Certain cruise missiles built by Ukraine or supplied by Ukraine's allies also take part in the deep strike campaign. Although these tend to be much more expensive, and easier to intercept, they carry larger warheads and thus present a greater threat to potential Russian targets:
The primary targets of Ukraine's deep strike campaign have been the petroleum industry in Russia and military assets of the Russian Armed Forces, as well as ports and airports. The export of hydrocarbons, mostly oil and gas, has been the Russian government's main source of revenue used for military spending on the war. A secondary objective has been to put pressure on the civilian population of Russia (also called "bringing the war back to Russia"), which through a mixture of acquiescence and participation keeps enabling the Kremlin's military aggression against Ukraine. On 8 October 2026, after another successful drone strike on the Omsk refinery, one of Russia's largest oil refineries, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated: "The destruction of such facilities is the exercise by Ukraine of its inalienable right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and is aimed at reducing the military-economic potential of the Russian Federation".
History
Summary of 2022–2026
The deep strike campaign began in early 2024, with a few dozen pilotless aircraft per month. By June 2026, Ukraine was launching an average of 200 to 300 drones against targets in the Russian Federation every night, divided in several groups per strike.
War year
Number of strikes on Russia's oil facilities
In year
Cumulative
1st
3
3
2nd
13
16
3rd
92
108
4th
138
246
Feb '26– Jun '26
59
305
According to a 25 June 2026 analysis by CNN, Ukraine had struck Russian oil facilities over 300 times since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Only 3 strikes were performed in the first year of the war (February 2022 to February 2023), with an additional 13 in the second year. Ukraine's attacks on Russia's oil infrastructure only really took off in 2024, with a cumulative total of 108 hits after three years of war, 246 after four years, and a total of 305 strikes when including 24 February 2022 to 25 June 2026.
In 2025
A substantial increase in targeted attacks by Ukraine on Russian energy infrastructure began in the second half of 2025. According to media reports, Ukraine carried out over a dozen drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure between 2 and 24 August, the majority of them striking facilities in Ryazan Oblast and Volgograd Oblast in southwestern Russia. On 27 August, Ukrainian media reported that the Ryazan refinery, one of the main fuel arteries to Moscow, had been struck by a powerful explosion. Boris Aronstein, an independent oil and gas analyst, said that the Ukrainian drone strikes had caused "the most severe crisis in recent years", adding that the size, coordination and repeated waves of the drones makes Russia unable to repair the refineries before the next attack occurs. According to Reuters, Crimea and Russia's far east were the first territories to experience gasoline shortages in August.
2025–2026 Ukrainian strikes on Russia's oil industry
In September 2025, Reuters reported that Russia was seeing certain fuel grade shortages, with the reduced refinery runs caused by the drone attacks and high borrowing costs leading to private filling stations being unable to stockpile fuel according to retailers and traders. According to Reuters, the attacks on some days had reduced Russian oil refining by almost a fifth, and cut exports from key ports. According to five retailers and traders in the Russian fuel market during September, problems from the shortages started to emerge in the Volga river region and in southern and central Russia as well. On 29 September, Forbes reported that the issues with fuel had worsened quickly and spread across much of the country, with rising prices, rationing, long queues and pumps running dry in some cases.
In October 2025, BBC Verify and BBC Russian reported that Ukrainian drone attacks reached a record level of 14 refineries targeted in August, while eight had been targeted in September and 12 in August, and that 21 out of Russia's 38 large refineries had been hit since January 2025. Meduza reported that some gas stations were shutting down altogether due to being unable to raise prices because of antitrust restrictions. In Crimea, Russian occupation officials limited gasoline sales to 20 liters per customer and imposed price caps.
According to a 17 June 2026 analysis by The Economist, Ukraine had conducted 685 deep strikes in 2025, and was on track to complete over 800 deep strikes in 2026 at the current pace, indicating a significant intensification.
In early July 2026, Euromaidanpress quoted the Pilotless Systems Forces of Ukraine as saying they had increased successful strikes deep inside Russian-held territory by 1,150% since the beginning of 2026.
