Operation Doppelschlag

Operation Doppelschlag
Admiral Scheer, photographed in early 1942
TypeSortie
Location
Arctic Ocean
Planned1942
Planned byKriegsmarine
Commanded by
TargetConvoy PQ 18
OutcomeCancelled

Operation Doppelschlag (Operation Double Blow/Unternehmen Doppelschlag) was a German plan during the Second World War for a sortie in 1942 into the Arctic Ocean by the Kriegsmarine. The operation followed Unternehmen Rösselsprung, against Convoy PQ 17 in July 1942 to attack Convoy PQ 18 the next Arctic convoy by the Western Allies.

Background

Following the success of the operation against Convoy PQ 17 (27 June – 10 July 1942) the Kriegsmarine was keen to repeat the victory. A plan was made to bring a powerful force of cruisers and destroyers against the next PQ convoy, to destroy it.

The Admiralty wished to avoid running another convoy in the continuous daylight of the Arctic summer and deferred passage of Convoy PQ 18 and the reciprocal Convoy QP 14 until later in the year. The German forces spent over two months at readiness before the convoys sailed in early September 1942.

Plan

Russian map showing Arctic convoy routes from Britain and Iceland, past Norway to the Barents Sea and northern Russian ports

A patrol line of U-boats (wolfpack Eispalast (Ice Palace) was stationed in the Norwegian Sea to give early warning of a convoy. The ships of Unternehmen Doppelschlag would be waiting in readiness at their bases. Once the convoy was detected the ships would sail north to Altafjord and lie in wait. The risk of losing a capital ship in an engagement with the Allied fleet meant that only Hitler could give permission for the second stage, a sortie into the Barents Sea. Once out, the ships would divide into two battle groups to attack the convoy from different sides.

It was envisaged that the first group would engage and draw off any big ships with the convoy and the second group would attack the merchant ships while their escorts were distracted. It was this intended double blow that inspired the operational name. The ships intended to take part in the operation were the Admiral Scheer, Admiral Hipper, Köln and six destroyers. Other German capital ships in Norway, Tirpitz and Lützow were not available for the operation as both had been under repair since the end of Rosselsprung.

Prelude

On 17 July, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder was informed that Adolf Hitler was becoming even more reluctant to allow the big ships in Norway to be used against Arctic convoys. Pleased, as Hitler was, of the arrival of Köln at Trondheim, it was to be kept for defensive operations only, even though a defensive strategy would be difficult for the crews of the big ships.

Operation

Convoy PQ 18 sailed from Iceland on 7 September 1942. It was sighted on 8 September by a long-range reconnaissance aircraft and again on 10 September by an Eispalast U-boat. On 10 September, the ships involved in Doppelschlag departed Narvik to move north to Altenfjord. The German ships were sighted by British submarines and Tigris mounted an abortive attack. The ships arrived at Altenfjord early the following day. The Doppelschlag commanders, Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz in Scheer and Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax ashore, pressed for permission to begin the sortie but Hitler's insistence that no damage should befall the ships so restricted their freedom of action that Admiral Erich Raeder, the professional head of the Kriegsmarine, cancelled the operation. The attack on Convoy PQ 18 was left to the Luftwaffe and the U-boat arm.

Aftermath

Analysis

The German surface fleet had little effect on the passage of Convoy PQ 18, though its latent threat forced the commitment of many Allied vessels to Operation EV, the escort operation. The British thought that the failure of the German ships to attack the convoy was caused by their measures to defeat a sortie. In his report, Admiral Tovey wrote that the German ships remained at Altenfiord for several reasons. The strength of the fighting destroyer escort acted as a deterrent, as did the presence of British submarines off the Norwegian coast, German knowledge of Operation Orator, the Search and Strike Force of torpedo-bombers based at Vaenga, the continuous reconnaissance by RAF aircraft of the German anchorages and the awareness of the Home Fleet heading north-east on 12 September.

