Deep strike campaign

Deep strike campaign
Part of the Attacks in Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War

Fire at the Moscow Oil Refinery in Kapotnya, photographed from Moscow's Brateevo district on 18 June 2026, following a Ukrainian strike
Date2024 – present (2 years)
Location
Result Ongoing
Belligerents
 Ukraine  Russia
Commanders and leaders
Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Commander-in-Chief)
Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi (Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces of Ukraine until 21 July 2026)
Ukraine Mykhailo Drapatyi (Commander-in-Chief, Armed Forces of Ukraine from 21 July 2026)
Ukraine Robert "Madyar" Brovdi (Commander, Unmanned Systems Forces)
Russia Vladimir Putin (Commander-in-Chief)
Russia Andrei Belousov (Minister of Defence)
Units involved
Strength
~200–300 long-range drones launched per night (June 2026)
2,359 deep-strike missions in June 2026, targeting sites 500–2,000 km behind the front line

The deep strike campaign, or long-range strike campaign, dubbed long range sanctions, is a military campaign by the Defence Forces of Ukraine against the logistics of the Russian Federation and the Russian Armed Forces. The campaign involves long-range drone strikes and missile strikes inside Russia, mainly targeting the oil industry and the arms industry. The goal is to undermine Russia's economic ability to continue waging its war against Ukraine. It is part of a broader wave of Ukrainian attacks inside Russia in response to the 2022 invasion.

Overview

"Deep strike" refers to the range of 200 to 1500+ kilometres, for which specialised deep-strike or long-range one-way attack drones have been developed by Ukraine, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as:

Certain cruise missiles built by Ukraine or supplied by Ukraine's allies also take part in the deep strike campaign. Although these tend to be much more expensive, and easier to intercept, they carry larger warheads and thus present a greater threat to potential Russian targets:

There are also several types of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) deployed by the Ukrainian Navy and Ukrainian Marine Corps on the Black Sea against Russia's Black Sea Fleet:

Objectives

The primary targets of Ukraine's deep strike campaign have been the petroleum industry in Russia and military assets of the Russian Armed Forces, as well as ports and airports. The export of hydrocarbons, mostly oil and gas, has been the Russian government's main source of revenue used for military spending on the war. A secondary objective has been to put pressure on the civilian population of Russia (also called "bringing the war back to Russia"), which through a mixture of acquiescence and participation keeps enabling the Kremlin's military aggression against Ukraine. On 8 October 2026, after another successful drone strike on the Omsk refinery, one of Russia's largest oil refineries, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated: "The destruction of such facilities is the exercise by Ukraine of its inalienable right to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and is aimed at reducing the military-economic potential of the Russian Federation".

History

Summary of 2022–2026

The deep strike campaign began in early 2024, with a few dozen pilotless aircraft per month. By June 2026, Ukraine was launching an average of 200 to 300 drones against targets in the Russian Federation every night, divided in several groups per strike.

War
year
Number of strikes on
Russia's oil facilities
In yearCumulative
1st 3 3
2nd 13 16
3rd 92 108
4th 138 246
Feb '26–
Jun '26
59 305

According to a 25 June 2026 analysis by CNN, Ukraine had struck Russian oil facilities over 300 times since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. Only 3 strikes were performed in the first year of the war (February 2022 to February 2023), with an additional 13 in the second year. Ukraine's attacks on Russia's oil infrastructure only really took off in 2024, with a cumulative total of 108 hits after three years of war, 246 after four years, and a total of 305 strikes when including 24 February 2022 to 25 June 2026.

In 2025

A substantial increase in targeted attacks by Ukraine on Russian energy infrastructure began in the second half of 2025. According to media reports, Ukraine carried out over a dozen drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure between 2 and 24 August, the majority of them striking facilities in Ryazan Oblast and Volgograd Oblast in southwestern Russia. On 27 August, Ukrainian media reported that the Ryazan refinery, one of the main fuel arteries to Moscow, had been struck by a powerful explosion. Boris Aronstein, an independent oil and gas analyst, said that the Ukrainian drone strikes had caused "the most severe crisis in recent years", adding that the size, coordination and repeated waves of the drones makes Russia unable to repair the refineries before the next attack occurs. According to Reuters, Crimea and Russia's far east were the first territories to experience gasoline shortages in August.