The deepest strike so far has been the 7 July 2026 drone attack on the Omsk refinery, Russia's largest oil refinery, located almost 2,500 kilometres from Ukraine.
On 26 August, the Kstovo refinery (NORSI) was hit once again, forcing Lukoil to halt processing crude oil once more.
Attack on an Iranian commercial vessel
On 25 July 2026, Ukraine claimed responsibility for an attack on an Iranian-linked vessel in the Caspian Sea, alleging that the ship was involved in transporting military-related cargo between Iran and Russia to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine. The strike reportedly damaged the vessel and resulted in a sailor's death and another injured, according to Iran. Ukraine presented the operation as part of its campaign to disrupt Russia's supply networks, particularly routes used to transfer weapons and military equipment.
Following the attack, Iran considered a retaliatory strike against Ukraine, reportedly targeting a Ukrainian Black Sea port with a limited ballistic missile strike. However, diplomatic efforts between Iranian and Ukrainian officials reduced tensions. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha described the incident as 'unintentional', though Iran continued to demand compensation for the losses.
Following unconfirmed reports circulated on Telegram channels claiming that Iran planned to launch up to three ballistic missiles against Ukraine, Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation, stated that there was no official information confirming such preparations and warned against spreading unverified claims. However, he emphasised that Iran may possess ballistic missiles that could be used for such attacks.
List of oil industry facilities in Russia hit by Ukrainian strikes
This is a dynamic list and may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by editing the page to add missing items, with references to reliable sources.
24–25 January 2024, 17 May 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 March 2025, 6 October 2025, 2 November 2025, 16 April 2026, 20 April 2026, 28 April 2026, 1 May 2026, 26–27 May 2026
On 4 July 2026, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimated 42.74% of Russia's oil refining capacity had been disabled at that time, while the International Energy Agency (IEA) said "more than 20%" of capacity has been knocked offline. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated in early July 2026 that Russia's capacity to produce and export oil had been reduced by 40% due to the Ukrainian mid- and long-range drone strikes. The Financial Times reported that Russia produced 4.1 million barrels of oil per day in June 2026 (28% below the 5-year average, and 35% below design capacity); the fuel shortage had so far affected 50 million people (35% of the Russian Federation's population); and by 9 July the majority of regions of Russia had local authorities or retailers imposing fuel sales restrictions.
Exiled Russian energy expert Mikhail Krutikhin[ru] concluded in mid-July 2026: "I think some of the oil capacity of Russia has been lost forever, because of the closure of the [oil] wells right now. Russia is not going to recover, even five years after the war." Around the same time, Radio Svoboda reported based on recent satellite imagery that Russia was withdrawing most of its remaining S-300 and S-400 air defence systems from the Arctic Far North (especially Novaya Zemlya and Severodvinsk in Arkhangelsk Oblast) in order to protect its oil refineries (such as the Saratov refinery, where air defence systems appeared to have been moved between May 2023 and August 2025) and Moscow to the southwest from Ukrainian drone strikes. The remaining stockpile of these types of air defence missiles was reportedly also diminishing due to being outproduced by Ukrainian drone manufacturing, as well as direct strikes on air defence launchers, although the remaining volume was unknown, and Ukrainian officials cautioned that Russia had some other systems left. More generally, OSINT analysts concluded that c. 60% of Russia's air defence systems had been moved from the locations they were stationed in before Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
According to Russian Forbes, 54% of all oil refineries had been damaged by August 2026. In July 2026, Russia's daily petrol output declined to 75,000~80,000 tonnes, even though domestic summer demand was 115,000~120,000 tonnes a day, meaning Russia had a daily oil refining capacity deficit of c. 35%.
↑"The degradation of Russia's oil refining industry and defense-industrial complex directly reduces the aggressor state's military and economic potential. The systematic destruction of Russia's strategic facilities is an effective instrument for exerting pressure on its war machine."
↑"Ukraine’s deep strike campaign extends to the maritime domain through unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), notably the Magura and Sea Baby. These systems demonstrate sophisticated solutions for operating in E-W-heavy environments... The operational effectiveness of these EW-resilient systems is evidenced by the destruction of approximately one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, forcing the fleet to withdraw from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk." Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2026).
