Searchable symmetric encryption

Keyword search using an SSE scheme

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) is a form of encryption that allows efficient searching over a collection of encrypted documents or files without requiring decryption. SSE can be used to outsource files to an untrusted cloud storage server without revealing the files in plaintext, while preserving the server's ability to perform searches over them.

Description

A searchable symmetric encryption scheme is a symmetric-key encryption scheme that encrypts a collection of documents 𝐃=(D1,…,Dn), where each document DiβŠ†π•Ž is viewed as a set of keywords from a keyword space π•Ž. Given the encryption key K and a keyword wβˆˆπ•Ž, one can generate a search token tk with which the encrypted data collection can be searched for w. The result of the search is the subset of encrypted documents that contain the keyword w.

Static SSE

A static SSE scheme consists of three algorithms 𝖲𝖲𝖀=(π–²π–Ύπ—π—Žπ—‰,π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡,𝖲𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖼𝗁) that work as follows:

  • π–²π–Ύπ—π—Žπ—‰ takes as input a security parameter k and a document collection 𝐃 and outputs a symmetric key K, an encrypted index 𝐈, and an encrypted document collection 𝐄𝐃
  • π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ takes as input the secret key K and a keyword w and outputs a search token tk
  • 𝖲𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖼𝗁 takes as input the encrypted index 𝐈, the encrypted document collection 𝐄𝐃 and a search token tk and outputs a set of encrypted documents π‘βŠ†π„πƒ

A static SSE scheme is used by a client and an untrusted server as follows: the client encrypts its data collection using the π–²π–Ύπ—π—Žπ—‰ algorithm which returns a secret key K, an encrypted index 𝐈, and an encrypted document collection 𝐄𝐃. The client keeps K secret and sends 𝐄𝐃 and 𝐈 to the untrusted server. To search for a keyword w, the client runs the π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ algorithm on K and w to generate a search token tk which it sends to the server. The server runs Search with 𝐄𝐃, 𝐈, and tk and returns the resulting encrypted documents back to the client.

Dynamic SSE

A dynamic SSE scheme supports, in addition to search, the insertion and deletion of documents. A dynamic SSE scheme consists of seven algorithms 𝖲𝖲𝖀=(π–²π–Ύπ—π—Žπ—‰,π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡,𝖲𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖼𝗁,π–¨π—‡π—Œπ–Ύπ—‹π—π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡,π–¨π—‡π—Œπ–Ύπ—‹π—,π–£π–Ύπ—…π–Ύπ—π–Ύπ–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡,𝖣𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗍𝖾) where π–²π–Ύπ—π—Žπ—‰, π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡, and 𝖲𝖾𝖺𝗋𝖼𝗁 are as in the static case and the remaining algorithms work as follows:

  • π–¨π—‡π—Œπ–Ύπ—‹π—π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ takes as input the secret key K and a new document Dn+1 and outputs an insert token itk
  • π–¨π—‡π—Œπ–Ύπ—‹π— takes as input the encrypted document collection 𝐄𝐃 and an insert token itk and outputs an updated encrypted document collection 𝐄𝐃′
  • π–£π–Ύπ—…π–Ύπ—π–Ύπ–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ takes as input the secret key K and a document identifier id and outputs a delete token dtk
  • 𝖣𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗍𝖾 takes as input the encrypted data collection 𝐄𝐃 and a delete token dtk and outputs an updated encrypted data collection 𝐄𝐃′

To add a new document Dn+1 the client runs π–¨π—‡π—Œπ–Ύπ—‹π—π–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ on K and Dn+1to generate an insert token itk which it sends to the server. The server runs π–¨π—‡π—Œπ–Ύπ—‹π— with 𝐄𝐃 and itk and stores the updated encrypted document collection. To delete a document with identifier id, the client runs the π–£π–Ύπ—…π–Ύπ—π–Ύπ–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ algorithm with K and id to generate a delete token dtk which it sends to the server. The server runs 𝖣𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗍𝖾 with 𝐄𝐃 and dtk and stores the updated encrypted document collection.