2025–2026 Ukrainian strikes
on Russia's oil industry
About OpenStreetMaps
Maps: terms of use
700km
435miles
26
Yug Rusi
26 Yug Rusi
26 Yug Rusi
25
25 Krasnodar
25 Krasnodar
24
Ilsky
24 Ilsky
24 Ilsky
23
Kuibyshev        
23 Kuibyshev refinery
23 Kuibyshev refinery
22
Afipsky
22 Afipsky refinery
22 Afipsky refinery
21
Antipinsky
21 Antipinsky refinery
21 Antipinsky refinery
20
Ust-
Luga
20 Ust-Luga Multimodal Complex
20 Ust-Luga Multimodal Complex
19
Novorossiysk
terminals (3)
19 Port of Novorossiysk
19 Port of Novorossiysk
18
Tikhoretsk pump
18 Tikhoretsk
18 Tikhoretsk
17
Novoil
17 Bashneft – Novoil
17 Bashneft – Novoil
16
Slavyansk                  
16 Slavyansk-on-Kuban
16 Slavyansk-on-Kuban
15
Saratov
15 Saratov
15 Saratov
14
            Ufimsky
14 Ufimsky refinery plant
14 Ufimsky refinery plant
13
Novokuibyshevsk
13 Novokuibyshevsk Refinery
13 Novokuibyshevsk Refinery
12
TANECO  
12 Nizhnekamsk
12 Nizhnekamsk
11
          Syzran
11 Syzran
11 Syzran
10

Tuapse terminal
10 Tuapse oil terminal
10 Tuapse oil terminal
9
Tuapse refinery
9 Tuapse Refinery
9 Tuapse Refinery
8
Moscow
8 Moscow Refinery
8 Moscow Refinery
7
    Perm
7 Perm refinery
7 Perm refinery
6
Volgograd
6 Volgograd refinery
6 Volgograd refinery
5
Yaroslavl
5 Yaroslavl refinery
5 Yaroslavl refinery
4
Kstovo
4 Kstovo refinery
4 Kstovo refinery
3
Ryazan
3 Ryazan refinery
3 Ryazan refinery
2
    Kinef
2 Kirishi Refinery
2 Kirishi Refinery
1
Omsk
1 Omsk refinery
1 Omsk refinery
⬤ Oil refinery
⬤ Other oil infrastructure

In September 2025, Reuters reported that Russia was seeing certain fuel grade shortages, with the reduced refinery runs caused by the drone attacks and high borrowing costs leading to private filling stations being unable to stockpile fuel according to retailers and traders. According to Reuters, the attacks on some days had reduced Russian oil refining by almost a fifth, and cut exports from key ports. According to five retailers and traders in the Russian fuel market during September, problems from the shortages started to emerge in the Volga river region and in southern and central Russia as well. On 29 September, Forbes reported that the issues with fuel had worsened quickly and spread across much of the country, with rising prices, rationing, long queues and pumps running dry in some cases.

In October 2025, BBC Verify and BBC Russian reported that Ukrainian drone attacks reached a record level of 14 refineries targeted in August, while eight had been targeted in September and 12 in August, and that 21 out of Russia's 38 large refineries had been hit since January 2025. Meduza reported that some gas stations were shutting down altogether due to being unable to raise prices because of antitrust restrictions. In Crimea, Russian occupation officials limited gasoline sales to 20 liters per customer and imposed price caps.

In 2026

According to a 17 June 2026 analysis by The Economist, Ukraine had conducted 685 deep strikes in 2025, and was on track to complete over 800 deep strikes in 2026 at the current pace, indicating a significant intensification.

In early July 2026, Euromaidanpress quoted the Pilotless Systems Forces of Ukraine as saying they had increased successful strikes deep inside Russian-held territory by 1,150% since the beginning of 2026.

The deepest strike so far has been the 7 July 2026 drone attack on the Omsk refinery, Russia's largest oil refinery, located almost 2,500 kilometres from Ukraine.

On 26 August, the Kstovo refinery (NORSI) was hit once again, forcing Lukoil to halt processing crude oil once more.

Attack on an Iranian commercial vessel

On 25 July 2026, Ukraine claimed responsibility for an attack on an Iranian-linked vessel in the Caspian Sea, alleging that the ship was involved in transporting military-related cargo between Iran and Russia to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine. The strike reportedly damaged the vessel and resulted in a sailor's death and another injured, according to Iran. Ukraine presented the operation as part of its campaign to disrupt Russia's supply networks, particularly routes used to transfer weapons and military equipment.

Following the attack, Iran considered a retaliatory strike against Ukraine, reportedly targeting a Ukrainian Black Sea port with a limited ballistic missile strike. However, diplomatic efforts between Iranian and Ukrainian officials reduced tensions. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha described the incident as 'unintentional', though Iran continued to demand compensation for the losses.

