| ← 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 → Midterm elections | |
| Election day | November 3 |
|---|---|
| Incumbent president | ▌Donald Trump (R) |
| Next Congress | 120th |
| Senate elections | |
| Seats contested | 35 of 100 seats (33 seats of Class II + 2 special elections) |
| Map of the incumbents: Democratic incumbent Democratic incumbent retiring Republican incumbent Republican incumbent retiring or lost renomination No election | |
| House elections | |
| Seats contested | All 435 voting members 5 of 6 non-voting delegates |
| Map of the incumbents: Democratic incumbent Democratic incumbent retiring or lost renomination Republican incumbent Republican incumbent retiring or lost renomination Independent incumbent No incumbent Vacant | |
| Gubernatorial elections | |
| Seats contested | 39 (36 states, 3 territories) |
| Map of the incumbents: Democratic incumbent Democratic incumbent term-limited, retiring, or lost renomination Republican incumbent Republican incumbent term-limited or retiring Retiring Independent No election | |
Elections are scheduled to be held, in large part, on November 3, 2026, in the United States. In these midterm elections, scheduled to occur during Republican president Donald Trump's second term, all 435 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and 35 of the 100 seats in the U.S. Senate will be contested to determine the 120th United States Congress. Thirty-nine state and territorial U.S. gubernatorial elections, attorney general elections, and numerous state and local elections, will also be contested.
The lead-up to the elections was marked by an inflation surge amidst the United States affordability crisis, including on gas, healthcare, and food prices. Polling indicated this was the top issue for voters ahead of the elections. The unpopular 2026 Iran war, driven by deliberate Iranian shipping attacks and prolonged diplomatic talks aimed at raising gas prices ahead of elections, along with tariffs, contributed to high prices. Other key issues include opposition to water, energy, and pollution-intensive AI data centers; restrictions on abortion; corruption; and foreign policy, including relations with American allies along with proposed expansionism.
The Democratic Party is anticipated by analysts to win the House, and the Senate has become competitive following strong polling in favor of Democrats in Republican territory. Analysts describe record low approval ratings for Trump as being a drag on down-ballot Republican races.
Trump called on Republican-led states to enact rare mid-decade redistricting to boost the party's chances of holding power ahead of historical losses for the incumbent party during midterm elections. The moves prompted reciprocal redistricting from Democratic-led states through measures such as California's Election Rigging Response Act. In April 2026, the Supreme Court ruled in Louisiana v. Callais that parts of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which enabled the creation of majority-minority districts were unconstitutional. The ruling was expected to create additional Republican districts, and some scholars classified it as allowing for legal discrimination against minorities. The Trump administration involve made repeated false claims of voter fraud and used taxpayer dollars to fund Republican campaign advertisements.
In the 2024 United States presidential election, Republican nominee Donald Trump defeated Democratic nominee Kamala Harris. Key issues shaping the campaign included public concern for the post-pandemic recovery and rising inflation.
ABC News, CBS News, Fox News, NBC News, the Associated Press, MS Now and CNN will use the Voter Poll by SSRS to gather voter preferences and opinions for the 2026 elections. From 2018 to 2024, ABC, NBC, CBS and CNN used data from the National Election Pool while the Associated Press and Fox News relied on AP VoteCast.
The Republican Party performed worse than expected in the November 2025 general elections. Democratic candidates Abigail Spanberger of Virginia and Mikie Sherrill of New Jersey won their gubernatorial races over their Republican opponents by larger than expected margins. Democrats performed strongly in the concurrent state legislative elections, winning a supermajority in the New Jersey General Assembly and expanding their majority in the Virginia House of Delegates. In New York City, Democrat Zohran Mamdani, a self-identified democratic socialist, was elected mayor in a three-way race against Republican Curtis Sliwa and independent former governor Andrew Cuomo, who ran as a moderate relative to Mamdani. The main theme of the elections was the United States affordability crisis.
Voters' views of Trump's presidency will likely be a factor in the election. During the 2025 off-year elections, exit polls found that many voted in opposition to Trump or said that he was not a factor. Surveys released in late 2025 and early 2026 found that many viewed Trump's handling of the economy and immigration, two issues that propelled him to victory in the 2024 election, negatively. During elections held in his first term, Trump was on the minds of many who voted. In September 2026, Trump featured in a two-day midterm convention in Dallas to rally support and raise funds—historically, this type of event is reserved for presidential election years, although the Democratic National Committee had previously held midterm-year party conferences in 1974, 1978 and 1982. Many Republicans on the ballot attended, but many also chose to forego the event, which RNC Chairman Joe Gruters dubbed a "Trump-a-Palooza."
The outbreak of the 2026 Iran war on February 28 introduced a further complicating factor, with rising gasoline prices and other economic challenges emerging as central electoral concerns. Analysts argued that gasoline prices represented the most direct channel through which the costs of the Iran war were transmitted to American voters, and that domestic electoral pressure from fuel costs was a primary political driver behind the Trump administration's push toward a ceasefire ahead of the November midterms. In response to the general unpopularity and economic concerns of the Iran war, several Republican candidates have distanced themselves from Trump and his approach to the war and have called for operations in Iran to end. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer compared the political environment in 2026 to the one in 2006, when dissatisfaction with George W. Bush's handling of the Iraq war led to many Democratic victories in the elections that year.
The nearly seven-month-old war in Iran became a political liability for some vulnerable Republican candidates ahead of the November midterms. In September 2026, two Republicans in tight Senate races — Mike Rogers of Michigan and Ashley Hinson of Iowa — called for a swift end to the conflict, distancing themselves from President Trump. Hinson, who had voted six times against measures to curb Trump's war powers, said Iowans "shouldn't have to foot the bill at the pump or the checkout line for the war in Iran." Rogers, who had previously backed Trump's strikes, released a campaign ad urging that the war "end and end quickly." The shift came as Trump's approval rating fell to 32%, a career low, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll, with Americans souring on both his handling of the economy and the war. Diesel prices reached record highs, a particular concern in Iowa, where agriculture plays an outsized role in the state's economy. Other Republicans also moved to distance themselves: Iowa Representatives Zach Nunn and Mariannette Miller-Meeks reversed their stances and voted to limit Trump's war powers, while Representative Maria Elvira Salazar of Florida warned that Trump's immigration crackdown had gone too far. Democrats characterized the moves as election-year repositioning. By mid-October, the same polling series put Trump's approval at 31% — a record low for either of his terms and a point below where it stood two weeks earlier. The same Reuters/Ipsos survey had Democrats ahead of Republicans 47% to 35% on the generic congressional ballot, a 12-point gap that was the widest of the election cycle.
The administration's immigration policies, including deportations by ICE due to strengthened funding via the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, were also scrutinized. Polling found that Hispanics, who were considered a key reason for Trump's victory in the 2024 election, overwhelmingly disapproved of Trump and had largely swung back towards Democrats due to economic concerns and dissatisfaction of Trump's handling of immigration and deportation. An October Reuters/Ipsos poll found that majorities said the cost of living was their top issue for the election and that 76% of Americans blamed Trump's policies for increasing inflation, including 57% of Republicans. Signs of an enthusiasm gap between Republican and Democratic voters were noted by analysts as possibly forecasting a Democratic "blue wave". In September 2026, American political analyst Charlie Cook described this phenomenon as a "red undertow", arguing that anticipated Democratic victories would come not from a rising Democratic tide, but a drowning Trump brand.
A month before the election, polling consistently found that Democratic candidates were leading key races for state governorships and those that would determine control of the Senate, with large swings towards Democratic candidates by independent voters. The New York Times highlighted how Kansas, a state that had not elected a Democratic Senator since the Second World War, had become a competitive battleground amid an unexpected surge of Democratic support deep in Republican territory. Democratic support came amidst multiple polls finding record-low approval ratings for Trump which some analysts considered was negatively impacting down-ballot races. Trump repeatedly told voters to pretend he was on the ballot to increase Republican enthusiasm which Democrats and some analysts considered a mistake owing to his low approval ratings. Increasing concerns about the Republicans' position in the November midterm elections have exposed tensions within Donald Trump's political structure. According to Reuters, Trump criticized his advisers for their election strategy, including decisions related to campaign spending and candidate selection. This is despite polls suggesting that Democrats could gain control of the House of Representatives.
In October, the Trump administration called for Ukraine to replace Volodymyr Zelenskyy as the nation's president and struck a deal with Russia to purchase the country's fuel in an effort to bring down diesel prices before the elections, and deepened Russian-American cooperation. The fuel deal was criticized by Democrats and some Republicans for undercutting the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which allowed the president to waive tariffs or sanctions if he certified to Congress that doing so was in the national interest of the United States, a provision that some Democratic lawmakers concerned about Trump unilaterally lifting the sanctions against Russia pointed to in their opposition to the bill.
Foreign nations have sought to interfere with the 2026 elections. Since 2016, "the Kremlin has initiated online influence operations in every American federal election cycle" according to declassified intelligence documents. According to US intelligence officials, in 2026, Russia is targeting Americans with covert online disinformation campaigns to undermine confidence in the election and seed and promote domestic divisions with the goal to "inject chaos". No evidence exists that Russia has attempted to take aim at voting machinery or compromise the voting process. US intelligence officials have described the effort as less extensive and coordinated than prior years, with officials speculating Russia is less interested in midterm races than presidential contests and is distracted by the Russo-Ukrainian war.
US intelligence has speculated Iran may have engaged in online influence efforts, and in August 2026 Meta Platforms reported a small number of accounts on Facebook and Instagram originating from Iran spreading AI generated content with "anti-Republican views". US intelligence speculates that unlike prior years where China supported or opposed individual candidates based on their views, it may stay out of the 2026 elections due to fears of blowback. On October 14, 2026, the social network X suspended more than 13,000 accounts linked to Iran, Russia, and China ahead of the US midterm elections.
On July 30, Trump alleged that China had collected 220 million American voter identification files including private information in 2022 and that it amounted to election interference. Trump then declassified intelligence records he presented as evidence the US election system falls "catastrophically short". Election experts pushed back on some of the claims, stating that voter registration files are public and easily accessible in most states and would not necessarily allow interference with the voting process. On September 28, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the Department of Defense would launch an effort dedicated to combating foreign meddling in US elections that would use "advanced intelligence and cyber capabilities to identify, disrupt, and neutralize foreign interference". Democratic leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees have expressed worry that Trump will use claims of foreign interference in an attempt to intervene in the midterm elections.
The second Trump administration has issued executive orders and other presidential directives instituting federal department and agency actions that have impacted election administration by state governments, federal election security and campaign finance agencies, and offices within the U.S. Justice Department for enforcing voting rights protections. The administration's actions on election law and voting rights have occurred alongside the administration's targeting of political opponents and Republican Party efforts to disrupt voting after the 2024 presidential election. Election lawyers at the Brennan Center for Justice and Democracy Docket have described the administration's actions as election subversion, while surveys of U.S. political scientists conducted after Trump returned to office have found a consensus that the United States is transitioning towards illiberal democracy and competitive authoritarianism.
In January 2026, The Washington Post reported that the second Trump administration had undertaken several tactics, including mid-decade redrawing of congressional districts for partisan gain, prosecution of political opponents, and a push to change voting methods and rules, that were meant to undermine confidence in the midterm elections. In October 2026, a New York Times analysis found Trump had attacked the integrity of US elections more than 70% of the days since he returned to office, particularly with false claims about "rigged" voting machines and fraudulent mail-in ballots.
Upon returning to office, the Trump administration has dismantled election security efforts across the federal government. Such cuts have included: firing or reassigning personnel at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency focused on elections; defunding training programs for the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center; eliminating the FBI's foreign influence taskforce; downsizing and announcing closure of the Foreign Malign Influence Center; and firing all members of the independent Election Assistance Commission.
Trump appointed prominent 2020 election deniers into positions in government that could oversee the voting process. In the lead up to the election, pro-Trump conspiracy theorists and election deniers have won local races responsible for overseeing election results, and several election deniers are running for electoral offices in battleground states.
The Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act, also known as the SAVE Act or SAVE America Act, is a proposed United States federal law that requires documentary proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote in U.S. federal elections. The bill was introduced amid unsubstantiated claims that there was significant election fraud in previous elections, including voting by undocumented immigrants, as part of the immigration policies of the second Donald Trump administration. Opponents have claimed that the bill would disenfranchise eligible voters.
