021 election stands as the only time in Qatari history that members of the Council were chosen by voters.
↑Shahnawaz, Mohammad; Alam, Mujib (2026), Ashwarya, Sujata; Alam, Mujib (eds.), "Political Participation in Qatar: From Municipal Elections to the Shura Council", Comparative Electoral Politics and the Quest for Representation in West Asia and North Africa, Singapore: Springer Nature, pp.365–390, doi:10.1007/978-981-95-3704-4_15, retrieved 2026-08-12, Approved in 2003 but delayed until 2021, the elections coincided with global attention before the 2022 FIFA World Cup, suggesting a strategic move to enhance Qatar's international image rather than deepen democratic governance. Thus, while Shura Council elections initially promised greater representation, their abrupt termination reveals Qatar's prioritization of political stability and global prestige over substantive democratization and meaningful participation. ... Initially seen as an important step towards participation, the 2021 Shura Council elections, approved in 2003 but delayed until after the 2017 Gulf blockade, were cancelled shortly after Qatar hosted the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Muftah, 2021). The timing suggests strategic manoeuvring to enhance Qatar's international image under global scrutiny. Repeated election delays since 2003 likely served as symbolic reforms intended to manage domestic expectations and bolster global legitimacy, rather than advance genuine political liberalization.