Following unconfirmed reports circulated on Telegram channels claiming that Iran planned to launch up to three ballistic missiles against Ukraine, Andriy Kovalenko, head of Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation, stated that there was no official information confirming such preparations and warned against spreading unverified claims. However, he emphasised that Iran may possess ballistic missiles that could be used for such attacks.

List of oil industry facilities in Russia hit by Ukrainian strikes

Oil refineries, oil terminals and other oil industrial infrastructure in Russia, struck by Ukrainian attacks since 2025, ranked by refining or transloading capacity. The distance from Ukrainian-controlled territory is indicated in kilometres.

Oil refineries

Facility Region Operator Capacity by MTPA Ref Distance
(km)
Date of strike(s)
Omsk refinery Omsk Oblast Gazprom Neft 22.0(2024) 2500 6 July 2026, 8 October 2026
Kirishi refinery
(Kinef)
Leningrad Oblast Surgutneftegas 17.5(2024) 810 March 2024, 14 September 2025, 4 October 2025, 8 March 2026, 26 March 2026, 5 May 2026, 9 July 2026
Ryazan refinery Ryazan Oblast Rosneft 13.1(2024) 480 24 January 2025, 20 February 2025, 2 August 2026, 5 September 2025, 23 October 2025, 15 November 2025, 24 February 2026, 15 May 2026, 29 July 2026
Kstovo refinery Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Lukoil (NORSI) 15.0 800 5 April 2026, 20 May 2026, 24 June 2026, 2 July 2026, 26 August 2026
Yaroslavl refinery (YANOS) Yaroslavl Oblast Slavneft 14.9(2024) 700 1 October 2025, 12 December 2025, 24 June 2026, 6 July 2026
Volgograd refinery Volgograd Oblast Lukoil 13.7(2024)
-40% (2026)
500 11 February 2026, 1 June 2026
Novoshakhtinsk refinery Rostov Oblast Yug Rusi 13 200 25 September 2026
Perm refinery Perm Krai Lukoil 12.6(2024) 1485 29 April 2026, 7 May 2026, 29 July 2026, 25 September 2026
Moscow refinery Moscow Gazprom Neft Offline 475 17 May 2026, 12 June 2026, 18 June 202620 September 2026
Tuapse refinery
Tuapse oil terminal
Krasnodar Krai Rosneft 12.0 500 24–25 January 2024, 17 May 2024, 22 July 2024, 14 March 2025, 6 October 2025, 2 November 2025, 16 April 2026, 20 April 2026, 28 April 2026, 1 May 2026, 26–27 May 2026
Syzran refinery Samara Oblast Rosneft 9 800 18 April 2026, 21 May 2026, 12 July 2026
TANECO Tatarstan Tatneft 17.0(2024) 1150 12 June 2026, 8 July 2026, 7–8 July 2026
TAIF-NIK Tatarstan Sibur-RT 8.5 1150 7–8 July 2026
Antipinsky refinery Tyumen Oblast RI-Invest 6.0~9.0 2000+ 20 June 2026, 25 July 2026
Novokuibyshevsk refinery Samara Oblast Rosneft 5.74(2024) 900 20 September 2025, 19 October 2025, 2 June 2026
Ufimsky refinery Bashkortostan Bashneft 3.8(2024) 1400 3 March 2025, 11 October 2025, 25 June 2025, 1 July 2026.
Saratov oil refinery Saratov Oblast Rosneft 5.8(2024) 700 21 November 2025, 30 May 2026, 8 July 2026
Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Bashkortostan Gazprom 6.5~7.2 1300 9 May 2024, 18 September 2025, 24 September 2025, 13 July 2026, 8 October 2026
Ilsky refinery Krasnodar Krai INPZ 6.6 500 At least 16 times between May 2023 and 2 June 2026, 10 July 2026
Afipsky refinery Krasnodar Krai SAFMAR 6.25 200 10 February 2025, 7 August 2025, 29 November 2025, 14 March 2026, 11 June 2026, 14 July 2026
Kuibyshev refinery Samara Oblast Rosneft 4.7(2024) 850 9–10 June 2026
Slavyansk Refinery Krasnodar Krai Slavyansk ECO 5.2 350 17 December 2025, 24 June 2026, 28 June 2026
Novo-Ufimsky
refinery
Bashkortostan Bashneft – Novoil 3.8(2024) 1400 1–2 April 2026
Krasnodar refinery Krasnodar Krai SAFMAR 3.0 375 30 August 2025
Ukhta refinery Komi Republic Lukoil 3.0(2025) 1720 12 February 2026
NPS Samara, Prosvet Samara Oblast 950 21 April 2026, 2 October 2026, 7 October 2026