In March, the House of Representatives passed the SAVE America Act, an amended version of the previously proposed Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act. The bill, if approved by the Senate and signed into law by Trump, would have required voters to provide proof of citizenship in order to obtain or renew their voter registration. Voting rights experts said that such provisions would disenfranchise married women, racial minorities, low-income groups, and people who legally changed their name, among others. The bill ultimately died in the Senate that June, with four Republicans joining Democrats to block its inclusion.
In January, Trump floated the idea of illegally canceling the elections, citing an expected loss in the elections and a distrust in democratic systems. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt later stated that Trump was "speaking facetiously", and was "simply joking". In February, Trump stated that the elections should be nationalized to prevent voter fraud.
On February 27, The Washington Post reported that several right-wing activists are working with the Trump administration to draft an executive order which, if signed, would effectively instate a national emergency and give Trump extended powers over the elections. Trump denied the existence of such an order.
According to ABC News, Trump met prominent election denier Tina Peters on October 5 at the White House. Speaking to conservative podcaster Joe Oltmann on October 8, Peters' attorney stated that Trump "is not going to relinquish control again" if he believes the elections are rigged, and that "It's better if we're going to have a civil war of any sort that it be martial law with our side in control of the armaments."
In February, Steve Bannon said the federal government was planning to send ICE to patrol polling stations in an attempt to prevent a Democratic victory, vowing to "never again allow an election to be stolen". In March, Stateline reported that legislation to "restrict immigration enforcement or the presence of federal forces" near polling places and other election sites has been offered or announced in California, Connecticut, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia and Washington. The same month, the Associated Press reported that several Democratic-led states including New Mexico and Virginia are taking steps to counter potential tactics to intimidate voters. In May, Ned Lamont, the governor of Connecticut, signed into law a bill that restricts immigration enforcement at locations including schools and places of worship. The legislation also prohibits law enforcement from wearing facial coverings or personal disguises.
Internal documents reviewed by The New York Times found a widespread effort by the federal government to promote mistrust in the integrity of the 2026 election, with homeland security officials investigating over 150 nonprofit organizations they allege are helping noncitizens to vote. Trump and Republicans have repeatedly made false and unsubstantiated claims of massive voter fraud by noncitizens, with The Times describing Trump as making the case that "any Democratic election victory is suspicious on its face".
As part of investigations into election-integrity, the Justice Department has demanded voter registration data from states, suing 23 states and the District of Columbia that declined to provide unredacted voter rolls; all of the sued states were led by Democrats or had been won by Joe Biden in 2020. In January 2026, a federal judge blocked the Trump administration from threatening to withhold election funding from states that did not provide their voter information or alter their voter registration forms or voter systems. Also in January 2026, U.S. District Judge David Carter dismissed the department's lawsuit against California, which had sought personal information including partial Social Security numbers for roughly 23 million registered voters, ruling that the demands violated privacy laws and writing that federal centralization of the data would have a "chilling effect" on voter registration; a federal judge dismissed a similar lawsuit against Oregon later that month. The department appealed the California ruling to the Ninth Circuit. In June 2026, federal prosecutors in Los Angeles publicly accused the state of blocking a voter roll audit and said they were conducting election fraud investigations while ballots from the state's June primary were still being counted.
The Department of Homeland Security engaged in a widespread effort to investigate supposed voter fraud. Per internal documents released by the advocacy group Democracy Forward, efforts have relied on the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which CNN described as part of a "phased national initiative involving voter-roll acquisition, data analysis, investigative leads and field investigations". A June 1 HSI report documented the Justice Department had reviewed more than 50.6 million records and an additional 48.4 million records from Heather Honey obtained through "independent sources of information". The 50.6 million records were speculated to have been received by unredacted voter lists handed over by over a dozen Republican states months prior. By October 2026, the Justice Department had sued 30 states to hand over their voter information.
In July, Trump and DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin alleged they had discovered 270,000 noncitizens on voter roles in Nevada, California, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Letters sent to states days later acknowledged the numbers had been inflated, noting Trump had stated "there may be as many as", and the letters did not offer any proof of the claims. Mullin later claimed there were 15,903 noncitizen voters in Nevada, although the Department of Homeland Security later admitted in a meeting with Nevada election officials the claim was unsubstantiated. DHS then stated 185 of the 15,903 were noncitizens of which Nevada disputed, saying after a state review all 185 were citizens and that DHS had "never provided Nevada with a list of 15,903 individuals" to begin with.
Ahead of the elections, Trump made false claims of voter fraud through mail-in ballots, calling it "corrupt" and "cheating", and encouraged Republican lawmakers to pass strict voter ID laws claiming it would "guarantee the midterms" for the GOP. In March 2026, Trump signed a new executive order on elections which would require the government to compile a list of eligible voters in each state and only allow the United States Post Office to send ballots to verified voters. Election experts described the effort as likely unconstitutional, and the announcement was met with promises to sue by voter rights groups and Democratic officials. On September 4, Judge Indira Talwani issued a preliminary injunction against the USPS plan, finding it likely illegal and noting USPS had no authority to control mail-in voting, and Judge Carl J. Nichols issued another preliminary injunction against the plan on September 13. On September 14, the Supreme Court ruled against the Trump administration's attempt to screen mail-in ballots finding the government was "unlikely to succeed on the merits" and that it would implement chaos and confusion ahead of the elections. Following the ruling, state election officials were described as moving to restore faith in mail-in voting, and Trump later encouraged Republicans to vote by mail.
In September, the Supreme Court allowed the administration to use the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements system to check voter rolls for noncitizens, although federal law prohibits "systematically" removing voters from voter rolls 90 days before an election. The Trump administration had overhauled the system to combine social security and other data to create a master database of citizens per Executive Order 14248. Lawsuits and court rulings had previously blocked implementation of the system, with judges finding the overhaul had violated law in combining private information and had removed eligible voters from voter rolls.
Activists say they are preparing large-scale demonstrations if the Trump administration attempts to interfere with voting or the counting of ballots. At the same time, legal experts are publishing guidance for judges on how to respond if the government attempts to take control of ballots.
In January 2026, FBI agents executed a search warrant at the Fulton County, Georgia, election center, seizing approximately 600 boxes of ballots and other records from the 2020 presidential election, an action election law experts described as unprecedented federal intervention in locally administered elections. Federal investigations of the 2020 election subsequently expanded to several states: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence procured voting machines in Puerto Rico for examination in February, federal officials subpoenaed records of the partisan review of Maricopa County, Arizona's 2020 results in March, the Justice Department demanded ballots cast in Wayne County, Michigan, in April, and FBI agents questioned former poll workers in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in May.
David Becker, executive director of The Center for Election Innovation & Research, said the investigations were "about the 2026 and 2028 elections" rather than 2020, characterizing them as intimidation of election officials. John Keller, former acting head of the Justice Department's Public Integrity Section, said the administration appeared to be normalizing federal investigation of state elections in preparation for potentially challenging future results.
In June 2026, FBI agents searched the Cleveland offices of the Ohio Organizing Collaborative, a voter registration and community organizing group, seizing computers and questioning staff and volunteers across Ohio as part of a Justice Department investigation into the group's voter registration efforts; the Brennan Center for Justice said the search fit a pattern of federal inquiries targeting voting infrastructure ahead of the midterm elections.
Five weeks before the midterm elections, the Department of Homeland Security allocated $20M in taxpayer funds initially reserved for Customs and Border Protection from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act to air campaign-style television ads promoting Donald Trump, drawing widespread bipartisan criticism. The White House defended the ads as "public service announcements" aimed at promoting patriotism rather than campaigning. Senate Majority Leader John Thune told reporters, "I like the message, but it shouldn't be paid for with taxpayer money." Multiple legal experts contacted by the Associated Press said the advertisements likely violated federal law prohibiting "publicity or propaganda". Following widespread criticism, Trump announced he would pay for the ads via a campaign account, but did not commit to reimbursing the government the $12M already spent on the ad campaign. On October 11, a federal judge issued an order to stop the airing of Trump administration television advertisements funded by taxpayer money, but two other advertisements were also broadcast after the deadline set by the court. The next day, Justice Department lawyers apologized for the incident, saying that legal counsel had not been informed of the court's order in time.
Overall, advertising spending for the 2026 midterm elections surpassed $10 billion by the middle of October.
Since July, Elon Musk has spent more than $276 million on right-wing political groups to help maintain the Republican majority. With total spending of about $366 million, he has become the largest donor in the 2026 U.S. midterm elections. The donations include $158 million to the Senate Leadership Fund, the largest supporter of Republican Senate candidates, $76 million to America PAC, and $10 million to Lone Star Liberty PAC, which supports Ken Paxton, the Republican Senate candidate in Texas.
During the 2026 US midterm elections, betting on election outcomes on prediction platforms such as Polymarket and Kalshi has increased significantly. According to a Reuters report on October 14, 2026, an analysis by the Anti-Corruption Data Collective (ACDC) shows that trading volume in these platforms' election markets has exceeded $220 million, while the figure was about $92 million in the 2024 congressional elections.
Analysts had predicted that a decision in Callais reducing the scope of the VRA could allow Republicans to gain a significant number of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives from redistricting in the Southeast, where the VRA has generally prevented Republican-controlled legislatures from maximizing their numbers of "safe" districts. The New York Times estimated that, if the Court weakened the VRA, up to twelve seats could shift from Democratic to Republican control.
When the decision in Callais was announced, media outlets characterized it as a "landmark" decision, predicting that the additional restrictions on Section 2 of the VRA would likely make challenges to redistricting significantly more difficult. Analysts expect it will allow southern states to eliminate majority-minority districts, changing election outcomes. The decision was seen by lawyers as the culmination of a long-time grudge of Roberts against the VRA, while media outlets considered the decision as rendering the VRA all but dead and harming the country's democratic process. The ruling was described by critics as starting a new era of Jim Crow laws, allowing for legal discrimination of minorities in the United States. The court's opinion was expected to affect all levels of government including state and local governments.
An analysis from The Guardian found that Justice Alito's claim that Black voter turnout had surpassed white voter turnout in two of the five most recent presidential elections, both nationally and in Louisiana, was based on misleading data and questionable methodology. Alito cited the brief from the Department of Justice which used "a proportion of the total population of each racial group over the age of 18"; however, that approach is "not favored by experts", who instead use "voter turnout as a proportion of the citizen voting age population or the voter eligible population." Following the latter analysis, the gap in voter turnout has actually widened, with Black voter turnout dropping since 2012, particularly after the Supreme Court's opinion in Shelby County v. Holder which struck down the preclearance formula defined in Section 4(b) of the VRA for states with historical discrimination concerns including Louisiana.
In September 2026, Trump barred CNN, MS NOW, and Politico from the White House grounds. The three outlets filed suit, arguing that the ban violated due process and First Amendment protections. The move drew criticism from Republican strategists, who warned that it diverted attention from economic issues ahead of the midterms.
Leading issues in the election include the economy, particularly inflation, healthcare, and tariffs; opposition to water, energy, and pollution-intensive AI data centers; restrictions on abortion; corruption; and foreign policy, including relations with American allies, the Iran war, along with proposed expansionism.
The economy, including gas prices, inflation, healthcare, tariffs, and cost of living, is one the primary issues of the election. The second Trump administration has imposed tariffs on much of the world with the intent to re-industrialize the United States. It was criticized by experts and global leaders for worsening inflation. Fuel costs were further increased by the 2026 Iran war. The Trump administration announced in October 2026 that it would buy diesel from Russia and suspend sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. The move was intended to lower fuel prices before the November elections. A group of seven senators — four Republicans and three Democrats — criticized the decision. They said it violates the 2022 congressional ban on Russian energy imports. They also said the administration neither consulted Congress nor gave the required legal justification. At the same time, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent defended the agreement, saying the government was acting under existing legal authority and that the deal would reduce prices. Trade, including tariffs, has been a leading issue of the campaign season.
Data released on October 14, 2026, by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed US annual inflation rising to 3.7 per cent in September. That marked an increase from 3.4 per cent in August and exceeded the 3.6 per cent forecast by economists in a Bloomberg poll. It was the first uptick since May. Core inflation, which leaves out food and energy, also surpassed Wall Street expectations, climbing to 2.6 per cent from 2.4 per cent the month before.