12Million tonnes per annum (MTPA) refers to the annual crude oil refining capacity of an oil refinery, or the annual handling (transloading/exporting or storage) capacity of an oil terminal, pump, or depot (LPDS).
12Estimated distance as the drone flies in kilometres (km) between the targeted facility and Ukrainian-controlled territory; essentially, Ukraine minus the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine. Although it is possible certain (drone) strikes were launched from elsewhere (such as during Operation Spiderweb), the vast majority of strikes on Russia's oil infrastructure have reportedly originated in Ukrainian-controlled territory.
↑Design capacity: 20.0–21.0. Reported result 2024: 17.5 ("6.6% of the total volume of oil refining in the Russian Federation").
↑Design capacity: 14. 2024: 11.6. After the June 2026 strikes, the refinery was completely shut down, and industry sources expected the Moscow Refinery to remain offline for at least 6 months pending repairs, before production could be resumed.
↑The January 2024 attack was one of Ukraine's first long-range drone strikes. Militarnyi commented: "It is unlikely that the group of drones flew through the occupied Crimea, which is saturated with air defense systems, or across the front line in the Zaporizhzhia region. However, if the route was across the Black Sea, the drones would have flown more than 800 kilometers. It is known that Ukraine has several drones capable of covering distances of 1000 kilometers or more."
↑Reported estimates include: 10.0 (design capacity), 6.8 (late 2022), 6.5 (2023), 7.2 (2024); "2.7% of the total refining volume in the Russian Federation.".
↑The design capacity of Ilsky refinery is 6.6 million tonnes of crude oil annually, but it is unknown what its current real output is as of July 2026, after it had been struck at least 17 times within 3 years and 2 months.
12The Afipsky refinery and Krasnodar refinery have been merged as the same legal entity owned by SAFMAR. Their combined capacity was 7.2 million tonnes in 2024, and in January–June 2025 3 million tonnes.
↑In July 2026, The Moscow Times stated: "According to sources, total exports of petroleum products via the Novorossiysk terminals in 2025 amounted to 19.8 million tonnes." As it had a separate entry for the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal, "the Novorossiysk terminals" probably refers to the Sheskharis oil terminal and Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal (NOFT) combined, but excluding the CPC terminal in Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka.
↑While the Russian Ministry of Defence issued a statement on 6 April 2026 saying that the Ukrainian strikes had hit the CPC marine terminal (in Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka), it provided no visual evidence of the strikes. On the other hand, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine claimed that it had attacked the Sheskharis oil terminal, and most media pointed to video footage of a burning oil terminal which the Astra Telegram channel had geolocated to the Sheskharis oil terminal, filmed from the other shore of the Tsemes Bay, as indicated by the Malaya Zemlia memorial[ru] that is visible in the video between the camera and the fire across the bay.
↑On 6 April 2026, The Moscow Times reported the oil transloading capacity of the CPC marine terminal at Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka as "roughly 1 million barrels per day", "between 3.5 million and 4.5 million tons of crude per month", "up to 20% of Russia’s seaborne oil exports", and "around 1% of the world's oil supplies, as well as around 80% of Kazakhstan's exports".
↑"According to source-based data, the port [of Ust-Luga] exported 32.9 million metric tonnes of oil products last year [2025] and typically handles about 700,000 barrels of crude oil per day."
↑"The [Novatek] Ust-Luga complex has three processing units with a capacity of 3 million metric tons a year each and refines stable gas condensate into light and heavy naphtha, jet fuel, ship fuel component (fuel oil) and gasoil."
↑Since April 2025, 55% of shares have been seized by the Russian state from Cyprus-based offshore holding companies owned by children of the deceased co-founder Dmitry Skigin. The remaining 45% is owned by Elena Vasilieva, widow of co-owner Sergey Vasiliev. Fuel is supplied by Rosneft North-West LLC, which acquired the Petersburg Fuel Company (PTK) in 2019, liquidating it in 2021.
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