Oil terminals and other facilities

Facility Region Operator MTPA Ref Distance (km) Date of strike(s)
Sheskharis oil terminal
Grushova Balka oil depot
Port of Novorossiysk,
Krasnodar Krai
Transneft 19.8(2025) 340 Sheskharis: 17 May 2024, 2 March 2026, 6 April 2026, 23 May 2026
Grushovaya: 23 May 2026, 8 June 2026
Novorossiysk Fuel Oil Terminal (NOFT) NCSP & Gunvor
5.0
17 May 2024
Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka CPC marine terminal Caspian Pipeline Consortium
48.0
29 November 2025
Port of Primorsk Leningrad Oblast Transneft 60.0 1087 12 September 2025, 22–23 and 25 March 2026, 5 April 2026, 3 May 2026
Ust-Luga Multimodal Complex Leningrad Oblast Ust-Luga Oil JSC
Nevskaya: Gazprombank
& Transneft-Baltika
Novatek
32.9(2025)
9.0
875 21 January 2024, 24 August 2025 (Novatek),
22, 25, 27, 29, 31 March 2026, 6 July 2026
Petersburg Oil Terminal Leningrad Oblast Petersburg Oil Terminal JSC 12.5 1100 18 January 2024, 3 June 2026, 4 July 2026
Tikhoretsk oil pumping station Krasnodar Krai Transneft 45 300 12 March 2026
Port of Taman Krasnodar Krai OTEKO 20.0 (LPG) 247 13 June 2024, 13 May 2026, 13 June 2026
Vysotsk oil terminal Leningrad Oblast Lukoil 9.0(2025) 18 April 2026, 6 July 2026
Rostov-on-Don Yug Rusi terminal Rostov Oblast Yug Rusi group 3.5 200 10 October 2026
Port Kavkaz Krasnodar Krai Rosmorport 2.5 300 20–21 June 2026
Cherkassy LPDS Bashkortostan Transneft-Ural 2.0 1500 8 July 2026
Taganrog oil terminal Rostov Oblast Kurgannefteprodukt 1.2 170 10 July 2026
Tvernefteprodukt oil depot Tver Oblast Surgutneftegas (6,400 m3) 520 9 July 2026
Yugnefteprodukt oil depot Stavropol Krai Lukoil 0.15 (5,600 m3) 500 9 July 2026, 13 July 2026, 18 July 2026
Noginsk oil depot Moscow Oblast 18 July 2026

Impact

On 4 July 2026, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimated 42.74% of Russia's oil refining capacity had been disabled at that time, while the International Energy Agency (IEA) said "more than 20%" of capacity has been knocked offline. Finnish President Alexander Stubb stated in early July 2026 that Russia's capacity to produce and export oil had been reduced by 40% due to the Ukrainian mid- and long-range drone strikes. The Financial Times reported that Russia produced 4.1 million barrels of oil per day in June 2026 (28% below the 5-year average, and 35% below design capacity); the fuel shortage had so far affected 50 million people (35% of the Russian Federation's population); and by 9 July the majority of regions of Russia had local authorities or retailers imposing fuel sales restrictions.

Exiled Russian energy expert Mikhail Krutikhin [ru] concluded in mid-July 2026: "I think some of the oil capacity of Russia has been lost forever, because of the closure of the [oil] wells right now. Russia is not going to recover, even five years after the war." Around the same time, Radio Svoboda reported based on recent satellite imagery that Russia was withdrawing most of its remaining S-300 and S-400 air defence systems from the Arctic Far North (especially Novaya Zemlya and Severodvinsk in Arkhangelsk Oblast) in order to protect its oil refineries (such as the Saratov refinery, where air defence systems appeared to have been moved between May 2023 and August 2025) and Moscow to the southwest from Ukrainian drone strikes. The remaining stockpile of these types of air defence missiles was reportedly also diminishing due to being outproduced by Ukrainian drone manufacturing, as well as direct strikes on air defence launchers, although the remaining volume was unknown, and Ukrainian officials cautioned that Russia had some other systems left. More generally, OSINT analysts concluded that c. 60% of Russia's air defence systems had been moved from the locations they were stationed in before Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

According to Russian Forbes, 54% of all oil refineries had been damaged by August 2026. In July 2026, Russia's daily petrol output declined to 75,000~80,000 tonnes, even though domestic summer demand was 115,000~120,000 tonnes a day, meaning Russia had a daily oil refining capacity deficit of c. 35%.