Abortion and reproductive rights will be on the ballot.
According to a September 2026 Gallup poll, 89% of people believe that there is pervasive corruption within the US government.
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While in office, Trump has engaged in unprecedented self-enrichment and faced widespread allegations of corruption. Trump's grants of pardons and clemency have favored political allies and loyalists, with several given after millions in donations or fees. Trump has proactively solicited donations from companies and individuals following which favorable regulatory actions and decisions have occurred. He has maintained an active stock market account with thousands of trades totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. Trump has directly benefited by soliciting his own memecoin $TRUMP and from his family's cryptocurrency company World Liberty Financial which has received investments by anonymous individuals and foreign governments.
According to analysis from The New York Times, anonymous political contributions to the midterm elections, known as "dark money," exceeded $1 billion by late August. This funding is funneled into Super PACs through nonprofit organizations and shell companies, allowing donors to remain undisclosed.
Opposition to water, energy, and pollution-intensive data centers, and unregulated artificial intelligence more broadly, emerged as an unexpected issue during the election. A September 2026 poll found that 70% of Americans oppose data center construction in their own communities. AI opposition has occurred across bipartisan lines, described as "sweeping the globe" by Politico. A September 2026 Quinnipac University poll found that 73% of Americans "would oppose the building of an AI data center in their community" while 21% would support it. The Brookings Institution described the backlash against data centers as part of a broader opposition against "AI power".

Throughout both of his presidencies, U.S. president Donald Trump has expressed a desire to expand the United States' territory and influence through both land purchases and military means.
Trump first stated his desire to annex Greenland during his first presidency; he has pursued a campaign to acquire Greenland during his second presidency. He has also suggested annexation or taking control of Canada, Iceland, Mexico, Cuba, the Panama Canal and Gaza Strip. After proposing an invasion of Venezuela during his first presidency, Trump's second administration removed President Nicolás Maduro as part of Operation Absolute Resolve and stated the U.S. would "run" Venezuela; the Venezuelan government, led by acting president Delcy Rodríguez, remains in place but is far more amicable to American interests than it was under Maduro. Threats were also made against Colombia and then-president Gustavo Petro, which Trump accused of drug trafficking. Amid the 2026 Iran war, Trump lauded about invading and seizing control of both the Strait of Hormuz and Kharg Island from Iran.
Trump's determination to treat the Western Hemisphere as a U.S. sphere of influence has been characterized as a revival of the Monroe Doctrine in what has become known as the Donroe Doctrine. On his orders, U.S. federal agencies adopted new names for shared international waters, renaming the Gulf of Mexico as "Gulf of America" in 2025 and Lake Ontario as "Lake America" in 2026. Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller and Secretary of State Marco Rubio defended the second Trump administration's foreign policy as a matter of operating as a superpower nation and for national security purposes. Numerous politicians outside the U.S. have criticized Trump's annexation comments. The Democratic Party has introduced bills to prevent the Trump administration from invading countries without the approval of Congress.
One of the main topics of discussion during the election campaign trail was the conflict with Iran. Tehran has changed its maritime strategy, increasing the kind and speed of offensive attacks against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, two senior Iranian officials publicly confirmed to Reuters in October 2026. The officials made it clear that the strategic change was authorized at the highest levels of Iranian leadership with the specific goal of frustrating American attempts to lower oil prices, interfere with international energy markets, and use political pressure to affect the outcome of the U.S. election. A senior official referred to the plan as a "game of chess," pointing out that Tehran would not permit Trump to lower oil prices worldwide prior to the election.
Campaign discussions about foreign policy and energy security intensified as a result of the conflict, which cost the United States an estimated $3 billion each month. According to U.S. military sources, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) adjusted by using unarmed spotters in small civilian boats to call in and coordinate targets against merchant and U.S. naval vessels after U.S. forces destroyed much of Iran's coastal radar infrastructure.
Senior Iranian officials claimed during the war that Tehran purposefully extended diplomatic negotiations with the United States in order to politically undermine Trump prior to the elections, anticipating a resumption of military conflict regardless of negotiations. Saeed Leylaz, an analyst, remarked that the delay was a lawful strategy designed to influence domestic politics within the United States.
35 seats in the United States Senate will be up for election, including all 33 Class 2 seats. Republicans gained majority control of the Senate in the 2024 elections by flipping four Democratic seats. Two Democratic-held seats, Georgia and Michigan, are in states won by Donald Trump in the previous presidential election, while Maine is the only Republican-held seat in a state won by Kamala Harris.
Two special elections will be held to fill the unexpired terms of senators who vacated their seats during the 119th Congress:
All 435 voting seats in the United States House of Representatives will be up for election. Additionally, elections will be held to select the non-voting delegate for the District of Columbia and the non-voting delegates from 4 of the 5 U.S. territories, excluding Puerto Rico due to its non-voting delegate serving a 4-year term. There are 16 Democratic incumbents in districts Donald Trump won, while only 8 Republican incumbents are in seats won by Harris.
The House map features a number of new congressional maps: Ohio and Utah will have new, court-mandated congressional districts this cycle; Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas redrew their maps mid-cycle; and the district map was changed in California following the passage of Prop 50.
In Missouri, the legality of a Republican-backed congressional map remained disputed in September 2026. On September 8, Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh declined to intervene in an emergency appeal seeking to allow the new map to be used in the November election. Hours later, U.S. District Judge Stephen Clark issued a temporary order requiring Missouri to use the Republican-backed map, conflicting with Missouri Supreme Court ruling that had blocked its use and ordered a referendum on the map. The competing rulings left the state's congressional districts unresolved ahead of the general election. However, on September 10, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed Judge Clark's order whilst a federal lawsuit filed by Republican nominees Bob Onder and Rick Brattin for the 3rd and 5th districts respectively, played out. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit then fast-tracked the case for a hearing on September 17 and, ruling on the merits, affirmed the lower courts order on September 21, remanding the case back to the District Court for entry of a permanent injunction but stayed their ruling for a week pending an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. On September 25, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that state law rules in the case and granted an emergency stay of the Eighth Circuit's order and Judge Clark's injunction, leaving the 2022 maps in place for the 2026 elections. The court also faulted the District Court and the Eighth Circuit for what it deemed as having "incorrectly applied" the Purcell Principle and further held that the Supreme Court of Missouri was not at fault for "upsetting the status quo".
Six special elections to the House of Representatives were held in 2026.
| Source of poll aggregation |
Dates administered |
Dates updated |
Republicans | Democrats | Other/ Undecided |
Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Decision Desk HQ | January 9, 2025 – October 13, 2026 | October 18, 2026 | 42.4% | 50.2% | 7.4% | Democrats +7.8% |
| FiftyPlusOne | January 9, 2025 – October 13, 2026 | October 18, 2026 | 43.2% | 51.7% | 5.1% | Democrats +8.5% |
| NBC News | January 9, 2025 – October 13, 2026 | October 18, 2026 | 43.0% | 51.0% | 6.0% | Democrats +8.0% |
| RealClearPolitics | September 24 – October 13, 2026 | October 18, 2026 | 42.6% | 50.8% | 6.6% | Democrats +8.2% |
| Silver Bulletin | January 9, 2025 – October 13, 2026 | October 18, 2026 | 41.1% | 50.1% | 8.8% | Democrats +9.0% |
| Average | October 18, 2026 | 42.5% | 50.8% | 6.7% | Democrats +8.3% | |





36 states and three territories will be holding regularly scheduled gubernatorial elections. The governors of 15 states and two territories are term-limited. Prior to the 2026 gubernatorial elections, Republicans control 26 of the 50 state governorships, and each party holds 18 state governorships up for election. Republicans have held a majority of the state governorships since the 2010 elections.
Nine states will be holding lieutenant gubernatorial elections independently from their gubernatorial elections.
30 states, two territories, and one federal district will be holding regularly scheduled attorney general elections.
26 states will be holding regularly scheduled secretary of state elections.
27 states will be holding regularly scheduled treasurer elections.
23 states will be holding regularly scheduled auditor elections.
88 state legislative chambers and 5 territorial chambers will be holding regularly scheduled elections. Republicans have held a majority of the state legislative chambers and seats since the 2010 elections. Prior to the regularly-scheduled 2026 state legislative elections, Republicans hold 4044 state legislative seats, while Democrats hold 3227 state legislative seats.
Elections are scheduled to be held in 2026, in various states across the country, including supreme courts and appellate courts.
100 ballot measures in 37 states will be held in the November election.
Local elections will be held in the United States throughout 2026 to elect officers of municipal and county governments. At least 22 mayorships in the country's top 100 most populous cities will be up for election, and many more will hold elections for local ballot measures, city council, and numerous other municipal offices. Many of these races will coincide with the 2026 midterm elections.
A number of major cities will hold mayoral elections in 2026.
This table shows the partisan results of congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative races held in each state and territory in 2026. Note that not all states and territories hold gubernatorial, state legislative, and Senate elections in 2026, and some seats in the U.S. House of Representatives will be vacant at the time of the regularly-scheduled 2026 elections. The five territories and Washington, D.C. do not elect members of the Senate; instead, they each elect one non-voting member of the House. Nebraska's unicameral legislature and the governorship and the legislature of American Samoa are elected on a non-partisan basis, and political party affiliation is not listed.