In 1977, the British historian Peter Smith wrote that the German decision not to commit the ships to an attack on Convoy PQ 18 had been taken weeks before the convoy sailed based on the German analysis of the operation against Convoy PQ 17. The Luftwaffe claimed the sinking of a cruiser, a destroyer, two escort ships and 22 merchant ships and the U-boats claimed 16 ships of 113,963 GRT and cut the Luftwaffe total to twenty ships and 131,000 GRT. Colonel-General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, the commander of Luftflotte 5, claimed that his aircraft has sunk 142,216 GRT of shipping but Convoy PQ 17 lost eight ships to air attack, nine to U-boats and seven to attacks by both. The Germans did not know that the convoy had been scattered against an attack by ships; the Luftwaffe thought that its attacks had caused the convoy to scatter and this mistaken impression affected later German plans.

Subsequent operations

The next opportunity for an attack by German surface ships came in December, when Unternehmen Regenbogen (Operation Rainbow), following a similar plan to Doppelschlag, was mounted against Convoy JW 51B, leading to the Battle of the Barents Sea.

German order of battle

Kriegsmarine

Ships in the Unternehmen Doppelschlag plan
NameFlagClassNotes
Ships
Admiral Scheer  Kriegsmarine Deutschland-class cruiser
Admiral Hipper  Kriegsmarine Admiral Hipper-class cruiser
Köln  Kriegsmarine Königsberg-class cruiser
Z4 Richard Beitzen  Kriegsmarine Type 1934-class destroyer
Z16 Friedrich Eckoldt  Kriegsmarine Type 1934A-class destroyer
Z23  Kriegsmarine Type 1936A-class destroyer
Z27  Kriegsmarine Type 1936A-class destroyer
Z29  Kriegsmarine Type 1936A-class destroyer
Z30  Kriegsmarine Type 1936A-class destroyer
Wolfpack gruppe Eispalast (Ice Palace)
U-88 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarineSunk by Faulknor
U-255 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-377 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-378 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-403 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-405 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-408 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarineSank Stalingrad
U-435 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-457 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarineDamaged Atheltemplar, sunk Impulsive
U-589 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarineSank Oliver Ellsworth, sunk by Onslow
U-592 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine
U-703 KriegsmarineType VIIC submarine

Luftwaffe

Luftflotte 5
UnitFlagTypeBaseNotes
Kampfgeschwader 30  Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 88 Banak Bomber
Kampfgeschwader 26  Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 88, Heinkel 111 Banak, Bardufoss Torpedo-bomber
I./Sturzkampfgeschwader 5  Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 87 Kirkenes Dive-bomber
Jagdgeschwader 5  Luftwaffe Messerschmitt Bf 109 Fighter
I./Kampfgeschwader 40  Luftwaffe Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Kondor Trondheim, Tromsø, Stavanger Long-range reconnaissance
1./Küstenfliegergruppe 406  Luftwaffe Heinkel He 115, BV 138 Tromsø/Søreisa Reconnaissance, torpedo-bomber
I./Küstenfliegergruppe 906  Luftwaffe Heinkel He 115, BV 138 Stavanger Reconnaissance, torpedo-bomber
1./Fernaufklärungsgruppe 22  Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 88 Banak, Bardufoss, Kirkenes Reconnaissance
1./Fernaufklärungsgruppe 124  Luftwaffe Junkers Ju 88 Banak, Bardufoss, Kirkenes Reconnaissance

Footnotes

  1. 1 2 Smith 1975, p. 126; Schofield 1964, p. 114; Kemp 1993, p. 102.
  2. ↑ Boyd 2024, pp. 338−339.
  3. ↑ Kemp 1993, pp. 102–103.
  4. ↑ Smith 1975, pp. 126–128.
  5. ↑ Schofield 1964, p. 118; Kemp 1993, p. 110.
  6. ↑ Smith 1977, p. 125.
  7. ↑ Smith 1977, pp. 125–126.
  8. ↑ Smith 1975, p. 128.
  9. ↑ Rohwer & Hümmelchen 2005, p. 195.
  10. ↑ Smith 1977, pp. 231–232; Blair 2000, pp. 20–21, 250, 268.
  11. ↑ Smith 1975, p. 50.
  12. 1 2 3 Blair 2000, p. 20.
  13. ↑ Smith 1975, pp. 150–151.
  14. ↑ Smith 1975, pp. 132–134.
  15. ↑ Smith 1977, p. 225.

Bibliography

Further reading