Saul Smilansky

Saul Smilansky
שאול סמילנסקי
Born1961 (age 64–65)
Philosophical work
Era21st-century philosophy
RegionWestern philosophy
Analytic
InstitutionsUniversity of Haifa
Main interests
Ethics, Free Will, Meaning of Life
Notable ideas
Free Will Illusionism, Paradoxical Ethics
Websitehttps://www.saulsmilansky.com/

Saul Smilansky (Hebrew: שאול סמילנסקי; born 1961) is an Israeli philosopher and a Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Haifa. He is known for his works on free will and normative and applied ethics.

In normative and applied ethics, Smilansky has written extensively on moral paradoxes and related issues in what he terms "paradoxical ethics," where propositions may appear both plausible and absurd. His work addresses moral theory, justice, the role of self-deception and illusion in human life, population ethics, punishment, moral complaint and hypocrisy, gratitude, and contribution.

In the free will debate, Smilansky has developed two major lines of argument. First, he has defended a pluralistic approach to the compatibility question, which acknowledges both compatibilism and hard determinism (or other forms of free will skepticism) as partially valid, and seeks to integrate them. Second, he has advanced the position of Illusionism, according to which illusion plays a central and in many respects positive role in the free will problem.

Smilansky is the author of Free Will and Illusion (Oxford University Press, 2000), 10 Moral Paradoxes (Blackwell, 2007), which has been translated into seven languages, and Paradoxical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2026). He has also published more than one hundred papers in leading philosophical journals and edited collections.

Smilansky received his B.A. in philosophy from Tel Aviv University (1986) and his D.Phil. from Oxford University (Magdalen College) (1990).

Books

Selected articles (Partial List)

References

  1. ↑ Lam, Vanessa (1 December 2016). "On Smilansky's Defense of Prepunishment: A Response to Robinson". Philosophia. 44 (4): 1367–1374. doi:10.1007/s11406-016-9775-y. ISSN 1574-9274.
  2. ↑ Fischer, John Martin (1 June 2008). "My Way and Life's Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, and Perry". The Journal of Ethics. 12 (2): 167–189. doi:10.1007/s10892-008-9029-8. ISSN 1572-8609.
  3. ↑ Moriarty, Jeffrey (1 February 2013). "Smilansky, Arneson, and the asymmetry of desert". Philosophical Studies. 162 (3): 537–545. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9780-8. ISSN 1573-0883.
  4. ↑ Pirhayati, Ali (October 2024). "A Short Counter-argument to Belief in Progress". Think. 23 (68): 45–48. doi:10.1017/S1477175624000095. ISSN 1477-1756.
  5. ↑ Nadelhoffer, Thomas; Feltz, Adam (September 2007). "Folk Intuitions, Slippery Slopes, and Necessary Fictions: An Essay on Saul Smilansky's Free Will Illusionism". Midwest Studies in Philosophy. 31 (1): 202–213. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00156.x. ISSN 0363-6550.
  6. ↑ https://academic.oup.com/book/62721?login=false
  7. ↑ Smilansky, Saul (2007). 10 Moral Paradoxes. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 9781405160865.
  8. ↑ Fischer, John Martin (2001-10-26). "Review of Saul Smilansky's Free Will and Illusion". Times Literary Supplement. p. 28.
  9. ↑ Double, Richard (2001). "Review of Free Will and Illusion". Mind. 110 (437): 271–274. ISSN 0026-4423.
  10. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, no. 2 (1994): 355–363.
  11. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 12, no. 1 (1995): 41–53.
  12. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will.” *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy* 2 (1999): 143–152.
  13. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality of Illusion.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Free Will*, ed. Robert Kane. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
  14. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Can Deontologists Be Moderate?” *Philosophia* 15, no. 1:71 (2003): 9–29.
  15. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical 'Reductio'.” *Law and Philosophy* 30, no. 3 (2011): 353–367.
  16. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Morally, Should We Prefer Never to Have Existed?” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 4 (2013): 655–666. DOI:10.1007/s10790-013-9389-0.
  17. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “A Hostage Situation.” *Journal of Philosophy* 116, no. 8 (2019): 447–466.
  18. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will Denial and Deontological Constraints.” In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom, and Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), *Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society*, 79–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
  19. ↑ Smilansky, Saul, and Juha Räikkä. “Black Magic and Respecting Persons — Some Perplexities.” *Ratio* 33, no. 2 (2020): 173–183.
  20. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?” *Philosophical Quarterly* 70, no. 281 (2020): 850–867.
  21. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “The Moral Evaluation of Past Tragedies: A New Puzzle.” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 17, no. 2 (2020): 188–201.
  22. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “We Are All in This Life Together.” *Iyyun* 68 (2020): 85–93.
  23. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “A Puzzle About Self-Sacrificing Altruism.” *Journal of Controversial Ideas* 1, no. 1 (2021): Article 7. DOI:10.35995/jci01010007.
  24. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Contribution, Replaceability and the Meaning of Our Lives.” *Theoria* 87, no. 2 (2021): 193–213. DOI:10.1111/theo.12352.
  25. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Do You Have to Reply to This Paper?” *Philosophia* 49, no. 5 (2021): 1361–1368.
  26. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Overpunishment and the Punishment of the Innocent.” *Analytic Philosophy* 62, no. 4 (2021): 463–475. DOI:10.1111/phib.12206.
  27. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “The Idea of Moral Duties to History.” *Philosophy* 96, no. 1 (2021): 155–179.
  28. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Three Kinds of Failure.” *Iyyun* 69 (2021): 299–313.
  29. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Two Concepts of Effort.” *Philosophia* 50, no. 5 (2022): 2663–2673. DOI:10.1007/s11406-022-00494-z.
  30. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “The Moral Duty Not to Confirm Negative Stereotypes.” *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 21, no. 3–4 (2023): 379–403. DOI:10.1163/17455243-20234065.
  31. ↑ Smilansky, Saul. “Free Will Denialism as a Dangerous Gamble.” *Diametros* 21, no. 79 (2024): 119–131. DOI:10.33392/diam.1943.