| State/ |
2026 PVI |
Before 2026 elections | After 2026 elections | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Governor | State leg. | U.S. Senate | U.S. House | Governor | State leg. | U.S. Senate | U.S. House | ||
| Alabama | R+15 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 5–2 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Alaska | R+6 | Rep | Coalition | Rep | Rep 1–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Arizona | R+2 | Dem | Rep | Dem | Rep 6–3 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| Arkansas | R+15 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 4–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| California | D+12 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 43–8–1 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| Colorado | D+6 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Split 4–4 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Connecticut | D+8 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 5–0 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| Delaware | D+8 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 1–0 | Dem | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Florida | R+5 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 20–7 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Georgia | R+1 | Rep | Rep | Dem | Rep 9–5 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Hawaii | D+13 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 2–0 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| Idaho | R+18 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 2–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Illinois | D+6 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 14–3 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Indiana | R+9 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 7–2 | Rep | TBD | Rep | TBD |
| Iowa | R+6 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 4–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Kansas | R+8 | Dem | Rep | Rep | Rep 3–1 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Kentucky | R+15 | Dem | Rep | Rep | Rep 5–1 | Dem | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Louisiana | R+11 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 4–2 | Rep | Rep | TBD | TBD |
| Maine | D+4 | Dem | Dem | Split R/I | Dem 2–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Maryland | D+15 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 7–1 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| Massachusetts | D+14 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 9–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Michigan | EVEN | Dem | Split | Dem | Rep 7–6 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Minnesota | D+3 | Dem | Split | Dem | Split 4–4 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Mississippi | R+11 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 3–1 | Rep | Rep | TBD | TBD |
| Missouri | R+9 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 6–2 | Rep | TBD | Rep | TBD |
| Montana | R+10 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 2–0 | Rep | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Nebraska | R+10 | Rep | NP | Rep | Rep 3–0 | TBD | NP | TBD | TBD |
| Nevada | R+1 | Rep | Dem | Dem | Dem 3–1 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| New Hampshire | D+2 | Rep | Rep | Dem | Dem 2–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| New Jersey | D+4 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 9–3 | Dem | Dem | TBD | TBD |
| New Mexico | D+4 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 3–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| New York | D+8 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 19–7 | TBD | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| North Carolina | R+1 | Dem | Rep | Rep | Rep 10–4 | Dem | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| North Dakota | R+18 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 1–0 | Rep | TBD | Rep | TBD |
| Ohio | R+5 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 10–5 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Oklahoma | R+17 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 5–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Oregon | D+8 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 5–1 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Pennsylvania | R+1 | Dem | Split | Split | Rep 10–7 | TBD | TBD | Split | TBD |
| Rhode Island | D+8 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 2–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| South Carolina | R+8 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 6–1 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| South Dakota | R+15 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 1–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Tennessee | R+14 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 8–1 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Texas | R+6 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 24–13 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Utah | R+11 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 4–0 | Rep | TBD | Rep | TBD |
| Vermont | D+17 | Rep | Dem | Split D/I | Dem 1–0 | TBD | TBD | Split D/I | TBD |
| Virginia | D+3 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 6–5 | Dem | Dem | TBD | TBD |
| Washington | D+10 | Dem | Dem | Dem | Dem 8–2 | Dem | TBD | Dem | TBD |
| West Virginia | R+21 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 2–0 | Rep | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Wisconsin | EVEN | Dem | Rep | Split | Rep 6–2 | TBD | TBD | Split | TBD |
| Wyoming | R+23 | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep 1–0 | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| United States | EVEN | Rep | Rep | Rep | Rep | TBD | TBD | TBD | TBD |
| Washington, D.C. | D+44 | Dem | Dem | N/a | Dem | TBD | TBD | N/a | TBD |
| American Samoa | N/a | NP | NP | Rep | NP | NP | TBD | ||
| Guam | N/a | Dem | Rep | Rep | TBD | TBD | TBD | ||
| N. Mariana Islands | N/a | Ind | Coalition | Rep | TBD | TBD | TBD | ||
| Puerto Rico | N/a | PNP/R | PNP | PDP/D | PNP/R | PNP | PDP/D | ||
| U.S. Virgin Islands | N/a | Dem | Dem | Dem | TBD | TBD | TBD | ||
| State/ |
2026 PVI |
Governor | State leg. | U.S. Senate | U.S. House | Governor | State leg. | U.S. Senate | U.S. House |
| Before 2026 elections | After 2026 elections | ||||||||
| Poll source | Date(s) administered |
Sample size |
Margin of error |
Democratic |
Republican |
Other/ Undecided |
Lead |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RMG Research | October 13–14, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| ActiVote | October 4–14, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 53% | 47% | – | 6% |
| The Washington Post/ABC News/Ipsos | October 9–13, 2026 | 2,032 (LV) | ± 2.2% | 52% | 44% | 4% | 8% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 10–12, 2026 | 1,403 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% |
| Beacon Research (D)/ Shaw & Co. Research (R) |
October 9–12, 2026 | 1,202 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 54% | 45% | 1% | 9% |
| SurveyMonkey | September 28 – October 12, 2026 | 17,649 (RV) | ± 1.6% | 55% | 45% | – | 10% |
| Morning Consult | October 5–11, 2026 | 17,654 (LV) | ± 1.0% | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| Cygnal (R) | October 7–10, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 51% | 42% | 7% | 9% |
| TrueDot | October 5–9, 2026 | 974 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 49% | 42% | 8% | 7% |
| Focaldata | October 2–5, 2026 | 2,201 (LV) | – | 52% | 44% | 4% | 8% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 2–5, 2026 | 995 (LV) | – | 52% | 40% | 8% | 12% |
| 1,173 (LV) | – | 51% | 40% | 9% | 11% | ||
| Reuters/Ipsos | September 30 – October 5, 2026 | 3,526 (RV) | ± 1.7% | 44% | 37% | 19% | 7% |
| 4,506 (A) | ± 1.5% | 37% | 30% | 33% | |||
| Morning Consult | September 28 – October 4, 2026 | 17,659 (LV) | ± 0.9% | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| Pew Research Center | September 28 – October 4, 2026 | 3,917 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 44% | 36% | 20% | 8% |
| Cygnal (R) | October 1–2, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.53% | 52% | 43% | 6% | 9% |
| CBS News/YouGov | September 30 – October 2, 2026 | 1,572 (LV) | — | 54% | 45% | — | 9% |
| ActiVote | September 22 – October 2, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 4.4% | 52% | 48% | – | 4% |
| I&I/TIPP Insights (R) | September 29 – October 1, 2026 | 1,328 (RV) | ± 2.8% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Centerline Research & Strategy | September 26 – October 1, 2026 | 930 (LV) | ± 3.8% | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | September 24–30, 2026 | 1,794 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 44% | 9% | 3% |
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | September 26–28, 2026 | 2,200 (RV) | ± 2.1% | 50% | 50% | — | Tie |
| — (LV) | — | 51% | 49% | — | 2% | ||
| AlphaROC | September 25–28, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 37% | 20% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | September 25–28, 2026 | 1,003 (LV) | — | 53% | 38% | 9% | 15% |
| 1,423 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 45% | 37% | 18% | 8% | ||
| Quinnipiac University | September 24–27, 2026 | 1,032 (RV) | ± 3.8% | 51% | 39% | 10% | 12% |
| Morning Consult | September 21–27, 2026 | 18,786 (LV) | ± 0.9% | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| Angus Reid Global | September 19–25, 2026 | 919 (RV) | — | 56% | 40% | 4% | 16% |
| 1,041 (RV) | 49% | 35% | 16% | 14% | |||
| 1,205 (A) | ± 2.5% | 45% | 34% | 21% | 11% | ||
| Change Research (D) | September 15–24, 2026 | 2,021 (RV) | ± 2.3% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | September 17–23, 2026 | 1,819 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 48% | 43% | 9% | 5% |
| Emerson College | September 21–22, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 53% | 42% | 5% | 11% |
| The Argument/Verasight | September 16–22, 2026 | — (LV) | — | 55% | 45% | — | 10% |
| 50% | 41% | 9% | 9% | ||||
| 1,603 (RV) | ± 2.7% | 53% | 47% | — | 6% | ||
| 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% | ||||
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | September 16–22, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 48% | 43% | 9% | 5% |
| The Economist/YouGov | September 18–21, 2026 | 975 (LV) | — | 52% | 38% | 10% | 14% |
| 1,394 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 45% | 36% | 18% | 9% | ||
| Echelon Insights | September 17–21, 2026 | 1,002 (LV) | ± 3.6% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | September 16–21, 2026 | — (LV) | — | 52% | 42% | 6% | 10% |
| 1,374 (RV) | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% | |||
| 1,528 (A) | ± 2.6% | 49% | 41% | 10% | |||
| Impact Research (D)/ National Research Inc. (R) |
September 16–21, 2026 | 1,500 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 50% | 42% | – | 8% |
| KFF | September 16–21, 2026 | 1,013 (RV) | ± 4.0% | 45% | 35% | 21% | 8% |
| ActiVote | September 11–21, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 53% | 47% | – | 6% |
| Morning Consult | September 18–20, 2026 | 18,336 (LV) | ± 0.9% | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | September 17–20, 2026 | 979 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 43% | 35% | 22% | 8% |
| 1,277 (A) | ± 2.8% | 37% | 29% | 34% | |||
| Quantus Insights (R) | September 15–18, 2026 | 1,389 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% |
| CNN/SSRS | September 16–17, 2026 | 867 (RV) | ± 4.1% | 49% | 41% | 10% | 8% |
| John Zogby Strategies | September 15–17, 2026 | 1,007 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 40% | 14% | 6% |
| 48% | 42% | 10% | |||||
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | September 11–16, 2026 | 1,046 (LV) | ± 3.03% | 50% | 43% | 8% | 7% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | September 10–16, 2026 | 1,746 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 49% | 41% | 10% | 8% |
| Marist University | September 14–15, 2026 | 1,280 (RV) | ± 3.8% | 53% | 41% | 6% | 12% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | September 13–15, 2026 | 2,633 (LV) | ± 1.7% | 48% | 37% | 15% | 11% |
| 2,947 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 45% | 36% | 19% | 9% | ||
| Emerson College/ RealClear Opinion Research |
September 12–15, 2026 | 1,500 (RV) | ± 2.4% | 37% | 29% | 35% | 8% |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
September 11–15, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| Morning Consult | September 10–15, 2026 | 2,102 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| RMG Research | September 8–15, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | September 11–14, 2026 | 896 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 44% | 37% | 19% | 7% |
| 1,143 (A) | ± 3.0% | 39% | 31% | 30% | 8% | ||
| Beacon Research (D)/ Shaw & Co. Research (R) |
September 11–14, 2026 | 1,211 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 51% | 44% | 5% | 7% |
| The Economist/YouGov | September 11–14, 2026 | 1,051 (LV) | — | 51% | 39% | 10% | 12% |
| 1,455 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 44% | 39% | 17% | 5% | ||
| The Rainey Center | September 10–14, 2026 | 1,004 (RV) | ± 4.9% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| New York Times/Siena College | September 8–13, 2026 | 1,503 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| Morning Consult | September 7–13, 2026 | — (LV) | — | 49% | 43% | 8% | 6% |
| CBS News/YouGov | September 8–11, 2026 | 1,750 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 54% | 46% | – | 8% |
| ActiVote | August 31 – September 10, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 52% | 48% | – | 4% |
| Catawba College/YouGov | September 4–9, 2026 | 779 (LV) | – | 49% | 38% | 12% | 11% |
| 1,201 (A) | ± 3.6% | 38% | 28% | 34% | 10% | ||
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | September 3–9, 2026 | 1,905 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Marquette University Law School | September 2–9, 2026 | 581 (LV) | ± 4.3% | 54% | 41% | 8% | 13% |
| 864 (RV) | ± 3.6% | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% | ||
| 1,023 (A) | ± 3.3% | 48% | 39% | 13% | 9% | ||