An SSE scheme that does not support π–£π–Ύπ—…π–Ύπ—π–Ύπ–³π—ˆπ—„π–Ύπ—‡ and 𝖣𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗍𝖾 is called semi-dynamic.

History of Searchable Symmetric Encryption

The problem of searching on encrypted data was considered by Song, Wagner and Perrig, although earlier work on Oblivious RAM by Goldreich and Ostrovsky could, in theory, be used to address the problem. This work proposed an SSE scheme with a search algorithm that runs in time O(s), where s=|𝐃|. Goh and Chang and Mitzenmacher proposed new SSE constructions with search algorithms that run in time O(n), where n is the number of documents. Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky later proposed two static constructions with O(opt) search time, where opt is the number of documents that contain w, which is optimal. This work also proposed a semi-dynamic construction with O(optβ‹…log⁑(u)) search time, where u is the number of updates. An optimal dynamic SSE construction was later proposed by Kamara, Papamanthou and Roeder.

Goh and Chang and Mitzenmacher proposed security definitions for SSE. These were later strengthened and extended by Curtmola, Garay, Kamara and Ostrovsky, who introduced the notion of adaptive security for SSE. This work was also the first to observe leakage in SSE and to formally capture it as part of the security definition. Leakage was further formalized and generalized by Chase and Kamara. Islam, Kuzu and Kantarcioglu described the first leakage attack.

All the previously mentioned constructions support single-keyword search. Cash, Jarecki, Jutla, Krawczyk, Roşu and Steiner proposed an SSE scheme that supports conjunctive search in sub-linear time in n. The construction can also be extended to support disjunctive and Boolean searches that can be expressed in searchable normal form (SNF) in sub-linear time. At the same time, Pappas, Krell, Vo, Kolesnikov, Malkin, Choi, George, Keromytis and Bellovin described a construction that supports conjunctive and all disjunctive and Boolean searches in sub-linear time.

Security

SSE schemes are designed to ensure that an untrusted server cannot learn any partial information about the documents or search queries beyond a well-defined and reasonable leakage. The leakage of a scheme is formally described using a leakage profile, which itself can consist of several leakage patterns. SSE constructions attempt to minimize leakage while achieving the best possible search efficiency.

SSE security can be analyzed in several adversarial models, but the most common are:

Security in the Persistent Model

In the persistent model, there are SSE schemes that achieve a wide variety of leakage profiles. The most common leakage profile for static schemes that achieve single keyword search in optimal time is Ξ›opt which reveals the number of documents in the collection, the size of each document in the collection, if and when a query was repeated and which encrypted documents match the search query. It is also possibly to construct schemes that leak considerably less, at the cost of increased search time and storage.

For dynamic SSE schemes, state-of-the-art constructions with optimal-time search have leakage profiles that guarantee forward privacy, meaning that inserts cannot be correlated with past search queries.

Security in the Snapshot Model

In the snapshot model, efficient dynamic SSE schemes can be constructed with no leakage beyond the number of documents and the size of the collection. When using an SSE construction that is secure in the snapshot model, careful consideration must be given to deployment, as some systems might cache previous search queries.

Cryptanalysis

A leakage profile describes only the leakage of an SSE scheme and does not indicate whether that leakage can be exploited. Cryptanalysis is therefore used to better understand the real-world security implications of a leakage profile. A wide range of attacks exist, operating under different adversarial models, based on a variety of assumptions, and targeting different leakage profiles.

Systems Supporting Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Company Product / Feature SSE Notes
MongoDB Queryable Encryption Client-side field-level encryption indexes enabling equality search; SSE-style
Cossack Labs Acra (searchable encryption / blind indexes) Field-level encryption with blind index-based searchable encryption (exact, prefix, suffix); SSE-style
Baffle Read Queryable Encryption (Baffle Data Protection) Symmetric, proxy-based encryption that supports queries over protected data; SSE-like construction
AWS AWS Database Encryption

SDK – Searchable Encryption

Client-side encryption with HMAC-based beacons for equality search; related to SSE but explicitly noted by AWS as differing from academic SSE

See also