Proving too much

In philosophy, proving too much is a logical fallacy which occurs when an argument reaches the desired conclusion in such a way as to make that conclusion only a special case or corollary consequence of a larger, obviously absurd conclusion. It is a fallacy because, if the reasoning were valid, it would hold for the absurd conclusion.

The judgement of fallacy is therefore largely dependent on a normative judgement of the "absurd" conclusion. A charge of "proving too much" is thus generally invoked, rightly or wrongly, against normatively-opposed conclusions, and so such charges are often controversial at the time they are made, as in the following examples:

Showing that an opponent has proved too much is a form of reductio ad absurdum.

References

  1. ↑ Arp, Robert; Barbone, Steven; Bruce, Michael (2019). Bad arguments: 100 of the most important fallacies in western philosophy. Hoboken (N.J.): Wiley Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-119-16578-1.
  2. ↑ Mizrahi, Moti. "On Proving Too Much". Acta Analytica.
  3. ↑ Coppée, Henry (1850). Elements of rhetoric: designed as a manual of instruction. J.H. Butler & Co. p. 234.

Further reading