| The Economist/YouGov | September 4–8, 2026 | 1,015 (LV) | — | 49% | 38% | 13% | 11% |
| 1,464 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 42% | 35% | 23% | 7% | ||
| Morning Consult | September 4–6, 2026 | 2,203 (RV) | — | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Quinnipiac University | September 3–6, 2026 | 970 (RV) | ± 3.9% | 49% | 38% | 13% | 11% |
| Cygnal (R) | September 1–2, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 51% | 42% | 7% | 9% |
| Focaldata/Financial Times | August 28 – September 2, 2026 | 1,837 (LV) | – | 52% | 45% | 3% | 7% |
| 1,837 (RV) | 51% | 44% | 5% | ||||
| 1,914 (RV) | 49% | 42% | 9% | ||||
| 2,178 (A) | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% | |||
| Reuters/Ipsos | August 28–31, 2026 | 924 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 43% | 38% | 19% | 5% |
| 1,167 (A) | ± 2.9% | 38% | 31% | 31% | 7% | ||
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | August 28–30, 2026 | 2,100 (RV) | ± 2.1% | 51% | 49% | – | 2% |
| – (LV) | – | 49% | 51% | – | 2% | ||
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | August 23–30, 2026 | 2,231 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 41% | 36% | 23% | 5% |
| UMass Amherst/YouGov | August 21–26, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 4.1% | 42% | 34% | 14% | 8% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | August 14–24, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 48% | 43% | 9% | 5% |
| ActiVote | August 10–24, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 52% | 48% | – | 4% |
| Emerson College | August 16–17, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| The Economist/YouGov | August 14–17, 2026 | 1,449 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% |
| 1,610 (A) | 39%' | 32% | 29% | ||||
| Reuters/Ipsos | August 14–17, 2026 | 876 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 41% | 36% | 23% | 5% |
| 1,166 (A) | ± 2.9% | 35% | 30% | 35% | |||
| The Bullfinch Group | August 14–17, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 42% | 37% | 21% | 5% |
| 1,200 (A) | ± 2.8% | 45% | 40% | 15% | |||
| Echelon Insights | August 13–17, 2026 | 1,002 (LV) | ± 3.4% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| Morning Consult/Cato Institute | August 13–16, 2026 | 4,150 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Noble Predictive Insights/ The Center Square |
August 12–16, 2026 | 2,533 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Morning Consult | August 10–16, 2026 | 29,719 (RV) | ± 0.6% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Angus Reid Global | August 8–11, 2026 | 1,525 (A) | ± 2.0% | 45% | 36% | 19% | 9% |
| Wave Polling/Verasight | August 7–11, 2026 | 1,591 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 50% | 43% | 8% | 8% |
| 48% | 40% | 12% | |||||
| Focaldata/Financial Times | August 7–11, 2026 | 1,857 (LV) | – | 51% | 45% | 4% | 6% |
| 1,913 (RV) | 49% | 43% | 8% | ||||
| 2,152 (A) | 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% | |||
| AlphaROC | August 8–10, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 41% | 37% | 22% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | August 7–10, 2026 | 1,419 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 40% | 14% | 6% |
| 1,558 (A) | 40% | 32% | 28% | 8% | |||
| Morning Consult | August 3–9, 2026 | 29,719 (RV) | ± 0.6% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| ActiVote | July 29 – August 8, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 52.5% | 47.5% | – | 5% |
| Cygnal (R) | August 6–7, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| John Zogby Strategies | August 4–5, 2026 | 921 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 51% | 40% | 9% | 11% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | August 3–4, 2026 | 1,048 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 49% | 43% | 8% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | July 31 – August 3, 2026 | 1,472 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| 1,607 (A) | 41% | 33% | 26% | 8% | |||
| Reuters/Ipsos | July 29 – August 3, 2026 | 3,542 (RV) | ± 1.7% | 42% | 37% | 21% | 5% |
| 4,505 (A) | ± 1.5% | 36% | 30% | 34% | 6% | ||
| Morning Consult | July 27 – August 2, 2026 | 24,000 (RV) | ± 1.0% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | July 27–29, 2026 | 2,617 (LV) | ± 1.7% | 50% | 39% | 10% | 11% |
| 48% | 37% | 15% | |||||
| 2,922 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 49% | 38% | 13% | |||
| 46% | 35% | 19% | 9% | ||||
| Marquette University Law School | July 22–29, 2026 | 572 (LV) | ± 4.4% | 51% | 45% | 4% | 6% |
| 886 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% | ||
| 1,076 (A) | ± 3.2% | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% | ||
| CNN/SSRS | July 23–27, 2026 | 914 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 39% | 14% | 8% |
| Quinnipiac University | July 23–27, 2026 | 963 (RV) | ± 4.1% | 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | July 24–26, 2026 | 1,003 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 40% | 38% | 22% | 2% |
| 1,246 (A) | ± 2.9% | 36% | 32% | 32% | 4% | ||
| Morning Consult | July 20–26, 2026 | 24,000 (RV) | ± 1.0% | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| The Argument/Verasight | July 20–26, 2026 | 3,000 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 54% | 46% | – | 8% |
| 48% | 40% | 12% | |||||
| CBS News/YouGov | July 22–24, 2026 | 1,474 (RV) | – | 47% | 40% | 13% | 7% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | July 17–22, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 52% | 42% | 6% | 10% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | July 15–21, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| Emerson College | July 19–20, 2026 | 1,100 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 53% | 42% | 5% | 11% |
| Beacon Research (D)/ Shaw & Co. Research (R) |
July 17–20, 2026 | 1,003 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 53% | 46% | 1% | 7% |
| The Economist/YouGov | July 17–20, 2026 | 1,432 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% |
| 1,602 (A) | 39% | 33% | 28% | 6% | |||
| Morning Consult | July 17–19, 2026 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| Focaldata | July 14–20, 2026 | 2,064 (A) | — | 44% | 36% | 20% | 8% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | July 14–17, 2026 | 1,364 (RV) | – | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| 1,514 (A) | ± 2.6% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% | ||
| AlphaROC | July 13–14, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 42% | 37% | 21% | 6% |
| RMG Research | July 6–14, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 47% | 45% | 8% | 2% |
| Morning Consult | July 10–13, 2026 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| The Economist/YouGov | July 10–13, 2026 | 1,447 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| 1,612 (A) | 39% | 35% | 24% | ||||
| Echelon Insights | July 9–13, 2026 | 1,004 (LV) | ± 3.6% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| The Washington Post/Ipsos | July 8–13, 2026 | 1,483 (LV) | ± 2.6% | 53% | 45% | 2% | 8% |
| 2,092 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 48% | 45% | 7% | 3% | ||
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | July 11–12, 2026 | 1,776 (RV) | ± 2.3% | 50% | 50% | – | Tie |
| – (LV) | – | 51% | 49% | – | 2% | ||
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
July 8–12, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 49% | 45% | 6% | 4% |
| Pew Research Center | July 6–12, 2026 | 2,779 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 43% | 37% | 20% | 6% |
| HarrisX/2WAY | July 9–10, 2026 | 787 (LV) | – | 47% | 44% | 9% | 3% |
| 51% | 49% | – | 2% | ||||
| 1,019 (RV) | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% | |||
| 52% | 48% | – | 4% | ||||
| Quantus Insights (R) | July 3–7, 2026 | 1,140 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Morning Consult | June 29 – July 5, 2026 | 24,000 (RV) | ± 1.0% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Manhattan Institute | July 1–6, 2026 | 1,121 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| Zogby Analytics | July 1–4, 2026 | 1,003 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 42% | 36% | 22% | 6% |
| Talker Research | June 25 – July 2, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 48% | 39% | 13% | 9% |
| Cygnal (R) | June 30 – July 1, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | June 24 – July 1, 2026 | 2,224 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Focaldata/Financial Times | June 26–30, 2026 | 1,723 (RV) | – | 51% | 44% | 5% | 7% |
| 1,795 (RV) | 49% | 42% | 9% | ||||
| 2,016 (A) | 47% | 39% | 14% | 8% | |||
| The Economist/YouGov | June 26–29, 2026 | 1,426 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| 1,603 (A) | 37% | 35% | 27% | 2% | |||
| AlphaROC | June 27–28, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 37% | 20% | 7% |
| Morning Consult | June 26–28, 2026 | 2,202 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | June 26–28, 2026 | 2,604 (LV) | ± 1.8% | 50% | 41% | 9% | 9% |
| 48% | 39% | 13% | |||||
| 2,971 (RV) | ± 1.7% | 47% | 39% | 14% | 8% | ||
| 45% | 37% | 18% | |||||
| Morning Consult | June 22–28, 2026 | 24,000 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| ActiVote | June 6–28, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 53% | 47% | – | 6% |
| Morning Consult/Cato Institute | June 25–26, 2026 | 1,797 (RV) | – | 45% | 39% | 16% | 6% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | June 17–23, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| Morning Consult | June 19–22, 2026 | – (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | June 19–22, 2026 | 1,517 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 43% | 12% | 2% |
| 1,679 (A) | 38% | 35% | 27% | 3% | |||
| Reuters/Ipsos | June 18–22, 2026 | 978 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 41% | 36% | 23% | 5% |
| 1,262 (A) | ± 2.8% | 35% | 31% | 34% | 4% | ||
| Echelon Insights | June 18–22, 2026 | 1,008 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 51% | 45% | 3% | 6% |
| Quinnipiac University | June 18–22, 2026 | 1,165 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | June 17–22, 2026 | 1,896 (RV) | – | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| 2,087 (A) | ± 2.2% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% | ||
| Data for Progress (D) | May 15 – June 21, 2026 | 5,809 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 51% | 44% | 5% | 7% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | June 16–17, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| The Bullfinch Group | June 12–16, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 36% | 20% | 8% |
| 1,200 (A) | ± 2.8% | 43% | 34% | 23% | 9% | ||
| The Economist/YouGov | June 13–15, 2026 | 1,402 (RV) | ± 3.4% | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| 1,547 (A) | 39% | 36% | 25% | 3% | |||
| Echelon Insights | June 11–14, 2026 | 1,012 (LV) | ± 3.7% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| Morning Consult | June 8–14, 2026 | 24,000 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Emerson College | June 7–8, 2026 | 1,200 (LV) | ± 2.8% | 50% | 40% | 10% | 10% |
| The Economist/YouGov | June 5–8, 2026 | 1,393 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| 1,567 (A) | 37% | 33% | 30% | ||||
| Reuters/Ipsos | June 3–8, 2026 | 3,578 (RV) | ± 1.7% | 41% | 37% | 22% | 4% |
| 4,531 (A) | ± 1.5% | 35% | 31% | 34% | 4% | ||
| Morning Consult | June 1–7, 2026 | 24,849 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
May 29 – June 7, 2026 | 2,400 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| HarrisX/Forbes | May 20 – June 7, 2026 | 1,565 (LV) | – | 46% | 45% | 9% | 1% |
| 1,876 (RV) | 44% | 43% | 13% | ||||
| 2,010 (A) | ± 2.2% | 43% | 42% | 15% | |||
| Research Co. | June 4–6, 2026 | 1,001 (A) | – | 38% | 33% | 29% | 5% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | May 28 – June 5, 2026 | 1,045 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 48% | 45% | 7% | 3% |
| Noble Predictive Insights/ The Center Square |
June 1–4, 2026 | 2,585 (RV) | ± 1.9% | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| RMG Research | June 1–4, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 49% | 45% | 6% | 4% |
| Cygnal (R) | June 2–3, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| The Argument/Verasight | May 29 – June 3, 2026 | 3,008 (RV) | – | 53% | 47% | – | 6% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | June 1–2, 2026 | 1,050 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| The Winston Group (R) | May 30 – June 2, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% |
| The Bullfinch Group | May 29 – June 2, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 42% | 36% | 22% | 6% |
| 1,200 (A) | ± 2.8% | 41% | 34% | 25% | 7% | ||
| Focaldata/Financial Times | May 29 – June 1, 2026 | 1,483 (RV) | – | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| 1,537 (RV) | 48% | 43% | 9% | ||||
| 1,718 (A) | 45% | 42% | 12% | 3% | |||
| The Economist/YouGov | May 29 – June 1, 2026 | 1,452 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| 1,603 (A) | 41% | 35% | 24% | 6% | |||
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | May 29–31, 2026 | 1,725 (RV) | ± 2.4% | 51% | 49% | – | 2% |
| – (LV) | – | 52% | 48% | – | 4% | ||
| Morning Consult | May 25–31, 2026 | – (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| I&I/TIPP Insights (R) | May 26–28, 2026 | 1,332 (RV) | ± 2.9% | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | May 24–27, 2026 | 2,784 (LV) | ± 1.8% | 51% | 38% | 10% | 13% |
| 49% | 36% | 16% | |||||
| 3,121 (RV) | ± 1.7% | 50% | 37% | 13% | |||
| 47% | 34% | 19% | |||||
| The Economist/YouGov | May 22–26, 2026 | 1,393 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% |
| 1,514 (A) | 39% | 33% | 28% | 6% | |||
| Marquette University Law School | May 20–26, 2026 | 576 (LV) | ± 4.4% | 49% | 48% | 3% | 1% |
| 857 (RV) | ± 3.6% | 46% | 45% | 9% | |||
| 1,001 (A) | ± 3.4% | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% | ||
| Pennsylvania State University/YouGov | May 19–26, 2026 | 862 (RV) | ± 4.0% | 41% | 37% | 22% | 4% |
| Emerson College | May 24–25, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 50% | 41% | 9% | 9% |
