A Veracidade das reuniões deste consenso são disputadas dentro de Taiwan.[carecede fontes]? O partido nacionalista compreende que o consenso tornou a Política de Uma China em "Uma China, Diferente interpretações" (一中各表, 一個中國各自表述); na pratica, isso significa que China e Taiwan se reconhecem e concordam que só existe uma China, no entanto, discordam sobre quem é a China de fato (Ver sobre o Estatuto de Taiwan). Em outras palavras, a China reconhece o governo de Taiwan, mas eles seriam ilegítimos.
Os criticos também afirmam que o termo "Uma China, Diferente interpretações" é uma anacronia, pois, o termo nunca teria sido usado nas reuniões de 1992, mas sim em Abril de 2000 por Su Chi. Também há a versão de Lee Teng-hui que negou a existência do consenso em 2006.
↑Chen, Dean P. (2024). «Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP "1992 Consensus"». In: Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing. China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. [S.l.]: Leiden University Press. ISBN9789087284411
↑Chen, Yu-Jie; Cohen, Jerome A. (2019). «China-Taiwan relations re-examined: the "1992 consensus" and Cross-Strait agreement». University of Pennsylvania Law School. Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. Consultado em 20 de julho de 2024. Unlike her predecessor Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen has not recognized the existence of the “1992 Consensus.” Yet, she has tried to reach a middle ground between Beijing’s stance and that of her own party, the DPP. In her inaugural speech, she carefully worded her position, acknowledging the first meeting between SEF and ARATS in 1992 as “historical fact.” She stated that the meeting had “arrived at various joint acknowledgments and understandings” and was conducted “in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences,” a phrase often used by Beijing... In other words, while Tsai did not accept the “1992 Consensus,” she acknowledged that the 1992 meeting took place in a positive spirit that should lay the groundwork for sustaining crossstrait peace. ...Under international law, the 1992 SEF-ARATS exchanges would not amount to a legally binding agreement on the meaning of “One China” and other sovereignty questions. While SEF and ARATS apparently possessed the capacity to represent their own governments in concluding agreements on cross-strait cooperation, the intention of each organization was to sign legal instruments recording their agreement on the specific matters under negotiation... The parties never evinced an intention to conclude an agreement on sovereignty matters involving the notion of “One China” precisely because they could not reach agreement on the thorny issues involved. Instead, they bypassed the “One China” issues and went on to conclude formal written agreements on technical matters. In other words, the element of intent to create legal obligations on sovereignty questions did not exist. This is evident from the caution of SEF—it carefully avoided committing itself to a written agreement with regard to the all-important political issue and suggested that each side orally state its differing position separately. This poses a contrast with the formal agreements later concluded by the two organizations on various economic and technical matters. None of these cross-strait agreements touched upon the “One China” issue, and all were concluded without regard to it.
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