| John Zogby Strategies | May 21–22, 2026 | – (LV) | – | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| Morris Predictive Insights/Verasight | May 18–20, 2026 | 2,000 (A) | ± 2.7% | 52% | 41% | 7% | 11% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | May 13–20, 2026 | 2,161 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | May 18–19, 2026 | 1,413 (RV) | – | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| 1,520 (A) | ± 2.7% | 51% | 41% | 8% | 10% | ||
| The Rainey Center | May 17–18, 2026 | 1,010 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 45% | 43% | 12% | 6% |
| Data for Progress (D) | May 15–18, 2026 | 1,149 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | May 15–18, 2026 | 984 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 39% | 38% | 23% | 1% |
| 1,271 (A) | ± 2.8% | 35% | 31% | 34% | 4% | ||
| The Economist/YouGov | May 15–18, 2026 | 1,375 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| 1,543 (A) | 40% | 35% | 25% | 5% | |||
| Echelon Insights | May 14–18, 2026 | 1,008 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| Quinnipiac University | May 14–18, 2026 | 1,106 (RV) | ± 3.7% | 50% | 39% | 11% | 11% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | May 12–18, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Impact Research (D)/ National Research Inc. (R) |
May 7–18, 2026 | 1,500 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 40% | 12% | 8% |
| Morning Consult | May 15–17, 2026 | 2,203 (RV) | – | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| Morning Consult | May 11–17, 2026 | 28,525 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| CBS News/YouGov | May 13–15, 2026 | 1,397 (RV) | – | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| New York Times/Siena College | May 11–15, 2026 | 1,507 (RV) | – | 50% | 39% | 11% | 11% |
| The Economist/YouGov | May 9–11, 2026 | 1,406 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| 1,547 (A) | 37% | 34% | 29% | 3% | |||
| Reuters/Ipsos | May 8–11, 2026 | 993 (RV) | – | 41% | 35% | 24% | 6% |
| 1,254 (A) | ± 2.9% | 36% | 31% | 33% | 5% | ||
| AtlasIntel | May 4–7, 2026 | 2,069 (A) | ± 2.0% | 55% | 40% | 5% | 15% |
| Cygnal (R) | May 4–7, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% |
| Cygnal (R) | May 5–6, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| RMG Research | May 4–6, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 50% | 41% | 9% | 9% |
| HarrisX/Forbes | April 29 – May 5, 2026 | 1,891 (LV) | – | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| 2,359 (RV) | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% | |||
| 2,569 (A) | ± 1.9% | 46% | 40% | 14% | 6% | ||
| Focaldata/Financial Times | May 1–5, 2026 | 3,017 (RV) | – | 52% | 44% | 4% | 8% |
| 3,167 (RV) | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% | |||
| 3,612 (A) | 46% | 39% | 15% | ||||
| The Economist/YouGov | May 1–4, 2026 | 1,406 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% |
| 1,703 (A) | 38% | 34% | 28% | 4% | |||
| CNN/SSRS | April 30 – May 4, 2026 | – (RV) | ± 3.2% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Morning Consult | April 30 – May 3, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| Marist University | April 27–30, 2026 | 1,155 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 52% | 42% | 6% | 10% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | April 25–28, 2026 | 2,874 (LV) | ± 1.7% | 50% | 39% | 10% | 11% |
| 47% | 37% | 16% | 10% | ||||
| 3,176 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 48% | 38% | 13% | 10% | ||
| 45% | 35% | 20% | |||||
| The Washington Post/ABC News/Ipsos | April 24–28, 2026 | 2,059 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 49% | 44% | 6% | 5% |
| The Economist/YouGov | April 24–27, 2026 | 1,645 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% |
| 1,834 (A) | 39% | 34% | 27% | ||||
| Reuters/Ipsos | April 24–27, 2026 | 1,014 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 41% | 37% | 22% | 4% |
| 1,269 (A) | ± 2.9% | 36% | 31% | 33% | 5% | ||
| Morning Consult | April 24–27, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Public Opinion Strategies (R) | April 21–27, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | – | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% |
| Emerson College | April 24–26, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 50% | 40% | 10% | 10% |
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | April 23–26, 2026 | 2,745 (RV) | ± 1.9% | 50% | 50% | – | Tie |
| – (LV) | – | ||||||
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | April 15–24, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | April 21–23, 2026 | 1,452 (LV) | ± 2.6% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| The Argument/Verasight | April 20–23, 2026 | 1,516 (RV) | ± 2.7% | 53% | 47% | – | 6% |
| 47% | 40% | 13% | 7% | ||||
| Beacon Research (D)/ Shaw & Co. Research (R) |
April 17–20, 2026 | 1,001 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 52% | 47% | 1% | 5% |
| Echelon Insights | April 17–20, 2026 | 1,012 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | April 17–20, 2026 | 1,549 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| 1,703 (A) | 39% | 33% | 28% | 6% | |||
| Reuters/Ipsos | April 15–20, 2026 | 3,577 (RV) | – | 41% | 38% | 21% | 3% |
| 4,557 (A) | ± 1.5% | 35% | 31% | 34% | 4% | ||
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
April 15–19, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 49% | 45% | 6% | 4% |
| KFF | April 14–19, 2026 | 1,107 (RV) | ± 4.0% | 43% | 34% | 23% | 9% |
| Morning Consult | April 13–19, 2026 | 27,869 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| John Zogby Strategies | April 17–18, 2026 | 1,001 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| Marquette University Law School | April 8–16, 2026 | 576 (LV) | ± 4.4% | 53% | 43% | 4% | 10% |
| 870 (RV) | ± 3.6% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% | ||
| 982 (A) | ± 3.4% | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% | ||
| GBAO (D)/Third Way (D) | April 8–15, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | – | 48% | 40% | 12% | 8% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | April 8–15, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | April 10–14, 2026 | 1,386 (RV) | – | 50% | 43% | 7% | 7% |
| 1,514 (A) | ± 2.6% | 49% | 41% | 10% | 8% | ||
| Survey 160 | April 8–13, 2026 | 1,539 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 37% | 16% | 10% |
| Morning Consult | April 6–12, 2026 | 12,505 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Tavern Research (D) | April 6–9, 2026 | 502 (LV) | – | 44% | 43% | 13% | 1% |
| Morning Consult | April 6–9, 2026 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| RMG Research | April 6–9, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| 45% | 42% | 3% | |||||
| Echelon Insights | April 3–9, 2026 | 2,880 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| Morning Consult | April 3–4, 2026 | 2,203 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| The Economist/YouGov | April 3–6, 2026 | 1,558 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 42% | 14% | 2% |
| 1,745 (A) | 38% | 36% | 26% | ||||
| Cygnal (R) | April 2–3, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 49% | 43% | 8% | 6% |
| Morning Consult | March 30 – April 5, 2026 | 12,505 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 2% |
| UMass Lowell/YouGov | March 26–30, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 4.1% | 38% | 35% | 27% | 3% |
| CNN/SSRS | March 26–30, 2026 | 951 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | March 25–26, 2026 | 2,009 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 51% | 49% | – | 2% |
| – (LV) | – | 52% | 48% | 4% | |||
| Quantus Insights (R) | March 25–26, 2026 | 1,472 (LV) | ± 2.8% | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | March 22–24, 2026 | 3,003 (RV) | ± 1.9% | 48% | 40% | 12% | 8% |
| 45% | 37% | 18% | |||||
| The Economist/YouGov | March 20–23, 2026 | 1,501 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 45% | 42% | 12% | 3% |
| 1,664 (A) | 39% | 36% | 25% | ||||
| Quinnipiac University | March 19–23, 2026 | 1,191 (RV) | ± 3.6% | 51% | 40% | 9% | 11% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | March 16–23, 2026 | 2,222 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Yale Youth Poll | March 9–23, 2026 | 3,429 (RV) | ± 1.4% | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | March 20–22, 2026 | 985 (RV) | – | 40% | 38% | 22% | 2% |
| 1,272 (A) | ± 2.8% | 35% | 31% | 34% | 4% | ||
| Morning Consult | March 17–22, 2026 | 15,029 (A) | ± 1.0% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Morning Consult | March 16–22, 2026 | 26,406 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Impact Research (D)/ BSP Research (D) |
March 10–20, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | March 17–19, 2026 | 1,206 (RV) | – | 40% | 37% | 23% | 3% |
| 1,545 (A) | ± 2.5% | 35% | 32% | 33% | |||
| John Zogby Strategies | March 17–18, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 46% | 8% | Tie |
| Quantus Insights (R) | March 17–18, 2026 | 1,064 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | March 16–18, 2026 | 1,370 (RV) | – | 49% | 43% | 8% | 6% |
| 1,530 (A) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% | ||
| Emerson College | March 16–17, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| The Winston Group (R) | March 15–17, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 49% | 40% | 11% | 9% |
| The Argument/Verasight | March 12–17, 2026 | 1,519 (RV) | ± 2.7% | 54% | 46% | – | 8% |
| 46% | 40% | 14% | 6% | ||||
| Morning Consult | March 13–16, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 48% | 40% | 12% | 8% |
| The Economist/YouGov | March 13–16, 2026 | 1,427 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 43% | 41% | 16% | 2% |
| 1,593 (A) | 39% | 35% | 26% | 4% | |||
| Yahoo News/YouGov | March 12–16, 2026 | 1,147 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 40% | 16% | |
| Echelon Insights | March 12–16, 2026 | 1,033 (LV) | ± 3.4% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| Survey 160 | March 9–15, 2026 | 1,546 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 48% | 38% | 14% | 10% |
| Morning Consult | March 9–15, 2026 | 26,63 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Focaldata | March 6–10, 2026 | 1,456 (RV) | – | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| 1,534 (RV) | 48% | 42% | 10% | ||||
| 1,782 (A) | 45% | 39% | 16% | ||||
| The Economist/YouGov | March 6–9, 2026 | 1,403 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| 1,561 (A) | 40% | 36% | 24% | 4% | |||
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | March 4–9, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| Morning Consult | March 2–8, 2026 | 25,948 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | February 26 – March 7, 2026 | 1,004 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| RMG Research | March 2–5, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 46% | 46% | 8% | Tie |
| 44% | 43% | 13% | 1% | ||||
| Cygnal (R) | March 3–4, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 49% | 45% | 6% | 4% |
| Marist University | March 2–4, 2026 | 1,392 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 53% | 44% | 3% | 9% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | March 2–3, 2026 | 1,624 (LV) | ± 2.6% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% | ||||
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
February 27 – March 3, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | February 27 – March 2, 2026 | 1,363 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| 1,512 (A) | 40% | 33% | 27% | 7% | |||
| Morning Consult | February 23 – March 1, 2026 | – (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| The Public Sentiment Institute | February 28, 2026 | 249 (LV) | ± 5.5% | 50% | 41% | 7% | 9% |
| 316 (RV) | 41% | 33% | 26% | 8% | |||
| CBS News/YouGov | February 25–27, 2026 | 1,523 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| I&I/TIPP Insights (R) | February 24–27, 2026 | 1,264 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | February 25–26, 2026 | 1,999 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 50% | 50% | – | Tie |
| – (LV) | |||||||
| Cygnal (R) | February 24–26, 2026 | 1,048 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 48% | 45% | 7% | 3% |
| GrayHouse (R) | February 20–23, 2026 | 1,394 (RV) | ± 2.6% | 43% | 40% | 17% | |
| The Economist/YouGov | February 20–23, 2026 | 1,402 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| Echelon Insights | February 19–23, 2026 | 1,002 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 50% | 46% | 4% | |
| Pennsylvania State University/YouGov | February 18–23, 2026 | 824 (LV) | ± 3.8% | 42% | 37% | 21% | 5% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | February 18–23, 2026 | 3,686 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 40% | 38% | 22% | 2% |
| 4,638 (A) | ± 1.5% | 35% | 32% | 34% | 3% | ||
| Emerson College | February 21–22, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% |
| Morning Consult | February 20–22, 2026 | 2,202 (RV) | – | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| Global Strategy Group (D) | February 17–22, 2026 | 1,051 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 48% | 40% | 12% | 8% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | February 18–20, 2026 | 1,401 (RV) | – | 52% | 42% | 6% | 10% |
| 1,566 (A) | ± 2.5% | 50% | 40% | 10% | |||
| Talker Research | February 13–19, 2026 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 42% | 36% | 22% | 6% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | February 16–18, 2026 | 2,012 (RV) | ± 2.1% | 48% | 40% | 12% | 8% |
| 45% | 37% | 18% | |||||
| 1,805 (LV) | ± 2.3% | 50% | 41% | 9% | 9% | ||
| 48% | 39% | 13% | |||||
| BGSU/YouGov | February 13–18, 2026 | 1,200 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 49% | 41% | 10% | 8% |
| Washington Post/ABC News/Ipsos | February 12–17, 2026 | 2,087 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 47% | 45% | 8% | 2% |
| 2,589 (A) | ± 2.0% | 43% | 39% | 18% | 4% | ||
| The Economist/YouGov | February 13–16, 2026 | 1,509 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 47% | 40% | 13% | 7% |
| 1,678 (A) | 39% | 33% | 28% | 6% | |||
| Reuters/Ipsos | February 13–16, 2026 | 846 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 41% | 37% | 14% | 4% |
| 1,117 (A) | 36% | 32% | 32% | ||||
| Morning Consult | February 13–16, 2026 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 45% | 43% | 12% | 2% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | February 12–13, 2026 | 1,515 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| 41% | 39% | 20% | 2% | ||||
| RMG Research | February 9–12, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 45% | 47% | 8% | 2% |
| 41% | 44% | 15% | 3% | ||||
| Yahoo News/YouGov | February 9–12, 2026 | 1,149 (RV) | – | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% |
| Focaldata | February 10, 2026 | – (LV) | – | 51% | 44% | 5% | 7% |
| – (RV) | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% | |||
| 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% | ||||
| – (A) | 42% | 38% | 20% | ||||
| The Argument/Verasight | February 4–10, 2026 | 3,003 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 53% | 47% | – | 6% |
| 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% | ||||
| Morning Consult | February 6–9, 2026 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | February 6–9, 2026 | 1,549 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 38% | 18% | 6% |
| 1,728 (A) | 39% | 31% | 30% | 8% | |||
| Morning Consult | February 2–8, 2026 | 29,303 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| John Zogby Strategies | February 4–5, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Cygnal (R) | February 3–4, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | January 30 – February 2, 2026 | 1,501 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 40% | 16% | |
| 1,668 (A) | 36% | 34% | 30% | 2% | |||
| Morning Consult | January 30 – February 1, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Public Policy Polling (D) | January 29–30, 2026 | 652 (RV) | – | 48% | 41% | 11% | 7% |
| Harvard/Harris Poll/HarrisX | January 28–29, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 54% | 46% | – | 8% |
| 41% | 41% | 18% | Tie | ||||
| – (LV) | – | 52% | 48% | – | 4% | ||
| 47% | 44% | 9% | 3% | ||||
| I&I/TIPP Insights (R) | January 27–28, 2026 | 1,126 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 42% | 13% | |
| Cygnal (R) | January 27–28, 2026 | 1,004 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| Marquette University Law School | January 21–28, 2026 | 577 (LV) | ± 4.4% | 52% | 45% | 3% | 7% |
| 869 (RV) | ± 3.6% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% | ||
| 1,003 (A) | ± 3.4% | 45% | 39% | 16% | 6% | ||
| The Argument/Verasight | January 26–27, 2026 | 1,515 (RV) | ± 2.7% | 52% | 48% | – | 4% |
| 46% | 42% | 12% | |||||
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | January 21–27, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | – | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| Beacon Research (D)/ Shaw & Co. Research (R) |
January 23–26, 2026 | 1,005 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 52% | 46% | 2% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | January 23–26, 2026 | 1,519 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 38% | 19% | 5% |
| 1,683 (A) | 38% | 35% | 27% | 3% | |||
| Echelon Insights | January 22–26, 2026 | 1,029 (LV) | ± 3.4% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | January 23–25, 2026 | 906 (RV) | – | 41% | 37% | 22% | 4% |
| Morning Consult | January 23–25, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 45% | 43% | 12% | 2% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | January 22–24, 2026 | 2,909 (LV) | ± 2.1% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| 46% | 42% | 12% | |||||
| Quantus Insights (R) | January 20–22, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | January 15–22, 2026 | 1,147 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 51% | 42% | 7% | 9% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | January 14–20, 2026 | 1,352 (RV) | – | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| 1,532 (A) | ± 2.5% | 50% | 42% | 8% | |||
| KFF | January 13–20, 2026 | 1,141 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| Emerson College | January 17–19, 2026 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | January 16–19, 2026 | 1,717 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 43% | 39% | 18% | 4% |
| 1,547 (A) | 39% | 34% | 27% | 5% | |||
| Morning Consult | January 16–18, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 45% | 43% | 14% | 2% |
| New York Times/Siena College | January 12–17, 2026 | 1,625 (RV) | ± 2.8% | 48% | 43% | 9% | 5% |
| Public Policy Polling (D) | January 13–14, 2026 | 597 (RV) | – | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | January 12–13, 2026 | 941 (RV) | – | 40% | 38% | 22% | 2% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | January 7–14, 2026 | 2,273 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| Impact Research (D)/ National Research Inc. (R) |
January 8–13, 2026 | 1,500 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| CNN/SSRS | January 9–12, 2026 | 968 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 46% | 41% | 13% | 5% |
| Morning Consult | January 9–12, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| The Economist/YouGov | January 9–12, 2026 | 1,433 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 40% | 16% | 4% |
| 1,597 (A) | 39% | 33% | 28% | 6% | |||
| Yahoo News/YouGov | January 8–12, 2026 | 1,148 (RV) | – | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| The Winston Group (R) | January 8–12, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| Cygnal (R) | January 7–8, 2026 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 45% | 7% | |
| RMG Research | January 5–8, 2026 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 44% | 43% | 13% | 1% |
| 47% | 46% | 7% | |||||
| The Economist/YouGov | January 2–5, 2026 | 1,386 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 39% | 16% | 6% |
| 1,547 (A) | 39% | 32% | 29% | 7% | |||
| Morning Consult | January 2–4, 2026 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Morning Consult | December 29, 2025 – January 4, 2026 | 22,709 (RV) | – | 44% | 42% | 14% | 2% |
| The Bullfinch Group | December 30, 2025 – January 1, 2026 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 33% | 23% | 11% |
| 1,200 (A) | ± 2.8% | 40% | 30% | 30% | 10% |
| Poll source | Date(s) administered |
Sample size |
Margin of error |
Democratic |
Republican |
Other/ Undecided |
Lead |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The Economist/YouGov | December 26–29, 2025 | 1,417 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 42% | 38% | 20% | 4% |
| 1,546 (A) | 36% | 31% | 33% | 5% | |||
| Big Data Poll (R) | December 26–28, 2025 | 3,412 (LV) | ± 1.9% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% | ||||
| Morning Consult | December 15–21, 2025 | 20,240 (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | |
| The Economist/YouGov | December 20–22, 2025 | 1,424 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 43% | 40% | 17% | |
| 1,591 (A) | 38% | 34% | 28% | 4% | |||
| Quantus Insights (R) | December 15–17, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 41% | 16% | 2% |
| AtlasIntel | December 15–19, 2025 | 2,315 (A) | ± 2.0% | 54% | 38% | 7% | 16% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | December 12–19, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | – | 46% | 45% | 9% | 1% |
| Fabrizio Ward (R) | December 15–17, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 38% | 17% | 7% |
| Emerson College | December 14–15, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 42% | 14% | 2% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | December 12–15, 2025 | 775 (RV) | – | 40% | 36% | 24% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | December 12–15, 2025 | 1,451 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 43% | 39% | 18% | 4% |
| 1,630 (A) | 37% | 33% | 30% | ||||
| Morning Consult | December 12–15, 2025 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 45% | 44% | 11% | 1% |
| Echelon Insights | December 11–15, 2025 | 1,011 (LV) | ± 3.8% | 48% | 45% | 7% | 3% |
| Quinnipiac University | December 11–15, 2025 | 1,035 (RV) | ± 3.9% | 47% | 43% | 10% | 4% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | December 10–12, 2025 | 3,004 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 47% | 43% | 10% | |
| 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% | ||||
| The Argument/Verasight | December 5–11, 2025 | – (LV) | – | 52% | 48% | – | 4% |
| 1,521 (RV) | ± 2.7% | 50% | 49% | – | 1% | ||
| 44% | 42% | 14% | 2% | ||||
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | December 4–11, 2025 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.1% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| GrayHouse (R) | December 6–8, 2025 | 2,058 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | December 5–8, 2025 | 1,379 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 42% | 37% | 21% | 6% |
| 1,529 (A) | 37% | 32% | 31% | 5% | |||
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
December 4–8, 2025 | 800 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 50% | 46% | 4% | 4% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | December 3–8, 2025 | 3,521 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 40% | 39% | 21% | 1% |
| Cygnal (R) | December 5–7, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| Morning Consult | December 5–7, 2025 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | December 4–5, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 40% | 16% | 4% |
| RMG Research | December 1–4, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 41% | 45% | 14% | 4% |
| 44% | 48% | 8% | |||||
| Big Data Poll (R) | November 28 – December 1, 2025 | 2,008 (RV) | ± 2.1% | 44% | 42% | 20% | 2% |
| 41% | 39% | 20% | |||||
| The Economist/YouGov | November 28 – December 1, 2025 | 1,452 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 39% | 16% | 6% |
| 1,623 (A) | 39% | 33% | 28% | ||||
| Morning Consult | November 26–30, 2025 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| GBAO (D)/Third Way (D) | November 19–26, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | – | 48% | 42% | 10% | 6% |
| The Bullfinch Group | November 21–25, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 41% | 35% | 24% | |
| 1,200 (A) | ± 2.8% | 37% | 32% | 31% | 5% | ||
| The Economist/YouGov | November 21–24, 2025 | 1,511 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 39% | 32% | 29% | 7% |
| 1,674 (A) | 44% | 39% | 17% | 5% | |||
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | November 17–24, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | – | 45% | 44% | 11% | 1% |
| Morning Consult | November 21–23, 2025 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 45% | 43% | 13% | 2% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | November 18–23, 2025 | 2,410 (LV) | ± 2.1% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| J.L. Partners (R) | November 19–20, 2025 | 797 (LV) | – | 50% | 46% | 4% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | November 15–17, 2025 | 1,380 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 40% | 17% | 3% |
| Echelon Insights | November 13–17, 2025 | 1,051 (LV) | ± 3.7% | 49% | 45% | 6% | 4% |
| The Argument/Verasight | November 10–17, 2025 | – (LV) | – | 54% | 46% | – | 8% |
| 1,508 (RV) | ± 2.6% | 53% | 47% | – | 6% | ||
| 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% | ||||
| Morning Consult | November 14–16, 2025 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| High Point University | November 10–14, 2025 | 1,004 (A) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 36% | 13% | 10% |
| Marist University | November 10–13, 2025 | 1,291 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 55% | 41% | 4% | 14% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | November 11–12, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 44% | 39% | 17% | 5% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | November 7–12, 2025 | 938 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 41% | 40% | 19% | 1% |
| Marquette University Law School | November 5–12, 2025 | 903 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| 1,052 (A) | ± 3.3% | 46% | 41% | 13% | |||
| The Economist/YouGov | November 7–10, 2025 | 1,499 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% |
| Morning Consult | November 7–9, 2025 | 2,201 (RV) | – | 48% | 43% | 9% | 5% |
| Cygnal (R) | November 5–6, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| Emerson College | November 3–4, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 40% | 16% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 31 – November 3, 2025 | 1,470 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% |
| RMG Research | October 27–30, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 42% | 43% | 15% | 1% |
| 44% | 46% | 10% | 2% | ||||
| CNN/SSRS | October 27–30, 2025 | 945 (RV) | ± 3.6% | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| NewsNation/DDHQ | October 27–29, 2025 | 1,159 (LV) | ± 2.9% | 47% | 47% | 7% | Tie |
| 1,609 (RV) | ± 2.4% | 45% | 44% | 11% | 1% | ||
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | October 24–29, 2025 | 1,352 (LV) | ± 2.7% | 49% | 41% | 10% | 8% |
| 1,567 (A) | ± 2.6% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% | ||
| Big Data Poll (R) | October 26–28, 2025 | 2,984 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 43% | 41% | 16% | 2% |
| Washington Post/ABC News/Ipsos | October 24–28, 2025 | 2,203 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 46% | 44% | 10% | |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
October 24–28, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 42% | 8% | 8% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 24–27, 2025 | 1,472 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 43% | 40% | 17% | 3% |
| Yahoo News/YouGov | October 23–27, 2025 | 1,197 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | October 21–27, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | – | 44% | 46% | 10% | 2% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | October 16–23, 2025 | 1,047 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 47% | 46% | 7% | 1% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 17–20, 2025 | 1,447 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| Quinnipiac University | October 17–20, 2025 | 1,327 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 50% | 41% | 9% | 9% |
| UMass Lowell/YouGov | October 16–20, 2025 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.5% | 38% | 35% | 27% | 3% |
| Echelon Insights | October 16–20, 2025 | 1,010 (LV) | ± 4.0% | 48% | 46% | 6% | 2% |
| Morning Consult | October 17–19, 2025 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| Emerson College | October 13–14, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 43% | 13% | 1% |
| The Argument/Verasight | October 10–16, 2025 | 1,530 (RV) | – | 51% | 49% | – | 2% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 10–13, 2025 | 1,466 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 40% | 17% | 3% |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
October 8–12, 2025 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 48% | 47% | 5% | 1% |
| YouGov Blue (D) | October 7–10, 2025 | 517 (RV) | – | 48% | 45% | 7% | 3% |
| Cygnal (R) | October 7–8, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 45% | 7% | |
| Quantus Insights (R) | October 6–8, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 42% | 43% | 15% | 1% |
| The Economist/YouGov | October 4–6, 2025 | 1,486 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 39% | 17% | 5% |
| Noble Predictive Insights/ The Center Square |
October 2–6, 2025 | 2,565 (RV) | ± 2.0% | 45% | 43% | 12% | 2% |
| Morning Consult | October 3–5, 2025 | 2,200 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| The Economist/YouGov | September 26–29, 2025 | 1,517 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 41% | 15% | |
| Yahoo News/YouGov | September 25–29, 2025 | 1,126 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 44% | 40% | 16% | 4% |
| New York Times/Siena College | September 22–27, 2025 | 1,313 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 45% | 8% | 2% |
| RMG Research | September 22–24, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 41% | 43% | 16% | 2% |
| 45% | 46% | 9% | 1% | ||||
| The Economist/YouGov | September 19–22, 2025 | 1,392 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| Echelon Insights | September 18–22, 2025 | 1,071 (LV) | ± 3.7% | 47% | 46% | 7% | 1% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | September 17–22, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | – | 41% | 47% | 12% | 6% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | September 15–19, 2025 | 1,268 (LV) | ± 2.8% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| 1,500 (A) | ± 2.6% | 47% | 42% | 11% | |||
| AtlasIntel | September 12–16, 2025 | 1,066 (A) | ± 3.0% | 52% | 44% | 4% | 8% |
| Normington Petts (D)/Third Way (D) | September 11–16, 2025 | 800 (V) | – | 51% | 49% | – | 2% |
| The Economist/YouGov | September 12–15, 2025 | 1,418 (RV) | ± 3.3% | 43% | 41% | 16% | |
| National Association of Independent Pollsters | September 6–13, 2025 | 2,071 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 47% | 46% | 7% | 1% |
| i360 | September 10–12, 2025 | 577 (RV) | ± 4.1% | 35% | 32% | 33% | 5% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | September 4–11, 2025 | 1,001 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 44% | 6% | 6% |
| The Economist/YouGov | September 5–8, 2025 | 1,482 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 40% | 4% | 2% |
| Public Religion Research Institute | August 15 – September 8, 2025 | 5,543 (A) | ± 1.8% | 33% | 30% | 36% | 3% |
| Cygnal (R) | September 2–3, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 45% | 7% | |
| Yahoo News/YouGov | August 29 – September 2, 2025 | 1,136 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 40% | 16% | 4% |
| The Economist/YouGov | August 29 – September 2, 2025 | 1,548 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 43% | 39% | 18% | |
| Survey 160 | August 26 – September 1, 2025 | – (RV) | ± 5.8% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% |
| Morning Consult | August 29–31, 2025 | 2,202 (RV) | – | 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% |
| Emerson College | August 25–26, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 43% | 43% | 14% | Tie |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | August 21–26, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 45% | 47% | 8% | 2% |
| The Economist/YouGov | August 22–25, 2025 | 1,374 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 43% | 41% | 16% | 2% |
| Reuters/Ipsos | August 22–24, 2025 | 1,022 (A) | ± 3.2% | 38% | 34% | 28% | |
| SoCal Strategies (R) | August 19, 2025 | 700 (A) | – | 42% | 37% | 21% | 5% |
| RMG Research | August 18–21, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 44% | 44% | 12% | Tie |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | August 18–21, 2025 | 1,500 (A) | ± 2.6% | 49% | 41% | 10% | 8% |
| Echelon Insights | August 14–18, 2025 | 1,057 (LV) | ± 3.6% | 47% | 46% | 7% | 1% |
| The Argument/Verasight | August 18–21, 2025 | 1,562 (RV) | ± 2.6% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| 51% | 49% | – | 2% | ||||
| The Economist/YouGov | August 15–18, 2025 | 1,404 (RV) | ± 3.2% | 44% | 39% | 17% | 5% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | August 11–13, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| The Economist/YouGov | August 9–11, 2025 | 1,473 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 42% | 40% | 18% | 2% |
| The Economist/YouGov | August 1–4, 2025 | 1,528 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 38% | 18% | 6% |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
July 29 – August 3, 2025 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.1% | 49% | 44% | 7% | 5% |
| GrayHouse (R) | July 27–29, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.7% | 47% | 44% | 9% | 3% |
| Yahoo News/YouGov | July 24–28, 2025 | 1,167 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 46% | 39% | 15% | 7% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | July 21–24, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | – | 46% | 43% | 11% | 3% |
| 1,633 (LV) | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% | |||
| Fabrizio (R)/Impact Research (D) | July 16–20, 2025 | 1,500 (RV) | ± 2.5% | 46% | 43% | 10% | 3% |
| Emerson College | July 21–22, 2025 | 1,400 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 44% | 42% | 14% | 2% |
| AtlasIntel | July 13–18, 2025 | 1,935 (A) | ± 2.0% | 51% | 43% | 6% | 8% |
| Rasmussen Reports (R) | July 13–17, 2025 | 2,288 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 46% | 42% | 12% | 4% |
| RMG Research | July 14–16, 2025 | 2,000 (RV) | ± 2.2% | 45% | 49% | 6% | 4% |
| Big Data Poll (R) | July 12–14, 2025 | 3,022 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 42% | 41% | 17% | 1% |
| Echelon Insights | July 10–14, 2025 | 1,084 (LV) | ± 3.6% | 47% | 48% | 5% | 1% |
| 45% | 41% | 14% | 4% | ||||
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | July 9–14, 2025 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 42% | 47% | 11% | 5% |
| A2 Insights | July 7–10, 2025 | 862 (RV) | – | 48% | 44% | 8% | 4% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | July 1–3, 2025 | 1,500 (A) | ± 2.7% | 47% | 43% | 10% | |
| Cygnal (R) | July 1–2, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 47% | 46% | 7% | 1% |
| Emerson College | June 24–25, 2025 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.0% | 43% | 40% | 17% | 3% |
| American Pulse Research & Polling (R) | June 23–25, 2025 | 633 (RV) | – | 47% | 42% | 11% | 5% |
| Cygnal (R) | June 19–21, 2025 | 800 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 48% | 46% | 6% | 2% |
| RMG Research | June 18–19, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 52% | 4% | 8% |
| Echelon Insights | June 12–16, 2025 | 982 (LV) | ± 3.8% | 47% | 48% | 5% | 1% |
| co/efficient (R) | June 12–16, 2025 | 1,035 (LV) | ± 3.2% | 46% | 46% | 8% | Tie |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | June 5–14, 2025 | 1,000 (V) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | June 6–12, 2025 | 1,500 (A) | ± 2.6% | 45% | 37% | 18% | 8% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | June 9–11, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 43% | 43% | 14% | Tie |
| Quantus Insights (R) | June 1–4, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 46% | 45% | 9% | 1% |
| AtlasIntel | May 21–27, 2025 | 3,469 (A) | ± 2.0% | 51% | 42% | 7% | 9% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | May 21–26, 2025 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 43% | 47% | 10% | 4% |
| RMG Research | May 20–21, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 48% | 45% | 4% | 3% |
| Fabrizio Ward (R) | May 15–19, 2025 | 800 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 42% | 42% | 16% | Tie |
| Echelon Insights | May 8–12, 2025 | 1,000 (LV) | ± 3.8% | 47% | 48% | 5% | 1% |
| co/efficient (R) | May 7–9, 2025 | 1,462 (LV) | ± 3.3% | 45% | 42% | 10% | 3% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | May 5–7, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 45% | 45% | 10% | Tie |
| Big Data Poll (R) | May 3–5, 2025 | 3,128 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 40% | 42% | 18% | 2% |
| Strength In Numbers/Verasight | May 1–6, 2025 | 1,000 (A) | ± 3.2% | 47% | 41% | 12% | 6% |
| NewsNation/DDHQ | April 23–27, 2025 | 1,448 (RV) | ± 2.4% | 45% | 40% | 15% | 5% |
| New York Times/Siena College | April 21–24, 2025 | 913 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 47% | 44% | 9% | 3% |
| Beacon Research (D)/ Shaw & Co. Research (R) |
April 18–21, 2025 | 1,104 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 49% | 42% | 9% | 7% |
| Noble Predictive Insights/ The Center Square |
April 15–18, 2025 | 2,500 (LV) | ± 2.0% | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| RMG Research | April 16, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 50% | 45% | 5% | 5% |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
April 9–13, 2025 | – (RV) | – | 45% | 42% | 13% | 3% |
| RealClear Opinion Research | April 10–12, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 40% | 39% | 21% | 1% |
| Cygnal (R) | April 1–3, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 48% | 47% | 5% | |
| Yale Youth Poll | April 1–3, 2025 | 4,100 (RV) | ± 1.9% | 43% | 42% | 15% | |
| Quantus Insights (R) | March 25–27, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 45% | 46% | 9% | 1% |
| Echelon Insights | March 10–13, 2025 | 1,007 (LV) | ± 3.5% | 46% | 47% | 7% | |
| Hart Research Associates (D)/ Public Opinion Strategies (R) |
March 7–11, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 48% | 47% | 5% | 1% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | March 3–9, 2025 | 1,036 (V) | ± 1.7% | 46% | 44% | 10% | 2% |
| Cygnal (R) | March 3–5, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 47% | 46% | 7% | 1% |
| Emerson College | March 2–3, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.0% | 44% | 41% | 15% | 3% |
| Public Opinion Strategies (R) | February 25 – March 2, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 44% | 46% | 10% | 2% |
| RMG Research | February 20–21, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 46% | 48% | 6% | |
| co/efficient (R) | February 15–17, 2025 | 2,063 (LV) | ± 3.4% | 44% | 46% | 10% | |
| Echelon Insights | February 10–13, 2025 | 1,010 (LV) | ± 3.6% | 46% | 47% | 7% | 1% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | February 10–12, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 44% | 48% | 8% | 4% |
| Morning Consult | February 3–9, 2025 | 19,675 (RV) | – | 43% | 45% | 12% | 2% |
| Clarity Campaign Labs (D) | January 31 – February 6, 2025 | 1,102 (V) | ± 1.5% | 45% | 44% | 11% | 1% |
| Cygnal (R) | February 4–5, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 46% | 47% | 7% | 1% |
| Morning Consult | January 27 – February 2, 2025 | 19,675 (RV) | – | 43% | 44% | 13% | |
| Fabrizio Ward (R)/ Impact Research (D) |
January 27 – February 1, 2025 | 3,000 (RV) | ± 1.8% | 43% | 43% | 14% | Tie |
| Morning Consult | January 20–26, 2025 | 19,675 (RV) | – | 42% | 45% | 13% | 3% |
| Quantus Insights (R) | January 22–23, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.5% | 45% | 48% | 7% | |
| RMG Research | January 15–16, 2025 | 1,000 (RV) | ± 3.1% | 44% | 51% | 5% | 7% |
| Cygnal (R) | January 9–12, 2025 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 45% | 47% | 8% | 2% |
| McLaughlin & Associates (R) | December 11–16, 2024 | 1,000 (LV) | – | 42% | 47% | 11% | 5% |
| Cygnal (R) | December 9–11, 2024 | 1,500 (LV) | ± 2.5% | 45% | 48% | 7% | 3% |
Prior to an appointment pursuant to paragraph 1 of subsection C of this section, a person who is a prospective appointee shall submit to the Secretary of State an oath affirming that the person will not file as a candidate for the office when it next appears on the ballot. The Secretary of State shall prescribe the oath required by this paragraph, and any oath submitted shall be public record and published on the website of the Office of the Secretary of State.
During the campaign, it was kind of hard to picture the specifics of how Trump might pull such a thing off. Alas, it's getting less hypothetical by the week.
The U.S. Supreme Court's new decision gutting a key provision of the federal Voting Rights Act clears the way for state officials to drastically reshape not only Congress but also state legislatures, county commissions, city councils and even local school boards.
Beyond Congress, the ruling will influence state legislative, local, and school board districts nationwide.
In a brief to the Supreme Court, the Brennan Center summarized the impact of Section 2:
Indeed, since the 1980s, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has played an indispensable role in improving representation on city councils, school boards, county commissions, and other local government bodies across the country.
Voting rights experts said the ruling leaves the Voting Rights Act only a shell of what it had been and will provide an open door for political mapmakers at every level — from local school districts to state legislatures to Congress — to undermine minority representation.
How concerned are voters about AI's potential to do harm? So concerned that nearly eight out of ten favor safety over the race to dominate development of AI. And voters say they would be more likely to vote for candidates who agree with that course.
Iran has deliberately prolonged talks with the US to try to weaken Donald Trump politically ahead of November's US midterm elections, senior officials say...